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In recent years, several European countries have adopted mandatory language and civic 
education requirements for immigrants. This dissertation examines why and to what effect this 
particular integration policy has spread across large parts of Europe. To do so, it is divided into 
three empirical chapters. The first chapter addresses the question why European countries have 
adopted mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants at different times 
and to different extents. To answer this question, I analyze country-level data on 25 EU member 
states between 2005 and 2014. I find that a country’s integration policy is strongly influenced by 
its past policy as well as the policies of the countries most successful at integrating their 
immigrant communities. In addition, I find that immigrants’ level of economic integration is 
positively related to the strictness of a country’s integration requirements; models with 
endogeneity correction suggest that the causal arrow runs exclusively from the latter to the 
former. 
The second empirical chapter evaluates whether mandatory language and civic education 
requirements for immigrants have been successful at achieving their intended goals. It uses data 
provided by the European Social Survey (2002-2015) to examine the effect of different 
integration policies in 15 EU member states on immigrants’ levels of social, political, and 
economic integration. I find that mandatory integration requirements have a strong and positive 
effect on immigrants’ level of economic integration, but no impact on their degree of social and 
political integration. In the final chapter, I posit that integration policies not only affect the 
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immigrants targeted by them but also have broader impacts on the host society. Specifically, I 
argue that public opinion toward immigrants is more favorable in countries with mandatory 
language and civic education requirements for immigrants than it is in countries without. 
Analyzing public opinion data in 15 EU member states provided by the European Social Survey 
(2002-2015) as well as evidence from two original survey experiments in the United Kingdom, I 
find support for my argument. Therefore, the results presented in this dissertation make a 
reasonable case for the adoption of stricter language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Policies designed to integrate immigrants1 into their host societies are high up on the political 
agenda in several European countries, and have been for years. For example, in October 2010, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel proclaimed that multiculturalism had “utterly failed” in 
Germany (Wright and Bloemraad 2012, 77), signaling a move away from Germany’s traditional 
approach to immigrant integration. Her remarks represented the culmination of months, if not 
years, of political and public debates about the failures of past German integration policies as 
well as the feasibility of alternative approaches (Hawley 2004). In April of 2016, France’s 
Minister for Families, Children, and Women’s Rights, Laurence Rossignol, caused public 
outrage when she compared Muslim women who choose to wear the veil to “American negroes 
who were for slavery” (Zerofsky 2016). Her comments came against the backdrop of months of 
                                                 
1 The most widely used definition of “immigrants” is that of the United Nations, which defines immigrants 
as “people living outside their country of birth for at least a year” (Castles et al. 2014, 7; see also Anderson and 
Blinder 2017). Simply put, immigrants are foreign-born individuals, regardless of their citizenship status. The caveat 
of “at least a year” is added to distinguish migration from short-term population movements such as tourism. Note 
that this definition does not exclude individuals based on their motive for migrating or the (il)legality of their 
presence. Some scholars use a broader definition of “immigrants” which includes the children and grandchildren of 
the original immigrants; these are generally referred to as second- and third-generation immigrants, respectively. 
While this broader definition is useful for certain research contexts, here I use the narrow definition of immigrants as 
foreign-born individuals. 
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intense discussions about French identity and the integration of Muslim immigrants. In the 
United Kingdom, the public reacted with shock and anger to the release of the “Casey Review” 
in December 2016, an official government report which detailed the dire state of immigrant 
integration in the country (Ashtana and Walker 2016; Taylor 2016). 
Despite the ubiquity of integration in current political discourse, there is still a great deal 
of confusion as to what the terms “immigrant integration” and “integration policy” actually mean 
(Favell 2001; Murphy 2016, 11-50; Spencer 2011). On a very general level, “integration” refers 
to the process of “adding single elements or partial structures to an existing structure and joining 
these to an interconnected ‘whole’” (Heckmann 2005, 8). The term is used to describe a variety 
of diverse phenomena, such as linking together different computing systems and software 
applications (Summers 2013) or forming close friendship ties with new members of a social 
group (Lakon and Valente 2012). In the context of migration, “integration” characterizes the 
process of immigrants adapting to their new host society. In other words, integration can be 
broadly defined as a series of actions that render immigrants close to or indistinguishable from 
natives in terms of behavior and values (Goodman and Wright 2015). Any such action 
undertaken by government institutions at the federal, state, or local level fall under the banner of 
“integration policy” (Murphy 2016; Penninx 2003). Differently put, integration policy can be 
defined as government efforts aimed at ensuring that immigrants become accepted and functional 
members of their new host society (Spencer 2011). 
This broad definition includes a multitude of different policies. For example, the Migrant 
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), one of the most widely used comparative measures of 
integration policy in migration research, currently lists 167 individual integration policies that 
fall into eight policy areas (MIPEX 2015). These policies represent a wide variety of laws and 
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government actions, such as providing job training to immigrants, giving them access to 
healthcare, and creating safeguards against discrimination in the workplace. While these 
measures technically all fall under the banner of “integration policies”, recent public, political, 
and scholarly debates on the subject have primarily focused on one particular class of integration 
policies, that is, mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants (Arribas 
Lozano et al. 2014; Goodman 2014; Mulcahy 2011; Sobolewska et al. 2017; Wiesbrock 2011). 
These requirements include integration courses, contracts, and tests with the goal of 
promoting “basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions” as well as 
“respect for the basic values of the EU” (Mulcahy 2011, 34). They are mandatory in the sense 
that migrants who refuse to participate in integration courses or repeatedly fail to pass certain 
tests, particularly language tests, can be fined/denied social benefits, refused citizenship, or 
otherwise sanctioned, thereby providing them with a strong incentive to acquire the host 
society’s language and otherwise integrate (Murphy 2006; Schrep 2013). Language acquisition is 
seen as being of primary importance, since it helps with achieving further steps in the integration 
process such as finding a job, navigating bureaucratic procedures, and connecting with members 
of the host society. Ultimately, then, the goal of these mandatory language and civic education 
requirements is to promote economic self-sufficiency and improvement among immigrants, and 
to render them close to natives in terms of their social and political attitudes and behavior 
(Goodman and Wright 2015). 
Despite the increasing visibility and importance of these requirements, scholars know 
relatively little about their causes as well as their consequences. This is mainly due to the fact 
that (a) mandatory language and civic integration requirements for immigrants are a relatively 
new phenomenon, and (b) previous research suffers from a number of methodological 
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shortcomings which hamper our ability to draw sound inferences. The overarching goal of this 
dissertation is to apply a more rigorous methodological approach to the study of immigrant 
integration policy in Europe, thereby providing more robust answers to the following set of 
interconnected questions: (1) What explains cross-national and temporal variation in immigrant 
integration policies? In other words, why did some European countries adopt mandatory 
language and civic education requirements later or to a lesser extent than others, and why did 
some countries refrain from adopting them altogether? (2) Do mandatory language and civic 
education requirements for immigrants actually work? Are they effective at achieving their 
intended purpose, that is, do they lead to improved integration outcomes? (3) Do integration 
policies have effects that go beyond the immigrants who are targeted by them? Do mandatory 
language and civic education requirements for immigrants have an impact on members of the 
host society, specifically their attitudes toward immigrants and immigration? 
The remainder of this introductory chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly describe 
the extent of migration into Europe over the past half century, and how this recent wave of 
immigration has fundamentally transformed European societies. I also outline the challenges that 
have arisen from this transformation, which illustrates the importance of immigrant integration in 
contemporary Europe. Second, I provide important background information on contemporary 
immigrant integration policy in Europe. Specifically, I explain how mandatory language and 
civic education requirements for immigrants work in practice, how they have proliferated over 
the past two decades, and how they are being promoted by the European Union (EU). Third, I 
provide a brief summary of my argument, and outline how this argument is developed 
throughout the course of this dissertation. 
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1.1 WHY IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION MATTERS 
Since the end of World War II, international migration patterns have changed significantly in 
both character and direction: “While for centuries Europeans have been moving outward through 
conquering, colonizing, and settling in lands elsewhere on the globe, these patterns were reversed 
in the second half of the twentieth century. Under the influence of decolonization, demographic 
change, rapid economic growth and the creation of the European Union as a free trade and 
migration zone, Europe has emerged as a major global migration destination” (Castles et al. 
2014, 102). Between 1945 and 1970, virtually all countries in Northern and Western Europe 
utilized some kind of guest worker program to recruit migrant workers. These programs brought 
millions of immigrants into Europe, mainly from North Africa and the Middle East but also from 
Asia and Latin America. Germany alone recruited 2.6 million migrant workers between 1956 
and 1973 (Castles et al. 2014, 107). These recruitment programs were based on the idea of 
“sectoral exclusion”, meaning that migrants were allowed to participate in some sectors of 
society, primarily the economic sector, but were barred or discouraged from participating in 
other sectors such as politics and cultural life. European governments hoped that sectoral 
exclusion would prevent migrants from becoming attached to their new host societies so that 
they would return to their home countries once their labor was no longer needed. 
 However, this hope turned out to be in vain. Despite the curbing of organized recruitment 
schemes for migrant workers due to economic stagnation in the mid-1970s, immigration into 
Europe continued at high rates. This new wave of immigrants consisted mainly of family 
members of migrant workers who had been previously recruited. By the late 1970s, family 
migration had become the most significant source of immigration for many European countries 
(Castles et al. 2014, 112-114). Migration movements steadied for a while in the mid-1990s but at 
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the beginning of the new millennium, immigration again increased sharply. Until 2008, Europe 
experienced renewed economic growth as economic globalization created new employment 
opportunities for migrants, especially for the highly skilled. Many governments introduced 
preferential entry rules for this category as well as student migrants (Castles et al. 2014, 116). 
Beginning in 2015, Europe experienced yet another spike in immigration, which was caused by 
unprecedented numbers of humanitarian migrants originating mainly from Syria and 
Afghanistan. In 2015 alone, a record number of over 1.2 million asylum seekers entered the 
European Union, a number more than double that of the previous year (Connor 2016). 
 The massive influx of immigrants into Europe over the past half century has 
fundamentally transformed many European societies. Today, foreign-born individuals make up 
more than 15% of the total population in several European countries, including Austria, Belgium, 
and Sweden.2 Countries that were once ethnically homogenous, such as Germany, had to adjust 
to now being home to a substantial ethnic minority population. Germany and other European 
countries, such as France, have had a difficult time grappling with the new reality of being 
“immigration countries”. These countries have had to reevaluate their national identities and, in 
some cases, fundamentally change their ideas about what it means to be German, French, etc. 
(Castles et al. 2014, 55-83; El-Menouar 2017; Hawley 2004; Danisman 2011). 
To be sure, immigration has been very beneficial for Europe, for multiple reasons. The 
most obvious reason are the economic benefits associated with immigration: Steady, moderate 
immigration has been shown to boost GDP per capita, increase average wages, and lower 
consumer prices (Collier 2013, 111-134). In addition, immigration has ameliorated some of the 
                                                 
2 For comparison, in the United States, which is often considered the immigration country, foreign-born 
individuals currently account for 14% of the total population. 
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demographic issues – low birth rates, ageing populations, etc. – which have recently put pressure 
on Europe’s social security systems. A recent estimate suggests that without migration, the EU-
27 population would decrease from 501 million to 414 million by 2061; keeping migration at its 
current level would likely lead to a population increase of 4 million during the same period 
(Castles et al. 2014, 123). Lastly, immigration has numerous social, cultural, and personal 
benefits for both immigrants and members of the host society that are difficult to quantify but 
nevertheless exist. For example, immigrants’ contributions to sports, sciences, and the arts have 
been well-documented for various European societies (European Migration Network 2006). 
At the same time, immigration has posed several challenges for Europe. For example, 
immigration is associated with increased unemployment among native-born Europeans with low 
education levels as well as increased housing costs. A recent estimate for Great Britain by the 
Office of Budgetary Responsibility suggests that housing costs have increased by 10% due to 
immigration (Collier 2013, 116). In addition, immigrants in Europe are more likely to be 
unemployed than native-born Europeans, and they receive more social assistance per capita. 
Moreover, foreign-born individuals commit crimes at higher rates than native-born Europeans. 
For example, in Germany immigrants account for 30% of all criminal suspects even though they 
only make up 15% of the population (Chazan 2017).3 Lastly, some European societies have 
                                                 
3 While crime statistics and incarceration rates are imperfect measures of actual crimes committed (not all 
crimes are solved, immigrants might receiver harsher sentences due to racism, etc.), they are widely used and 
generally accepted proxies in research on migration and crime (see Smith and Edmonston 1997; Bernat 2017). 
Migration scholars largely agree that immigrants in the United States are less likely to commit crimes than the 
native-born population while those in Europe are more likely to do so; possible reasons for this difference include 
cultural differences between immigrants in the U.S. and Europe, different incentive structures resulting from distinct 
social security systems, and immigrants in Europe being younger and predominantly male (e.g. Higgins 2015). 
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witnessed increased radicalization among their immigrant communities as well as rising numbers 
of terrorist attacks committed by some of their members (Rotella 2016). 
 Interestingly, the challenges that immigration poses for Europe are not experienced by all 
immigrant-receiving societies, at least not to the same extent. For example, immigrants in the 
United States are less likely to commit a crime, and have higher average levels of employment 
and education, than members of the host society (Bernal 2017; Luhby 2013). It is often said that 
this difference between Europe and the United States is due to the latter’s immigrant population 
being relatively well integrated (Jimenez 2011; Porter 2015). Conversely, Europe has failed to 
integrate significant parts of its immigrant communities, with some observers going so far as to 
refer to this issue as an “integration crisis” (Caponio and Cappiali 2016). This suggests that the 
extent to which immigration poses challenges for a host society is partly a function of how well 
immigrants are being integrated. In other words, successful integration, which can be facilitated 
through sound integration policy, allows a country to reap the benefits of immigration while 
simultaneously avoiding many of its drawbacks. Therefore, immigrant integration policy can be 
vital to the well-being of a country’s population, including the host population as well as the 
immigrants themselves. In the following section, I provide a brief historical overview of 
immigrant integration policy in Europe. 
1.2 IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY IN EUROPE 
As pointed out in the previous section, Europe has been a popular destination for immigrants 
since the end of World War II. For about 50 years, there was little coordination among European 
countries in how to deal with the massive influx of migrants (Mouritsen 2008). Distinct national 
 9 
models of integration policy were developed, many of them rooted in multiculturalist ideals and 
practices.4 Beginning in the late 1990s, however, an increasing number of policymakers across 
Europe became dissatisfied with the national policies that were set up to accommodate 
immigrants (Goodman 2012a; Koopmans et al. 2012). Tensions between immigrants and 
members of the host society had arisen in a number of European countries, and a significant part 
of the immigrant community was plagued by increasing unemployment, criminal activity, and 
radicalization (Adida et al. 2014; Koopmans 2010). These problems were in part attributed to the 
lack of a coherent and effective integration regime in Europe. 
 Several national investigations were launched, many of which arrived at devastating 
results (Joppke 2007a). For example, a 2004 parliamentary inquiry in France came to the 
conclusion that the country’s integration policy was “badly defined in its objectives and 
principles, incoherent, contradictory and insufficient” (Joppke 2007b, 1). As a result, the 
European Commission developed The Hague Programme, which was formally adopted by the 
European Council on November 4/5, 2004. The Hague Programme represents a revolutionary 
legal document in the sense that for the first time, an official body of the European Union had 
identified insufficient immigrant integration as one of the most pressing challenges facing the 
                                                 
4 Note that there is no single, universally agreed upon definition of “multiculturalism”. Here, I use the term 
in the sense of “laissez-faire multiculturalism” as a distinct approach to integration policy (Koopmans 2010; 
Goodman and Wright 2015). More specifically, the term “multiculturalism” describes policies which “grant 
immigrants easy access to equal rights and do not provide strong incentives for host-country language acquisition 
and interethnic contacts”, based on the belief that immigrants will integrate better the more they can retain and 
develop their own cultural identities and practices (Koopmans 2010, 1; see also Koopmans 2013). This definition is 
different from other common conceptions and measures of multiculturalism (see, for example, Banting and 
Kymlicka 2006; Kymlicka 2012; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). 
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EU (Collett 2014; Van Wolleghem 2017). To address this challenge, The Hague Programme 
identifies a set of common basic principles (CBPs), i.e. concrete measures aimed at providing 
guidance for the restructuring of EU members’ national integration policy regimes. These 
measures include mandatory integration courses, contracts, and tests with the goal of promoting 
“basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions” as well as “respect for 
the basic values of the EU” (Mulcahy 2011, 34). 
 The CBPs are non-binding policy recommendations, meaning that EU member states are 
not required to implement the integration measures outlined in the CBPs, and will not be 
formally sanctioned if they refuse to do so. However, the EU does actively try to facilitate the 
implementation of the CBPs in its member states, primarily through the European Integration 
Forum (EIF). The EIF is a dialogue platform with the official aim of encouraging civil society 
participation, in the interests of it having a role in the deﬁnition, evaluation, and implementation 
of EU integration policies. The meetings of the EIF are mainly centered around the exchange of 
information and “best practices” as well as the organization of working groups to tackle specific 
aspects of integration and more technical questions (Arribas Lozano et al. 2014). The EIF also 
produces reports, whether under its own initiative or at the request of other EU institutions, in 
both cases with a consultative role. However, while the stated goal of the EIF is to encourage 
civil society participation and the exchange of information, the underlying intention is quite 
clearly to channel the debate within the limits deﬁned by the EU’s political agenda, and to 
promote the integration measures outlined in the CBPs. In fact, the official mandate of the EIF 
explicitly states that the “Common Basic Principles on Integration will be the guide for the 
Forum’s activities” (Arribas Lozano et al. 2014, 563). 
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 The EIF does not only help EU member states implement the CBPs by providing 
expertise and facilitating the exchange of best practices, but also through the provision of funds. 
As Van Wolleghem explains, “the EIF operates on the principle of co-ﬁnancing and 
programming: the [m]ember [s]tate ﬁnancially commits to objectives announced in a multiannual 
[program], which is in turn further broken down into annual [programs]; this commitment is then 
supplemented by the EU fund. But, unlike most EU funds that provide a sound partnership 
principle […], the EIF places governments at the [center] of its implementation. There is a 
programming phase in coordination with the Commission, but the deﬁnition of the substantive 
content of the [programs] remains largely dominated by the state […]. There is a partnership 
principle here too but it is very weak since governments may or may not open the programming 
phase to other actors […]. Unlike other funds, no principle of additionality is provided for. The 
entire process therefore remains in the hands of governments, which have the option to neglect 
the fund’s purposes and pursue their own” (2017, 4). Since its inception, the EIF has provided 
member states with almost 1 billion Euros in funding. 
 Prior to 2004, only a few EU member states – Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands – 
had significant integration requirements for immigrants in place. In the years following the 
adoption of The Hague Programme, several Western European countries, including France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom, began to implement stricter language and 
civic education requirements for immigrants. By 2015, a majority of Western European countries 
had adopted thorough language and civic education requirements for immigrants (Goodman 
2014; Joppke 2007a). At the same time, several EU member states have resisted this trend 
toward stricter integration policies. In fact, there are a handful of European countries, most 
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notably Ireland, Portugal, and Sweden, which do not require immigrants to participate in any 
kind of integration course or test (Devitt 2014; Peixoto 2014; Wiesbrock 2011). 
 It should be noted that the European countries which adopted mandatory language and 
civic education requirements have done so to different degrees. In other words, integration 
requirements come in gradations: some countries have stricter requirements than others, while 
yet others have no requirements at all. One dimension on which such a gradation occurs is the 
intensity of the language and civic education classes as well as the level of difficulty of the tests. 
For example, to obtain long-term residence in Greece, third-country nationals are required to 
take 175 hours of Greek language classes, while in Germany the requirement is 600 hours 
(Goodman 2009). Accordingly, the required language level to pass also differs; it is A25 in 
Greece and B1 in Germany (Goodman 2014). Similarly, to acquire Austrian citizenship, 
immigrants must complete 75 hours of civic education classes and pass an accompanying exam, 
while Luxembourg requires participation in civic education classes but no test (Goodman 2014). 
 Another dimension on which the intensity of mandatory integration requirements for 
immigrants varies across countries is the number of stages in the migration process during which 
these requirements occur. For example, Denmark requires language certification for entry, 
permanent residence, and naturalization, Greece for permanent residence and naturalization, and 
                                                 
5 The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) is a guideline used to describe 
achievements of learners of foreign languages. Developed by the Council of Europe with the goal of standardizing 
the learning, teaching, and assessing of foreign language skills across Europe, the CEFR describes foreign language 
proficiency at six levels: A1 (beginner), A2 (elementary), B1 (intermediate), B2 (upper intermediate), C1 
(advanced), and C2 (proficient). For a more detailed description of the CEFR and its categories, see Council of 
Europe (2018). 
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Spain only for naturalization (Goodman 2014). Countries also differ regarding whether and to 
what extent immigrants have to pay for these language and civic education classes. In 
Luxembourg, for example, mandatory language courses for naturalization are free of charge, 
while in the Netherlands only 70% of the total costs (~ 4,000 Euros) are covered (Goodman 
2009). A last dimension of gradation is the severity of the punishment should immigrants refuse 
to participate in mandatory language and/or civic education classes. In Germany, for example, 
refusal to participate in language classes can result in having one’s benefits cut by up to 30%; for 
welfare recipients, a 30% deduction amounts to approximately 100 Euros per month (Schrep 
2013). In addition, such a refusal can negatively affect an immigrant’s application for long-term 
residence. In Belgium, immigrants who refuse to participate in mandatory language classes can 
be fined, but their residence and citizenship applications remain unaffected (Goodman 2009). 
 To further illustrate how this particular integration policy works, it might be helpful to 
compare two countries with vastly different language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants, Germany and Sweden. In 2004, the German legislature passed the Immigration Act 
(Zuwanderungsgesetz), which was amended in 2007. The Immigration Act fundamentally 
transformed several aspects of Germany’s immigration policies, including its immigrant 
integration policy (Bendel 2014; Klusmeyer and Papademitriou 2009). Germany now requires 
third-country nationals to provide proof of basic German language skills (A1-level) in order to 
enter the country.6 To obtain permanent residency, third-country nationals are required to pass a 
language test (B1-level) as well as a civic test. If they are unable to pass these tests, they are 
required to participate in language and/or civic education classes (Goodman 2014, 50). These 
                                                 
6 Certain categories of immigrants, such as humanitarian migrants and foreign military personnel stationed 
in Germany, are exempt from this rule (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2014). 
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courses are carried out by private organizations which have to be certified and are monitored by 
the federal government. If immigrants refuse to participate in the language courses or repeatedly 
fail the test, they not only run the risk of having their request for residency denied but also incur 
cuts to their social benefits (Schrep 2013). To obtain citizenship, third-country nationals are 
required to take an additional civic test, participate in an interview with a government official, 
and take a ceremonial oath during which they pledge allegiance to the Federal Republic of 
Germany and its values. 
 The Swedish approach to immigrant integration differs quite markedly from that of 
Germany. At no point during the immigration process (entry, residence, citizenship) are 
immigrants required to take a language or civic test (Goodman 2014, 51). All that immigrants 
have to do to become a permanent resident of Sweden is to have lived there for five years, 
provide proof that they have the financial means to support their family, and file the proper 
paperwork. Language and civic education classes are available to immigrants, but participation is 
entirely voluntary; immigrants are in no way sanctioned if they refuse to participate (Wiesbrock 
2011). In addition, unlike in Germany, integration courses in Sweden are free of charge.7 One 
last difference is that all immigrants who have entered the country legally have access to social 
benefits and public services, regardless of whether they participate in integration requirements 
(Borevi 2014). 
 
                                                 
7 While integration courses in Germany are generally not free of charge, immigrants can have these charges 
waived if they can claim financial hardship. 
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1.3 PLAN FOR THIS DISSERTATION 
Why do countries like Germany and Sweden have such fundamentally different integration 
requirements for immigrants? And what are the effects of these policies, both on the immigrants 
targeted by them as well as society at large? Since mandatory language and civic education 
requirements for immigrants are a somewhat new phenomenon, the literature aimed at explaining 
their origins and effects is relatively sparse, and as such suffers from a number of methodological 
shortcomings. As a result, we know surprisingly little about the causes of different integration 
policies as well as their consequences (Goodman 2015). The overarching goal of this dissertation 
is to use novel perspectives, data, and methods in order to provide more robust and nuanced 
answers about the origins and effects of mandatory integration requirements than previous 
studies. 
To do so, the remainder of this dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first of these 
chapters, Chapter 2, provides an overview of previous research on immigrant integration 
policies, with a particular focus on mandatory language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants. More specifically, this literature review is divided into five sections. The first 
section provides a general overview of the current state of research on integration policy, that is, 
it describes the data used by quantitative migration scholars as well as the methodological 
conventions and limitations of the field. In Section 2.2, I review the recent literature on the 
determinants of immigrant integration policy. Among other things, this review finds that a 
significant part of the previous literature has focused on public opinion and prior levels of 
integration as predictors of integration policy, though methodological limitations have kept these 
studies from convincingly establishing a systematic effect of these covariates. 
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Section 2.3 provides on overview of the research on the effects of mandatory language 
and civic education requirements for immigrants on integration outcomes. It illustrates that 
scholars are far from a consensus regarding the effects of these policies, which is in part due to 
methodological issues with this research. In the fourth section, I review the research on other 
effects of mandatory integration requirements, that is, their impact on individuals other than the 
immigrants who are specifically targeted by them. I find that almost no such studies exist, which 
is an unfortunate omission given that there are good reasons to suspect that integration policy 
also has broader effects on society at large, particularly on the attitudes of native-born 
individuals toward immigrants. Lastly, based on the extensive body of research reviewed 
throughout Chapter 2, Section 2.5 lays out the overarching framework of this dissertation which 
ties together the various empirical chapters. 
In a nutshell, this framework posits that there is a complex interplay between integration 
policy, immigrants’ level of integration (i.e. integration outcomes), and public attitudes toward 
immigrants. A condensed version of this central argument is outlined in Figure 1. I argue that 
whether and to what extent a country adopts mandatory language and civic education 
requirements for immigrants depends, among other factors, on its public opinion on immigration 
(see arrow a in Figure 1) as well as its immigrant community’s prior level of integration (see 
arrow b). As for the former, I expect that governments’ propensity to introduce or tighten 
existing integration requirements for immigrants increases as their voters show greater concern 
about immigrant integration. As for the latter, it seems reasonable to expect that a country with a 
poorly integrated immigrant community will be more likely to adopt stricter language and civic 
education requirements for immigrants than one in which the majority of immigrants is well-
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integrated, since there is a greater incentive to change a poorly performing approach to 
immigrant integration than a successful one. 
These relationships, as well as other potential determinants of mandatory integration 
requirements for immigrants, are explored in greater detail in Chapter 3. Using country-level 
data on a sample of 15 Western European countries between 2005 and 2014 as well as a sample 
of 25 EU member states between 2007 and 2014, I find that public opinion is not a reliable 
predictor of a country’s integration requirements for immigrants. Prior levels of integration, 
measured as unemployment among immigrants, are negatively and significantly associated with 
integration policy. However, this effect appears to be driven by reverse causality: stricter 
integration requirements cause lower unemployment among immigrants, not the other way 
around. Once this reverse causality is accounted for, prior levels of integration have no 
significant effect on the intensity of a country’s language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants. 
 
Figure 1. Outline of Argument 
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 Once mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants have been 
adopted, they presumably increase immigrants’ level of integration; after all, that is their 
intended purpose. Chapter 4 evaluates the effect of these integration requirements on three 
different dimensions of immigrant integration: social, political, and economic (see arrow c in 
Figure 1). Analyzing immigrants’ responses to the European Social Survey (2002-2015) in 15 
EU member states, I find that mandatory integration requirements have a strong and positive 
effect on immigrants’ level of economic integration, measured as unemployment and subjective 
financial well-being, but no impact on their degree of social and political integration. 
Supplemental data, which include 23 original, open-ended interviews with practitioners of and 
experts on integration courses in Germany, suggest that the positive relationship between 
mandatory integration requirements and immigrants’ level of economic integration is indicative 
of a true treatment effect rather than selection processes. Therefore, this chapter suggests a 
differential impact of integration policy across different dimensions of immigrant integration, but 
overall supports the notion that mandatory integration requirements produce better integration 
results than laissez-faire integration policies. 
 Furthermore, I posit that integration policies not only affect the immigrants targeted by 
them but also have effects on society at large. Specifically, I argue that mandatory language and 
civic education requirements for immigrants can improve public attitudes toward immigrants. 
They do so indirectly and directly. The indirect effect (see arrow e in Figure 1) is perhaps more 
obvious, with mandatory language and civic integration requirements for immigrants increasing 
immigrants’ level of integration; a more well-integrated immigrant community, in turn, improves 
public perceptions of immigrants. In addition, I argue that there is also a direct effect (see arrow 
d in Figure 1) in the sense that the mere presence of mandatory integration requirements leads to 
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more positive public attitudes toward immigrants, regardless of these policies’ effect on 
integration outcomes. This direct effect operates through two mechanisms. First, members of the 
host society presume that language and civic education requirements help immigrants acquire the 
host country’s language and adopt its values, which reduces cultural distance and makes 
immigrants appear less threatening. Second, mandatory integration requirements are a way for 
governments to signal the extent of immigrants’ obligations and responsibilities, and thereby 
mitigate concerns about fairness and deservingness among native-born individuals. 
This argument is laid out in greater detail in Chapter 5, and tested against two different 
sets of evidence: public opinion data in 15 EU member states provided by the European Social 
Survey (2002-2015) and two original survey experiments conducted in the United Kingdom in 
2017. Across both sets of evidence, I find that mandatory language and civic education 
requirements have a direct and positive effect on public attitudes toward immigrants. In addition, 
I find support for the first mechanism described above, that is, mandatory integration 
requirements reduce perceptions of cultural threat among members of the host society. The 
second mechanism, however, is not borne out by the evidence. In addition, I do not find evidence 
for the presence of an indirect effect of language and civic education requirements on attitudes 
toward immigrants, primarily because integration deficits do not significantly affect public 
opinion. Rather than being impacted by objective immigration conditions, i.e. the level of 
integration of the immigrant community, public attitudes toward immigrants appear to be 
primarily a function of integration policy, macroeconomic conditions (especially national 
unemployment rates), immigrants’ race/religion and access to the welfare state, and individual 
characteristics of the host society member. Chapter 6 provides a more detailed summary of this 
dissertation and discusses ways forward in the study of integration policy. 
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW AND CENTRAL ARGUMENT 
2.1 A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF INTEGRATION RESEARCH 
In this section, I provide an overview of the scholarship on mandatory language and civic 
education requirements for immigrants and, to a lesser extent, integration policy in general. To 
be sure, this overview is not intended to be a substantive literature review in the sense that I 
identify the causes and effects of mandatory integration requirements found by previous 
research; that comes later in this chapter. Rather, the purpose of this section is to review how 
previous research has approached the study of integration policy methodologically. This is a 
useful exercise because it situates my dissertation within the broader literature and familiarizes 
the reader with the methodological conventions in the field of integration research. It also serves 
to outline some of the general issues with and limitations of previous scholarship as well as the 
data currently available to researchers in this field. 
 Broadly speaking, scholarship on mandatory language and civic education requirements 
for immigrants has mainly approached the subject in two ways: case study research and 
quantitative analysis. Here, I want to focus primarily on the latter, though some of the issues I 
identify in this section also pertain to the former. The field of integration research has witnessed 
some exciting developments over the past two decades, one of them being the development of 
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several comparative indices aimed at measuring various integration policies.8 Mandatory 
language and civic education requirements for immigrants are no exception here, as there are 
currently six comparative indices available for this particular class of integration policies. Below, 
I describe three of these indices in greater detail.9 
 First, there is the Civic Integration Policy Index (CIVIX) developed by Goodman (2010; 
2012b; 2014, 37-64; 2015), which captures the extent to which countries demand acculturation 
programs for immigrants, that is, language training and civic education. More specifically, 
CIVIX looks at integration requirements across the three different stages of the immigration 
process (entry, settlement, and citizenship) and assigns points according to the stringency of the 
requirements at each stage. The composite index ranges from 0 to 9, with higher values 
representing stricter integration requirements. To briefly summarize the coding rules of CIVIX: 
“first, obligatory civic requirements at entry, settlement, and citizenship receive one point per 
criterion. […] Second, there are compounding and ameliorating factors that can make a 
requirement more or less arduous, respectively; quarter-point weights are added for increasing 
levels of language assessment or if a significant financial cost is incurred by the individual while 
deductions are factored in where, for example, a course is recommended but not required or 
                                                 
8 For helpful overviews of these indices see Gest et al. (2014); Goodman (2015); and Helbling and 
Michalowski (2017). 
9 The other three indices – the Nationalist Immigration and Integration Policy (NIIP) Index, the Citizenship 
Policy Index (CPI), and the International Migration Policy and Law Analysis (IMPALA) Database – are omitted 
from this section due to the fact that they are not publicly available. In addition, the former two suffer from a very 
limited data coverage, which makes them less useful for the purpose of this dissertation. For more information on 
these indices, see Akkerman (2012), Howard (2010), and Beine et al. (2016), respectively. 
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completion of a requirement for permanent residence ‘double counts’ for citizenship” (Goodman 
and Wright 2015, 1892). 
 
Table 1. CIVIX Scores for EU-15 Countries, 1997-2013 
Country 1997 2004 2009 2013 
Austria 1 3 4 5.5 
Belgium 1 1 1 1.25 
Denmark 1 4 8.75 8.25 
Finland 1 1.5 2.5 2.5 
France 1 2 4 5 
Germany 2 2.5 7 7 
Great Britain 2 2.5 5 5.5 
Greece 2 2 5.25 5.25 
Ireland 1 1 1 1 
Italy 1 1 1 4.25 
Luxembourg 1 1 2.5 2.5 
Netherlands 1 3.25 5.75 6.25 
Portugal 1 1 1.25 1.25 
Spain 2 2 2.5 2.5 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 
Average 1.20 1.85 3.43 3.87 
Sources: Goodman (2014); Goodman and Wright (2015) 
 
CIVIX data are currently available for the “EU-15” countries10 at four different points in 
time (1997, 2004, 2009, and 2013), for a total of 60 observations. Table 1 illustrates the CIVIX 
scores for all available countries and years. The information shown in the table reinforces several 
of the points I made in the previous section. First, in 1997, mandatory language and civic 
education requirements were virtually non-existent in Europe. Second, by 2004, only three 
countries – Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands – had implemented meaningful reforms 
                                                 
10 The EU-15 countries include: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great 
Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. 
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toward stricter language and civic education requirements for immigrants.11 Third, by 2009, a 
majority of the EU-15 countries had adopted robust language and civic education requirements 
for immigrants, and this trend continued further in 2013. Fourth, several European states – most 
notably Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, and Sweden – have resisted the trend toward stricter 
integration policies. 
 A second comparative index on mandatory language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants is the aforementioned Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). MIPEX provides 
annual data on 38 developed countries in Europe, North America, and East Asia between 2007 
and 2014. These data include information on 167 individual integration policies that fall into 
eight broader policy areas: access to nationality, anti-discrimination, education, family reunion, 
health, labor market mobility, permanent residence, and political participation (MIPEX 2015). 
Each of these 167 variables is coded on a scale from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the “most 
inclusive” integration policy possible. More specifically, “MIPEX assigns scores to policy based 
on whether or not it is in compliance with its normative framework of best practices to ‘promote 
societal integration in practice’, which in turn depends on whether or not requirements ‘facilitate 
or hinder participation’ and the ‘extent to which all residents are legally entitled to equal rights 
and responsibilities’” (Goodman 2012b, 176). MIPEX then takes the mean of the individual 
policies to create an average score for each of the eight policy areas, as well as an overall 
integration policy score for each country. 
                                                 
11 Goodman herself suggests that a value of 2.5 constitutes the cut-off point between low and high CIVIX 
scores (see Goodman and Wright 2015). In other words, CIVIX scores of 2.5 and below represent “weak” or “lax” 
integration requirements, while those above 2.5 signify “robust” or “thorough” policies. 
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 Out of the 167 individual integration policies included in MIPEX, five capture the extent 
of a country’s language and civic integration requirements for immigrants at a given point in 
time: “pre-entry integration requirements” (variable 28), “post-entry integration requirements” 
(variable 29), “language requirements for long-term residence” (variable 84), “naturalization 
language requirements” (variable 104), and “naturalization integration requirements” (variable 
105). Given the coding scheme of MIPEX, a value of 100 on these five variables represents the 
complete absence of mandatory requirements, whereas a value of 0 signifies the most stringent 
integration requirements possible (Goodman 2012b). For illustrative and analytical purposes, I 
take the inverse mean of these five variables so that the resulting variable ranges from 0 to 100, 
with higher values representing more stringent language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants.12 Throughout the remainder of this dissertation, I will refer to this index variable as 
the “MIPEX Integration Requirements Scale”, or MIPEX-IRS for short. 
                                                 
12 The index constructed by combining the five individual MIPEX variables and CIVIX have a correlation 
of .79, which speaks to the validity of this index. The alpha value for the index is .74 and its average interitem 
correlation is .36; both figures are within the respective range of values recommended by the literature on scale 
construction (DeVellis 2003, 94-96; Netemeyer et al. 2003, 57-59). 
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Table 2. MIPEX-IRS Scores for EU-25 Countries, 2007-2014 
Country 2007 2014 
Austria 40.8 54.2 
Belgium 0 24.6 
Denmark 48.6 38 
Finland 10 10 
France 53.4 58 
Germany 42.4 38 
Greece 50.6 44.6 
Ireland 0 0 
Italy 32 45 
Luxembourg 10 10 
Netherlands 64.2 78.2 
Portugal 11.2 13.2 
Spain 32 32 
Sweden 0 0 
United Kingdom 26.6 73 
EU-15 Average 28.12 34.59 
Cyprus 16 31.8 
Czech Republic 16 28.8 
Estonia 23.2 17.2 
Hungary 24 28 
Latvia 28.6 28.6 
Lithuania 45.8 45.8 
Malta 24.6 37.4 
Poland 16 14 
Slovak Republic 47.8 47.8 
Slovenia 6 6 
EU-N10 Average 24.80 28.54 
EU-25 Average 26.79 32.17 
Source: Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) 
 
 Table 2 illustrates the MIPEX-IRS scores for the EU-25 countries13 at two points in time, 
2007 and 2014. The information shown in the table leads to several important conclusions. First, 
much like the CIVIX scores, the MIPEX-IRS scores suggest that language and civic education 
                                                 
13 The EU-25 countries include the EU-15 plus the ten countries which joined the EU in 2004, which are 
sometimes referred to as the “EU-N10”. The EU-N10 are: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. 
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requirements for immigrants in the EU-15 countries have become stricter over time. In 2014, the 
average MIPEX-IRS score for the EU-15 was 34.59, which is almost six and a half points higher 
than the average score in 2007. Second, the EU-N10 countries have also tightened their language 
and civic education requirements for immigrants between 2007 and 2014, though to a somewhat 
lesser extent than the EU-15. Third, while the CIVIX and MIPEX-IRS scores are generally 
consistent (as pointed out above, they are correlated at .79), there are some significant 
discrepancies between the two indices. For example, CIVIX suggests that among the EU-15 
countries, Denmark currently has by far the strictest integration requirements. According to the 
MIPEX-IRS scores, however, Denmark’s language and civic education requirements are only 
slightly tougher than the average, with the Netherlands and Great Britain ranking highest. 
 The third comparative index on mandatory language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants examined here is the Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) Index 
by Koopmans et al. (2012; see also Koopmans and Michalowski 2017). The ICRI Index provides 
data on 44 countries at four points in time (1980, 1990, 2002, 2008), though only a subset of the 
data is publicly available. The ICRI Index “ranks countries on the degree to which [certain 
rights] are granted to immigrant groups in order to determine both the inclusiveness of a 
country’s understanding of citizenship and the degree to which countries give official recognition 
to specific groups” (Dancygier and Laitin 2014, 55). More specifically, these data include 
information on 41 individual indicators which fall into eight types of migrant rights: nationality 
acquisition, expulsion, marriage migration, access to public service employment, anti-
discrimination, political rights, educational rights, and other cultural/religious rights (Koopmans 
et al. 2012). Each of the 41 indicators is coded on a scale from -1 to 1, with higher values 
representing more inclusive integration policies (i.e. easier access to rights). The ICRI Index then 
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takes the mean of the individual indicators to create an average score for each of the eight types 
of rights, as well as an overall inclusiveness score for each country. 
 
Table 3. ICRI-IRS Scores for Eight EU Member States, 1980-2008 
Country 1980 1990 2002 2008 
Austria -.83 -.83 -.67 .33 
Belgium -.33 -.33 -1 -.33 
Denmark -.83 -.83 .67 .83 
France -.33 -.33 -.33 .67 
Germany .33 .33 -.33 .5 
Great Britain -.83 -.67 -.5 .17 
Netherlands -.33 -.83 -.83 .5 
Sweden -1 -1 -1 -1 
Average -.52 -.56 -.50 .21 
Source: Koopmans et al. (2012) 
 
 Out of the 41 individual indicators included in the ICRI Index, three capture the extent of 
a country’s language and civic integration requirements for immigrants at a given point in time: 
“cultural requirements for naturalization” (indicator 1.5), “cultural requirements for family 
reunification” (indicator 3.4), and “cultural requirements for granting of residence permit” 
(indicator 8.1). As with MIPEX, I take the inverse mean of these variables so that the resulting 
variable ranges from -1 to 1, with higher values representing more stringent language and civic 
education requirements for immigrants.14 I refer to this index variable as the “ICRI Integration 
Requirements Scale”, or IRCI-IRS for short. Table 3 illustrates the ICRI-IRS scores for all EU 
                                                 
14 The correlation between ICRI-IRS and CIVIX is .85, and the correlation between ICRI-IRS and MIPEX-
IRS is .83. The alpha value for the composite index is .64 and its average interitem correlation is .37. This alpha 
value is slightly below the recommended minimum of .70, but since the average interitem correlation is within the 
recommended range and the index correlates well with conceptually similar measures, I still consider this index to 
be sufficiently valid (DeVellis 2003, 94-96; Netemeyer et al. 2003, 57-59). 
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member states for which data are publicly available in all four years. The information shown in 
the table suggests that before 2002, language and civic education requirements for immigrants 
were a rarity. Since 2002, however, there has been a strong trend toward more thorough 
integration requirements. 
 The development of these indices has greatly advanced the field of integration research, 
as they “allow researchers to examine more cases (both across space and time) and, thus, 
generate more generalizable inferences through rigorous hypothesis testing (more than even the 
most adroit qualitative research could manage)” (Goodman 2015, 1906). However, a major issue 
with these indices is their limited comparability. In a recent methodological piece, Goodman 
(2015) replicated several quantitative analyses of immigrant integration policy. She found that 
despite the relatively high correlation among the indices, the main results of most analyses do not 
hold when a different index is used. Goodman (2015) further points out that these divergent 
results are due to two factors, that is, measurement issues and sample selection (i.e. each index 
covers different countries and time periods). Another limitation of existing indices is that while 
they span relatively long time periods, they measure policies only at a limited number of time 
points. For example, ICRI measures immigrant rights at four points in time: 1980, 1990, 2002, 
and 2008. Not only does this lead to a small number of observations,15 it also makes it 
impossible to locate the exact point in time during which the change in policy occurred. Locating 
the exact point in time, however, is necessary to convincingly match the change in policy with 
potential explanatory variables. 
 Aside from the limited data coverage and comparability of existing indices, there is one 
additional methodological issue in integration research that I wish to elaborate on here. 
                                                 
15 For example, the number of observations in Koopmans et al.’s (2012) main models is 30. 
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Quantitative research on the determinants of integration policy lacks a “standard model”, 
meaning there is no generally agreed upon set of predictors and measures for said predictors. 
Examples for such standard models are the “gravity model” in research on bilateral trade (Burger 
et al. 2009) and the “standard repression model” in the literature on human rights violations 
(Haschke 2014). Standard models are vital for progress in a particular research area, as they 
allow for comparisons of results across studies, thereby making it possible to develop more 
refined theories and, eventually, a generally agreed upon body of knowledge. Even worse, there 
is no clear consensus as to which factors should be considered “outcomes” (i.e. measures of 
successful integration) and which should be treated as determinants of integration (i.e. factors 
which make successful integration more or less likely). For example, some view immigrants’ 
level of education as an integration outcome (Eurostat 2017a), while others treat it as an 
independent variable (Banting and Soroka 2012; Burgoon 2014; De Vroome et al. 2014; Ersanilli 
and Koopmans 2011; Ten Teije et al. 2013). Similarly, citizenship (nationality acquisition) is 
sometimes used as an outcome variable, other times as a driver of integration (Eurostat 2017a; 
Hainmueller et al. 2017). 
 How are we to address these issues in integration research? Most importantly, given the 
limited comparability and limitations of existing indices on integration requirements, which of 
them should be used to measure mandatory language and civic integration requirements for 
immigrants? Integration researchers have debated whether CIVIX or MIPEX data are more 
useful in this context (Goodman 2012b; Michalowski and van Oers 2012). I am inclined to agree 
with Goodman, who argues that CIVIX is a more valid measure of the intensity of a country’s 
language and civic education requirements for immigrants than MIPEX: “MIPEX scores produce 
a sense of whether states provide more or less of an opportunity for immigrants to achieve full 
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inclusion, where integration requirements are one facet among many. CIVIX scores produce a 
sense of which states have more or fewer civic integration requirements” (2012b, 178).16 
Therefore, throughout this dissertation, I will use CIVIX as the primary measure of mandatory 
language and civic integration requirements for immigrants, and MIPEX-IRS as a secondary 
measure/robustness check. I elect to not utilize ICRI-IRS due to the relatively limited coverage 
of the data subset that is publicly available. 
Regarding the issue of CIVIX only covering four distinct points in time, I impute the 
years for which no CIVIX scores are provided with the CIVIX value for the closest year in 
which data are available. While this solution is not perfect, it has the advantage of retaining 
observations that would otherwise have been dropped, and it has become convention in 
quantitative analyses of mandatory integration requirements (see Goodman and Wright 2015). 
Lastly, there is no easy answer regarding the question whether certain factors such as 
immigrants’ level of education should be considered as outcomes or determinants. These 
decisions will have to be pondered and justified in the context of each individual analysis. With 
these methodological conventions and limitations in mind, I now turn my attention to the 
substantive findings of the literatures on the causes and effects of integration policies, 
particularly mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants. 
                                                 
16 For example, one problem with MIPEX is that its variables capturing the intensity of language and civic 
education requirements for immigrants give equal weight to course fees and sanctions for noncompliance. 
Therefore, a country with voluntary integration courses that cost money to attend can receive the same score as a 
country with mandatory integration courses that are free of charge. Issues like this lead MIPEX to assign a number 
of values that many country experts disagree with (Goodman 2012b, 176). For example, looking back at Table 2, it 
seems problematic that in 2014, Spain’s MIPEX-IRS score is almost as high as those of Denmark and Germany. 
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2.2 DETERMINANTS OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY 
What explains cross-national and temporal variation in immigrant integration policies? 
Numerous studies have attempted to answer this question; interestingly, their focus and 
methodological approach has somewhat changed over time. Early scholarship aimed to explain 
variation in policy regimes17 (i.e. why certain countries became multiculturalist, assimilationist, 
etc.), and they used comparative historical methods to do so (see Goodman 2015, 2). For 
example, Brubaker (1992) examines differences in how France and Germany approach the issue 
of naturalization. According to Brubaker, France’s assimilationist and expansive regime poses a 
stark contrast to Germany’s exclusionary and ethnicity-centric policy model; the former defines 
citizenship in terms of territory whereas the latter defines it in terms of ancestry. This difference, 
Brubaker argues, stems from deep-rooted notions of national identity and self-understanding that 
can be traced back to events in the late 18th century (the French Revolution and the Prussian 
                                                 
17 A combination of individual integration policies is often referred to as an “integration policy regime” or 
“integration policy model” (Ersanilli 2012). While a seemingly endless number of such combinations is possible, it 
is conceptually useful to categorize them into ideal types. Several typologies of integration policy models have been 
proposed (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Koopmans et al. 2005), with the most enduring distinction being the 
one between multiculturalist and assimilationist regimes (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Rodriguez-Garcia 2010). 
Multiculturalism, as previously stated, refers to a combination of policies which “grant immigrants easy access to 
equal rights and do not provide strong incentives for host-country language acquisition and interethnic contacts”, 
based on the belief that immigrants will integrate better the more they can retain and develop their own cultural 
identities and practices (Koopmans 2010, 1; see also Koopmans 2013). Assimilationism describes a policy model 
which emphasizes responsibilities over rights based on the idea that integration can best be achieved through the full 
adoption of the rules and values of the dominant society (Rodriguez-Garcia 2010). 
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Partition, respectively). Castles (1995) examines the origins of exclusionary (Germany), 
assimilationist (France), and pluralist (the Netherlands) policy models. Similar to Brubaker, 
Castles argues that these models are linked to different historical patterns of nation-state 
formation. 
 Beginning in the mid-2000s, the focus of this scholarship became narrower; instead of 
explaining policy regimes, the focus was now on individual integration policies or groups of 
policies. In addition, comparative historical methods were largely replaced by qualitative case 
studies and quantitative approaches, which was made possible by the increasing availability of 
comparative data on integration policies. An overview of these studies is provided in Table 4. 
The table includes studies which (a) explicitly use immigrant integration policy as their outcome 
variable, (b) were published after the year 2000, and (c) are cross-national (i.e. examine at least 
two different countries). This selection process leads to a total of twelve studies, though I do not 
claim that these constitute an exhaustive list of all available scholarship on the subject. For each 
of these twelve studies, Table 4 shows (1) the name(s) of the author(s) and the year in which it 
was published, (2) the specific type of integration policy that was used as the outcome measure, 
(3) the methodology (quantitative approaches or case studies), (4) the sample/cases that were 
examined, (5) the index that was used to measure integration policy (for quantitative studies 
only), and (6) the main finding(s). 
As Table 4 illustrates, recent scholarship has mostly focused on five explanations for 
variation in immigrant integration policies: partisanship/ideology, public opinion, issue salience, 
Europeanization, and policy legacies/path dependency. As for the former, right-leaning parties 
are more likely to adopt integration measures such as mandatory language classes and tests but 
less likely to adopt policies related to antidiscrimination and the like. Immigrant integration 
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appears to be an issue of genuine ideological concern (Akkerman 2012; Bale 2008). Center-right 
and center-left parties largely agree that successful integration is an important goal, yet they 
seem to disagree on how to best achieve this goal: right-leaning parties prefer integration policies 
that bestow obligations and responsibilities (such as integration courses and tests) upon 
immigrants, while left-leaning parties emphasize opportunities and rights (such as 
antidiscrimination measures) as the main channel toward successful integration. 
As for public opinion, research suggests that negative attitudes toward immigration and 
immigrants can prompt governments to adopt certain integration policies such as mandatory 
language classes and tests but also prevent the adoption of certain policies such as 
antidiscrimination measures (Facchini and Mayda 2010; Howard 2010). In addition, an 
increasing salience of immigration and immigrant integration has been shown to have a positive 
effect on the adoption of various kinds of integration policy, particularly on the adoption of 
mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants. Increasing salience, in 
turn, is associated with various events and developments, such as integration deficits (high 
welfare dependency among immigrants, immigrant crime, residential segregation, etc.), rising 
numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers, and acts of terrorism committed by immigrants 
(Green 2007; Joppke 2007b). 
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Table 4. Recent Literature on the Determinants of Integration Policy 
Study Type of Policy Methodology Sample/Cases Measure(s) Main Finding(s) 
Akkerman (2012) 
language and civic 
education requirements 
quantitative 
9 European 
countries, 1996-
2010 
Nationalist 
Immigration and 
Integration Policy 
Index (NIIP) 
center-right parties 
more likely to adopt 
than center and 
center-left parties 
Bale (2008) 
mandatory language 
courses and tests 
case studies 
France, Germany, 
Netherlands, UK 
--- 
right-leaning parties 
are more likely to 
adopt 
Facchini and 
Mayda (2010) 
unspecified (any kind of 
policy aimed at 
integrating immigrants) 
quantitative 
UN member states; 
1976-2013 
UN World Population 
Policies Database 
public opinion and 
interest groups drive 
policy adoption 
Givens and 
Luedtke (2005) 
access to citizenship, 
antidiscrimination 
measures 
quantitative 
3 EU member 
states, 1990-2002 
original dataset on 
integration laws 
issue salience and 
party ideology drive 
policy adoption 
Goodman (2014) 
language and civic 
education requirements 
case studies 
Austria, Denmark, 
France, Germany, 
Netherlands, UK 
--- 
existing policies and 
party ideology drive 
policy adoption 
Green (2007) 
language and civic 
integration 
requirements 
case studies Germany, UK --- 
issue salience and 
Europeanization 
drive policy adoption 
Hix and Noury 
(2007) 
antidiscrimination 
measures 
quantitative 
15 EU member 
states, 1999-2004 
voting patterns in 
European Parliament 
partisanship of EU 
legislators and issue 
salience drive policy 
adoption 
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Table 4. Recent Literature on the Determinants of Integration Policy (Continued) 
Study Type of Policy Methodology Sample/Cases Measure(s) Main Finding(s) 
Howard (2010) 
access to 
citizenship 
quantitative 
11 EU member 
states, 1980-2008 
Citizenship Policy 
Index (CPI) 
left parties more 
likely to liberalize, 
but constrained by 
strong far-right 
parties and public 
opinion 
Joppke (2007a) 
antidiscrimination 
measures and civic 
education 
requirements 
case studies 
France, Germany, 
Netherlands 
--- 
Europeanization 
drives policy 
adoption 
Joppke (2007b) 
antidiscrimination 
measures and civic 
education 
requirements 
case studies 
France, Germany, 
Netherlands 
--- 
issue salience 
drives policy 
adoption 
Koopmans et al. 
(2012) 
immigrant rights, 
e.g. 
antidiscrimination 
and cultural rights 
quantitative 
10 European states, 
1980-2008 
Indicators of 
Citizenship Rights 
for Immigrants 
(ICRI) 
size of immigrant 
electorate has 
positive effect on 
policy adoption, 
mobilization by 
right-wing parties 
has negative effect 
Koopmans and 
Michalowski 
(2017) 
immigrant rights, 
e.g. 
antidiscrimination 
and cultural rights 
quantitative 
29 states, 1980-
2008 (ICRI); 
35 states, 2007-
2014 (MIPEX) 
ICRI; Migrant 
Integration Policy 
Index (MIPEX) 
colonial powers, 
settler countries, 
and democracies 
are more likely to 
adopt 
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Moreover, supranational actors and processes appear to have been driving the adoption of 
certain integration measures, particularly antidiscrimination measures as well as mandatory 
language and civic education requirements (Green 2007; Joppke 2007a). Over the past 15 years, 
a common European framework on immigrant integration has been developed “through soft law 
tools, aiming to create a common understanding of the concept and promoting the coordination, 
funding, and exchange of best practices among states, local administrations, and 
nongovernmental actors” (Arribas Lozano et al. 2014, 556; see also Section 1.2 in this 
dissertation). Lastly, past policies can create a “situation of path dependence that limits the 
available choices for policymakers to make future policy decisions. Such policy lock in is often a 
result of ‘policy legacies’ that actively generate institutional routines and procedures that force 
decision-making in particular directions by eliminating or distorting the range of policy options 
available” (Nair and Howlett 2016, 911; see also Goodman 2014). 
From a methodological standpoint, the existing literature on the determinants of 
integration policy leaves much to be desired. In addition to the broader issues in integration 
research outlined in the previous section, the studies mentioned above suffer from a number of 
additional shortcomings. For example, several of the studies utilizing case study methods select 
their cases on the dependent variable (Bale 2008; Green 2007; Joppke 2007a; 2007b), meaning 
they only analyze countries which have adopted a particular integration policy without also 
examining non-adopters. This (unfortunately quite common) practice in comparative research 
can lead to biased results (Geddes 1990; 2003). For example, consider the study by Green 
(2007), in which the author argues that the adoption of stricter language and civic education 
requirements in Germany and Great Britain was in large part driven by an increasing salience of 
immigrant integration due to the influx of asylum seekers and rising numbers of terrorist attacks 
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committed by immigrants in these two countries. However, by only looking at policy adopters, it 
is impossible to say to what extent asylum seekers and immigrant terrorism were also present in 
countries which did not adopt stricter language and civic education requirements for immigrants. 
Therefore, the author cannot say with confidence that it was issue salience which led to the 
adoption of these policies. 
Another methodological issue is that the number of observations is alarmingly small for 
some of the quantitative analyses mentioned above; it is 33 for Givens and Luedtke (2005), 30 
for Koopmans et al. (2012), and 20 for Howard (2010). With that few observations, it is virtually 
impossible to draw robust inferences. In addition, the measure of integration policy used by 
Facchini and Mayda (2010) is problematic. While the UN World Population Policies Database is 
advantageous in terms of its data coverage (all UN member states between 1976 and 2013), it 
codes integration policy on a binary scale where 1 indicates the presence of any policies or 
programs aimed at integrating non-nationals, and 0 represents the absence of such policies or 
programs. This is troublesome in the sense that the umbrella term “integration policy” includes a 
diverse range of measures (such as antidiscrimination measures and mandatory language 
requirements) that do not necessarily share the same determinants. Moreover, the studies arguing 
that supranational factors/Europeanization has been responsible for the adoption of certain 
integration policies (Green 2007; Joppke 2007a) have failed to identify the exact mechanisms 
through which the EU might have had an effect on policy adoption in its member states. All EU 
member states are subject to the CBPs and the EIF, so we are left wondering why these 
supranational instruments would affect the adoption of stricter language and civic education 
requirements in some of them but not in others. 
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Lastly, the existing literature has paid insufficient attention to potential relationships 
between the various determinants of integration policy as well as the possibility of reverse 
causality. For example, previous studies have argued that both integration deficits (as a form of 
salience) and public opinion affect policy adoption; however, the potential effect of integration 
deficits on public opinion remains largely unexplored in this context. It seems plausible that 
public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are more favorable in countries where 
immigrants are well-integrated than they are in a society where this is not the case. Similarly, 
while it is intuitively convincing that public opinion influences the adoption of certain 
integration policies, it seems equally plausible that the policies themselves affect public opinion 
(see Chapter 5). Failing to address these issues of multicollinearity and simultaneity can 
potentially bias the results of previous analyses. In Chapter 3, I aim to create a research design 
that mitigates some of these issues and thereby allows for more robust inferences about the 
determinants of mandatory integration requirements for immigrants. 
2.3 EFFECTS OF POLICY ON INTEGRATION OUTCOMES 
Only recently have scholars begun to systematically examine the effects of different integration 
policies on immigrant integration in Europe. As Goodman and Wright (2015, 1888) point out, 
since mandatory language and civic integration requirements for immigrants are a relatively new 
phenomenon, there are only few studies that empirically examine their effects on integration 
outcomes (see also Boecker and Strik 2011, 173). I was able to locate seven original, English-
language studies on the subject. For each of these seven studies, Table 5 shows (1) the name(s) 
of the author(s) and the year in which it was published, (2) the methodology, (3) the 
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sample/cases that were examined, (4) the integration outcomes that were examined (economic, 
political, social, and/or cultural), (5) the specific metrics used to measure said outcomes, and (6) 
the main finding(s). I do not claim that these seven studies constitute an exhaustive list of all 
available scholarship on the subject, but they do provide at the very least a representative 
snapshot of available research in this research area. 
 Based on qualitative interviews with 127 immigrants as well as 87 public officials/staff 
involved with integration policy in eight EU member states (Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Latvia, and the Netherlands), Boecker and Strik (2011) 
conclude that language and knowledge-of-society requirements are largely ineffective at helping 
immigrants acquire the host country’s language and improving their access to the labor market. 
Even worse, standardized tests to control access to permanent residence appear to be 
counterproductive to some of the integration aims stated by the EU. Specifically, several 
immigrants reported feeling alienated by these tests, which in turn reduced their level of 
identification with the host country. Similarly, in a qualitative examination of the citizenship 
tests applied in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, van Oers (2013, 269-274) finds 
that such tests hinder integration and create exclusion by alienating the immigrant community, 
especially those immigrants that had already integrated well before taking the test. 
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Table 5. Literature on the Effects of Mandatory Integration Requirements 
Study Methodology Sample/Cases 
Integration 
Outcome(s) 
Outcome Measure(s) Main Finding(s) 
Boecker and 
Strik (2011) 
Qualitative 
interviews 
214 interviews in 8 
EU member states 
Social; 
economic 
Language proficiency; 
identification with host country; 
employment status 
Requirements 
hindered integration 
in several countries 
(e.g. Denmark, UK) 
Ersanilli and 
Koopmans 
(2010) 
Quantitative analysis 
(standard OLS) of 
original survey data 
1,000 Turkish 
immigrants in 3 
EU member states 
Social; 
cultural 
Identification with host country; 
host country language 
proficiency; host country 
language use; social contacts 
Requirements have 
a positive effect 
Ersanilli and 
Koopmans 
(2011) 
Quantitative analysis 
(standard OLS) of 
original survey data 
1,000 Turkish 
immigrants in 3 
EU member states 
Social; 
cultural 
Identification with origin 
country; origin country 
language proficiency; Muslim 
identification; religious 
observance 
Requirements have 
no effect on social 
and cultural 
outcomes 
Federal Office 
for Migration 
and Refugees 
(2011) 
Quantitative analysis 
(experimental 
design) of original 
survey data 
9,000 immigrants 
in Germany, 2007-
2011 
Social; 
economic 
Host country language 
proficiency; social contacts; 
identification with host country; 
employment status 
Requirements have 
a positive effect 
Goodman and 
Wright (2015) 
Quantitative analysis 
(standard logit and 
OLS) of ESS data 
4,482 immigrants 
in 15 EU member 
states, 2002-2012 
Political; 
economic; 
social 
Political interest; political 
efficacy; employment status; 
financial well-being; social 
trust; perceived discrimination 
Requirements have 
a positive effect on 
political integration, 
no effect on others 
Koopmans 
(2010) 
Correlation analysis 
of country-level data 
8 European 
countries 
Economic; 
social 
Employment status; residential 
segregation; crime levels 
Requirements have 
a positive effect 
Van Oers 
(2013) 
Qualitative 
interviews 
213 interviews in 3 
EU member states 
Social 
Language proficiency; 
identification with host country 
Requirements 
hindered integration 
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 Other studies arrive at more optimistic conclusion regarding the effects of mandatory 
language and civic education requirements of immigrants. Examining original survey data on 
Turkish immigrants in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, Ersanilli and Koopmans (2011) 
find that mandatory integration requirements have no significant effect on immigrants’ level of 
social and cultural integration, measured as ethnic and religious retention (identification with 
origin country, etc.). However, using the same survey data, Ersanilli and Koopmans (2010) find 
that when successful integration is measured as increased identification with the host society 
rather than decreased identification with the origin country, these requirements do have a 
significant and positive effect on immigrants’ level of social and cultural integration. Koopmans 
(2010) compares the labor market participation, spatial segregation from the host population, and 
incarceration rates of immigrants across eight Western European countries. He finds that 
countries which have combined multicultural policies with a relatively strong welfare state 
(Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands) exhibit relatively poor integration outcomes. 
Conversely, states with stricter integration policies (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and France) 
or a comparatively weak welfare state (the UK) have achieved better integration results. 
 Goodman and Wright’s (2015) impressive analysis of 15 EU member states suggests that 
mandatory integration requirements are positively associated with political integration (that is, 
political interest and efficacy) but have no significant impact on economic (employment and 
subjective financial well-being) and social (general trust and perceived discrimination) 
integration. In addition, Goodman and Wright argue that robust language and civic education 
requirements serve an important gate-keeping role by discouraging migrants unwilling to 
integrate from entering the country in the first place. In other words, the authors claim that rather 
than changing the attitudes and behavior of the immigrants that actually participate, mandatory 
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integration requirements lead to improved integration outcomes by keeping out immigrants who 
would likely not have integrated well. Lastly, in the largest examination of language and civic 
education requirements to date, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2011) 
analyzed the effects of these requirements on various integration outcomes using a sample of 
9,000 immigrants in Germany. The study shows that mandatory language and civic education 
requirement led to improved outcomes on several integration measures, including host country 
language proficiency, identification with the host country, social contacts among host society 
members, and labor market participation. 
 This brief review of the recent literature on the relationship between integration policy 
and immigrants’ attitudes and behavior illustrates two important points. First, scholars are far 
from a consensus regarding the direction and strength of this relationship. Some studies find a 
positive effect of restrictive policies on immigrant integration, others a negative effect, and yet 
others no effect at all. Among those studies that do find a positive effect, some find a stronger 
effect than others, and yet others suggest that the positive effect of mandatory integration 
requirements is restricted to certain dimensions of integration. These divergent findings are 
likely due to differences outcome measures, sample selection, and/or methodology. This goes 
back to the lack of a standard model in integration research which I elaborated on in Section 2.1; 
there are simply no agreed upon measures of successful integration that are consistently used 
across studies. This is particularly true for the social dimension of integration, which has been 
measured in a variety of ways, including host country language proficiency, identification with 
the host country, contact with members of the host society, and social trust. 
 Second, while generally insightful, from a methodological perspective the existing 
literature leaves much to be desired. Issues include small sample sizes, the absence of important 
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control variables, poor operationalization and measurement of key concepts, and little variation, 
both temporally and cross-nationally, on the explanatory variable. For example, Koopman’s 
(2010) conclusions are based on correlation analyses involving a relatively short timeframe and 
number of countries; there is no regression design that would allow him to control for other 
observables, much less unobervables. In addition, mandatory integration requirements are 
conceived as binary (present vs. absent), which means that a significant amount of information 
about policy differences between countries is lost. Similarly, the studies by Ersanilli and 
Koopmans (2010; 2011) involve a small number of countries as well as a binary measure of 
integration requirements. In addition, they are based on a one-shot survey, i.e. the data are purely 
cross-sectional, which further hampers their potential for causal inference. 
The study by Goodman and Wright (2015) represents an improvement over previous 
research on the subject, as the authors utilize the European Social Survey (ESS), a representative 
survey which includes information on several thousand immigrants. This allows the authors to 
match country’s integration requirements with integration outcomes over time while controlling 
for a number of observables. That being said, Goodman and Wright’s analysis exhibits some 
serious limitations. Rather than use the full range of CIVIX, the authors collapse this scale into a 
binary variable, which leads to a significant loss of information. Even worse, the set of control 
variables is quite small, and the analytical approach employed by the authors does not in any 
way control for unobservables. For example, the composition of the sample countries’ immigrant 
populations (in terms of their religion and region of origin) as well as the potential presence of 
variable trends in the data are completely unaccounted for. The methodologically most 
sophisticated study on the subject is that by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
(2011) in Germany, as it involves the analysis of immigrants who have participated in mandatory 
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integration requirements (treatment group) as well as those who have not (control group) over 
time. However, it is unclear to what extent the results of this study apply to other European 
countries, as they may be unique to Germany due to the composition of its immigrant community 
and other factors. As Sections 4.1 and 4.2 will show, the data and analytical approach utilized in 
this dissertation possess a number of properties that allow me to obtain estimates of the effect of 
integration requirements on various measures of integration that are more generalizable and lend 
themselves more to a causal interpretation than those of previous studies 
2.4 OTHER EFFECTS OF INTEGRATION POLICY 
While mandatory language and civic education requirements are targeted at specific groups of 
immigrants, it seems a bit naïve to assume that they are entirely inconsequential for the rest of 
society. In fact, there is a long line of research arguing that policies and programs often have 
effects on individuals and groups who are not their intended targets; these are generally referred 
to as “unintended”, “indirect”, or “spillover” effects. For example, analyzing the impact of civic 
education programs in Kenya, Finkel and Smith (2011) find that the individuals who participated 
in these programs often became opinion leaders, communicating their new orientations to others 
within their social networks and thereby spreading democratic knowledge, norms, and values 
throughout their communities. Therefore, if we were to only look at the individuals who 
participated in civic education programs, we would fail to fully appreciate their effects. 
Similarly, Miguel and Kremer (2004) show that studies in which medical treatment is 
randomized at the individual level may substantially underestimate the effect of the treatment by 
missing externality benefits to the comparison group from reduced disease transmission. One last 
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example elaborated on here is a recent study by Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), which finds 
that cash transfers not only increase the consumption of eligible households but also that of 
ineligible households because the latter benefit from the transfers by receiving more gifts and 
loans and by reducing their savings. Therefore, cash transfers benefit the economy at large, and 
looking only at the effect on the eligible households underestimates their overall impact. 
 In the specific context of immigrant integration policy, empirical examinations of 
potential spillover effects are virtually nonexistent. I was able to locate only two studies which 
analyze the impact of integration policies on outcomes other than immigrant integration. The 
specific outcome these two studies explore is public opinion. Schlueter et al. (2013) analyze the 
effect of immigrant integration policy on public attitudes toward immigrants using a sample of 
27 Western and Eastern European countries. Their results suggest that more laissez-faire 
integration policies are associated with decreased perceptions of group threat from immigrants. 
Similarly, in their analysis of 20 European countries, Hooghe and de Vroome (2015a) find that 
multiculturalist policies reduce anti-immigrant prejudice. 
While they deserve praise for pioneering this important research area, both studies suffer 
from serious methodological limitations that cast doubt on their ability to draw sound inferences. 
Two such limitations stand out in particular. First, the data utilized in both studies are purely 
cross-sectional, meaning there is no within-country variation over time. Compared to 
longitudinal data, which offer multiple ways to overcome endogeneity biases (such as panel 
fixed effects which control for stable unobservables), cross-sectional data exhibit a strong 
likelihood that some or all of the independent variables are endogenous in that they are 
correlated with the error term. This, in turn, violates the OLS assumption of exogeneity of the 
independent variables, and thus casts serious doubts on the validity of their inferences. Second, 
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both studies measure their key independent variable – integration policy – via countries’ overall 
MIPEX score (see Section 2.1). This score is obtained by combining indices for 167 individual 
integration policies, which makes it impossible to discern which particular policy has what kind 
of effect on public attitudes toward immigrants. In Chapter 5, I aim to create a research design 
that mitigates these issues and thereby allows for more robust inferences about the relationship 
between mandatory integration requirements and public attitudes toward immigrants. 
2.4.1 Determinants of Attitudes toward Immigrants 
Since scholars have largely ignored immigrant integration policy as a potential determinant of 
attitudes toward immigrants, the question becomes: how do existing studies explain variation in 
public opinion on this issue? Explanations of public attitudes toward immigration and 
immigrants can be categorized into three broad groups: (a) characteristics of the individual host 
society member; (b) characteristics of the immigrant (population); and (c) characteristics of the 
host society at large.18 Studies within the first category have shown that several demographic, 
socioeconomic, and psychological factors affect an individual’s attitudes toward immigrants and 
immigration. For example, several studies suggest that males and older individuals are generally 
less accepting of immigrants and immigration (Bohman 2011; Byrne 2011). Education and 
income have been shown to be strongly and positively correlated with attitudes toward 
immigrants and immigration (Creighton and Jamal 2015; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). 
Contact and personal relationships with immigrants also lead to more positive attitudes 
(McLaren 2003; Ellison et al. 2011). Partisanship and ideology are also important predictors in 
                                                 
18 For an excellent overview of this literature, see Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014). 
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this context, with conservatives being more negative toward immigrants and immigration than 
their liberal counterparts (Knoll et al. 2011; Merolla et al. 2013). Lastly, research in the social 
psychology tradition identifies certain psychological and emotional traits as predictors of 
negative attitudes toward immigration and immigrants, such as anxiety (Brader et al. 2008; 
Gadarian and Albertson 2014) and lack of general trust (Hooghe and de Vroome 2015b). 
Research within the second category suggests that host society members are more likely 
to support or oppose certain groups of immigrants depending on their origin, level of skill, and 
size. In a seminal study of U.S. public opinion on immigration, Hainmueller and Hopkins find 
that “Americans view educated immigrants in high-status jobs favorably, whereas they view 
those who lack plans to work, entered without authorization, are Iraqi, or do not speak English 
unfavorably” (2015, 529). Several other studies support the notion that public opinion toward 
immigration is least favorable when the immigrants in question are low-skill (Hainmueller et al. 
2015) and do not speak the host society’s language (Chandler and Tsai 2001). In addition, it has 
been suggested that the size of the immigrant population relative to the native-born population 
negatively affects public attitudes toward immigration and immigrants (Hainmueller and 
Hangartner 2013), particularly in communities without significant prior exposure to immigrants 
(Newman 2013). Research within the third category suggests that certain characteristics of the 
host society at large influence public perceptions of immigration and immigrants. For example, it 
has been shown that nativism and hostility toward immigrants increase during economic 
downturns/recessions (Alvarez and Butterfield 2000; Kehrberg 2007; Wilkes et al. 2008). In 
addition, national identity and norms emphasizing the importance of cultural homogeneity, such 
as in Japan in South Korea, are associated with negative attitudes toward immigrants and 
immigration (Burgess 2014; Castles et al. 2014, 156-157; Hockstader 2010). 
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2.5 CENTRAL ARGUMENT 
As Section 2.2 has illustrated, migration scholars have explained variation in integration policies 
in various ways. One common thread that runs through these studies – and research on policy 
origins in general – is the distinction between technocratic explanations of policymaking and 
approaches that view policy as the results of the preferences of key stakeholders (Fischer 2003). 
Technocratic explanations conceive policy primarily as the result of complex processes, the goal 
of which is to find the optimal solution to a particular problem. In this view, policymakers are 
mostly neutral agents who assess a particular problem and rely on objective conditions, evidence, 
and observations to find the best possible policy to address the problem at hand (e.g. de Vries 
1994; Erlandson 2017; Kawar 2014). According to this perspective, deviations from optimal 
policy are not primarily due to the self-interest of policymakers or the interference of outside 
actors, but rather the result of difficulties that are inherent to the process of policymaking such as 
imperfect or incomplete information.19 
 A second approach to policymaking argues that policy is the result of key stakeholders 
translating their preferences into public policy. Two stakeholders have received particular 
attention in this context: special interest groups and voters/the public. As for the former, special 
interest groups can influence the political process in various ways, for example by providing 
issue expertise to elected officials, financing electoral campaigns, or mobilizing their constituent 
base (De Figueiredo and Richter 2014). Various studies have shown that special interest groups 
use their considerable resources to lobby elected officials and translate their private agenda into 
                                                 
19 A synonym for the term “technocratic” in this context would be “rational”, though I avoid using the latter 
because it invokes associations with formal theory, which will not be used throughout this dissertation. 
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public policy, including policy areas such as trade (Gawande et al. 2012), immigration (Facchini 
et al. 2011), economic sanctions (McLean and Whang 2014), and even nuclear proliferation 
(Kirk 2008). As for the latter, a large body of research argues that voters evaluate the policies put 
in place by their elected officials and base their electoral decisions in part on these evaluations. 
For example, it has long been argued that individuals have rather strong preferences regarding 
trade policy and vote accordingly (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; 
Scheve and Slaughter 2001). And since parties and politicians are at least in part motivated by 
office-seeking rationales (i.e. interested in maximizing their vote share), they are somewhat 
responsive to the public’s preferences, at least in democracies (Kono 2008). 
 As Figure 1 illustrated, I draw on both technocratic and stakeholder approaches to explain 
variation in immigrant integration policies. In other words, I argue that in designing their 
country’s integration requirements, policymakers take objective conditions as well as the 
preferences of key stakeholders into account. I focus particularly on one such condition and one 
stakeholder: immigrants’ prior level of integration and voters/the public. As for the former, it 
seems reasonable to expect that prior levels of integration affect subsequent policy adoption. 
Governments in countries with large integration deficits (i.e. low levels of immigrant integration) 
have a stronger incentive to adopt alternative policy approaches to integrating immigrants, 
especially mandatory language and civic education requirements, since these have been 
promoted by the EU as avenues toward successful immigrant integration since 2004. Integration 
deficits are objective conditions in the sense that they are quantifiable and can be measured. In 
fact, since 2004, the EU has expended great effort to collect data on integration outcomes in all 
of its member states, and to disseminate these data among European governments (Eurostat 
2017a). 
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As for the stakeholder perspective, it seems quite plausible that in designing immigrant 
integration policy, governments take the preferences of their constituents into account. Stricter 
integration requirements are a way for governments to mitigate public concerns about 
immigration without having to take on the more difficult task of controlling migration flows.20 
Therefore, in countries where the public is wary of immigration, policymakers who wish to get 
reelected will strongly consider the adoption of stricter language and civic education 
requirements for immigrants. In fact, mandatory language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants have proliferated throughout Europe over the past two decades (see Section 1.2) 
while during the same period public attitudes toward immigrants have become somewhat more 
negative (Castles et al. 2014, 1-24), so there may very well be a causal relationship between the 
two. 
 In addition, I posit that the relationship between integration deficits and public opinion on 
the one hand and immigrant integration requirements on the other is not a causal one-way street. 
More specifically, I argue that mandatory language and civic education requirements positively 
affect integration outcomes as well as public attitudes toward immigrants. As for the effect of 
integration requirements on integration outcomes, mandatory language and civic education 
requirements can improve immigrant integration in various ways. For example, by helping 
                                                 
20 Migration scholars generally agree that relative to integration policies, immigration policies are difficult 
to change as a response to negative public opinion. Despite tough rhetoric on immigration by some elected officials 
and political parties, many developed countries rely on immigrant labor and therefore lack the will to enact stricter 
immigration policies. Companies in economic sectors that employ a disproportionately large number of immigrants 
expend great efforts to lobby their governments for liberal immigration laws. In addition, countries are restricted by 
international treaties such as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as well as the fact that human 
smuggling and irregular migration are particularly difficult to control (Castles et al. 2014, 215-239). 
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immigrants acquire the host country’s language, mandatory integration requirements enable 
immigrants to find better jobs and connect with members of the host society. Similarly, civic 
education courses are designed to improve social and political integration by familiarizing 
immigrants with the local political system, laws, and culture. I also argue that mandatory 
integration requirements positively affect public attitudes toward immigrants. They do so directly 
and indirectly. The direct effect operates through two mechanisms: first, immigrants are 
perceived as less of a threat when they are required to learn about the local language and culture; 
second, these requirements are a way to mitigate concerns about fairness and deservingness. In 
addition, by improving immigrant integration, mandatory integration requirements indirectly 
lead to more positive attitudes toward immigrants, since it is reasonable to assume that publics 
are more accepting of immigrant communities who are well-integrated. 
 This argument is developed in greater detail and tested over the course of three empirical 
chapters. The first of these chapters, Chapter 3, examines the effects of integration deficits and 
public opinion (as well as other covariates) on mandatory integration requirements while 
controlling for the reciprocal nature of these relationships via an instrumental variable approach. 
The second empirical chapter, Chapter 4, evaluates the impact of language and civic education 
requirements for immigrants on various integration outcomes, employing a research design that 
mitigates concerns about stable unobservables and trending in the variables. In the final 
empirical chapter, Chapter 5, I analyze the direct and indirect effects of mandatory integration 
requirements on public attitudes toward immigrants, again using a research design that controls 
for a range of confounding factors. As a result, I am able to obtain estimates of both the causes 
and the effect of mandatory integration requirements that are more generalizable and lend 
themselves more to a causal interpretation than those of previous research on the subject. 
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3.0  ANALYSIS OF POLICY ORIGINS 
The goal of this chapter is to examine the determinants of one particular integration policy, that 
is, mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants. I formulate nine 
hypotheses about the determinants of these requirements and test them against a sample of 25 
EU member states between 2005 and 2014. By doing so, this chapter makes two important 
contributions, one theoretical and one empirical. As for the former, it draws on previous studies 
on the determinants of immigrant integration policies as well as long-standing literatures on 
policy origins, policy diffusion, and socialization to detail the conditions under which countries 
are more or less likely to adopt stricter integration requirements for immigrants, and translates 
these conditions into testable hypotheses. As for the latter, it adds to our understanding of why 
and when different countries adopt certain integration policies. These insights might not be 
limited to immigrant integration policy but can possibly extend to other policy areas as well, and 
therefore be of interests to a wide range of scholars. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds in several steps. First, based on the findings of 
previous research on the determinants of immigrant integration policy (see Section 2.2), I 
develop nine testable hypotheses about the causes of variation in mandatory integration 
requirements. Next, I lay out the data and analytical approach I use to test these hypotheses. 
Section 3.3 describes the results, which can be summarized in four points. First, which predictors 
are found to be significant is fairly dependent on model specification. Second, language and civic 
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education requirements for immigrants are highly path-dependent, meaning that a country’s 
current integration policy is in large part a function of its previous policy. Third, countries appear 
to take policy cues from those which are most successful at integrating their immigrant 
communities. Fourth, unemployment among immigrants is negatively associated with the 
intensity of a country’s integration requirements, but this relationship appears to be driven by 
reverse causality: it is policy that affects levels of integration, not the other way around. A 
concluding section then discusses the implications of these findings, connects them with the 
broader literature, and describes potential avenues for future research on the subject. 
3.1 FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
In Section 2.2, I have outlined the causes of variation in immigrant integration policies identified 
by previous studies, as well as issues with these studies. Building on these insights, this section 
develops a theoretical framework which outlines the factors that potentially affect a country’s 
propensity to adopt (stricter) language and civic education requirements for immigrants and, for 
some of these factors, identifies possible mechanisms through which they do so. First, a long line 
of research has been arguing that governmental decision-making is largely a function of political 
ideology (e.g. Jackson and Kingdon 1992; Poole and Rosenthal 2001). In other words, legislators 
make decisions based on their political beliefs, convictions, and values. In the context of 
immigrant integration policy, I expect conservative governments to be more likely to adopt 
mandatory integration requirements for immigrants than their left-leaning counterparts due to 
tradition, order, and personal responsibility being central tenants of conservatism. In addition, 
previous research suggests that widespread public concern about immigration and immigrant 
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integration can lead to the adoption of stricter language and civic education requirements, as 
governments can use these measures to mitigate such concerns and appease the public. This goes 
back to the stakeholder perspective on policymaking elaborated on in Section 2.5. Moreover, it 
has been suggested that past adoptions of mandatory integration requirements make future 
adoptions of such policies more likely due to “policy legacies”, meaning that strict integration 
requirements beget stricter requirements.21 These policy legacies work through institutional 
routines, national identity considerations, etc. and force decision-making in particular directions 
by eliminating or distorting the range of policy options available (Nair and Howlett 2016). From 
these insights, three testable hypotheses can be derived: 
 
H1 (party ideology): The more conservative a government, the more likely it is to adopt 
stricter language and civic education requirements for immigrants. 
 
H2 (public opinion): The more negative a country’s public opinion toward immigrants, 
the more likely it is to adopt stricter language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants. 
 
H3 (policy legacies): Countries with preexisting integration requirements are more likely 
to adopt stricter language and civic education requirements for immigrants. 
                                                 
21 It seems equally plausible that rather than increase the likelihood of future policy adoptions, past 
adoptions decrease it due to ceiling effects. Mandatory integration requirements can only become so strict before no 
further reforms are possible. Therefore, while I hypothesize that existing integration requirements have a positive 
effect on the adoption of stricter policies, I am ultimately agnostic about the direction of this relationship. 
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 According to technocratic theories, policy is primarily the result of complex processes, 
the goal of which is to find the optimal solution to a particular problem. In this view, 
policymakers are mostly neutral agents who assess a particular problem and rely on objective 
conditions, evidence, and observations to find the best possible policy to address the problem at 
hand (see Section 2.5). I argue that in the context of immigrant integration, one of the most 
important objective conditions is immigrants’ prior level of integration. Governments in 
countries with large integration deficits (i.e. low levels of immigrant integration) have a stronger 
incentive to adopt alternative policy approaches to integrating immigrants, especially mandatory 
language and civic education requirements, since these have been promoted by the EU as 
avenues toward successful immigrant integration since 2004. Another objective immigration 
condition that policymakers potentially take into consideration is the size of the immigrant 
population, since a small number of immigrants is relatively inconsequential for a host society 
regardless of their level of integration. Conversely, in a country with a sizeable immigrant 
community, immigrant integration is more likely to be a salient issue, that is, to occupy a 
prominent position in the country’s political discourse. 
 
H4 (prior integration): The less integrated a country’s immigrant population, the more 
likely it is to adopt stricter language and civic education requirements for immigrants. 
 
H5 (immigrant population): The greater the size of a country’s immigrant population, the 
more likely it is to adopt stricter language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants. 
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In the specific context of the European Union, a prominent theoretical approach to 
explaining policymaking has been neo-functionalism. According to neo-functionalism, 
supranational actors and processes influence the adoption of certain national policies in EU 
member states. Neo-functionalist theory comes in different variants, one of them being (elite) 
socialization theory (e.g. Haas 1958; Stone Sweet and Brunell 2004). Socialization refers to “the 
processes by which the newcomer – the infant, rookie, or trainee, for example – becomes 
incorporated into organized patterns of interaction” (Stryker and Statham 1985, 325). In other 
words, socialization consists of patterns of interaction through which a new member of a group – 
in this case, a country which has joined the European Union – internalizes the norms and values 
of the group and acts accordingly. Over time, by regularly being involved in the supranational 
policy process, national policymakers will tend to develop a “European identity” and shift their 
loyalty to the European Union. 
Differently put, once a country has joined the European Union, it experiences more 
frequent and intense interactions with existing members, thus promoting a greater sense of “we-
ness” (Checkel 2005). New members are increasingly exposed to the principles and values 
espoused by the EU, and the forums provided by this organization provide an opportunity for 
new members to be persuaded by the old ones. The outcome of these processes is a state in 
which new members have truly internalized the principles and values of the Union, and they act 
in accordance with them because they perceive it as “the right thing to do” (Johnston 2001; 
Checkel 2005). In other words, countries which have been fully socialized into the EU adopt its 
policy recommendations because they genuinely believe in the European project and its goals, 
not because of selfish or opportunistic reasons. From this common conception of socialization, it 
follows that EU member states which have interacted more frequently with other members 
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should be more fully socialized, and therefore be more likely to adopt policy recommendations 
such as the CBPs. 
 
H6 (socialization): The longer a country has been a member of the European Union, the 
more likely it is to adopt mandatory language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants. 
 
 In addition to socialization, a second mechanism through which the European Union can 
potentially influence policy adoption in its member states is learning. Learning-related arguments 
have been quite popular in the literature on policy diffusion, particularly economic policies (e.g. 
Simmons and Elkins 2004; Quinn and Toyoda 2007). According to one line of argument within 
this literature, governments are unsure about the outcomes of a particular policy and seek 
available information in a rational fashion to maximize the chances of their own policy success. 
One way of obtaining such information is to look at the countries deemed most successful in a 
particular policy area. In the context of immigrant integration, this means that governments will 
take policy cues from the countries with the most well-integrated immigrant communities. 
Such learning-based arguments are intuitively convincing in the context of immigrant 
integration policy in Europe, since there is still a great deal of uncertainty regarding the effects of 
mandatory language and civic education requirements and since the EIF was specifically 
designed facilitate the exchange of information and “best practices”. In addition, the European 
Ministerial Conference in Zaragoza adopted the Declaration of the European Ministerial 
Conference on Integration in 2010. This declaration further facilitated information sharing 
among EU members by standardizing and centralizing the collection of data on immigrant 
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integration across the EU. The EU now collects data on integration policies and integration 
outcomes in all of its members; these data are housed at and maintained by Eurostat, the 
statistical arm of the Commission (Eurostat 2017a). Given these extensive efforts to share 
information, it seems reasonable to expect that Europe’s national governments know a great deal 
about integration policies and outcomes in other EU member states. 
 
H7 (learning): Countries are likely to be influenced by the integration policies of those 
countries deemed most successful in this policy area. 
 
 An additional determinant of policy adoption identified by previous research is 
administrative capacity (e.g. Feiock and West 1993; Meckling and Nahm 2018; Van Wolleghem 
2017). The implementation of certain policies, such as climate policy, military policy, and 
welfare policy, requires substantial resources (money, labor, expertise, etc.). Governments that 
lack these resources may be unable to adopt such policies, regardless of their political will. Like 
the aforementioned types of policy, mandatory language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants consume considerable government resources. Consider the case of Germany, where 
these requirements are currently executed by more than 8,500 private organizations (Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees 2016). Every single one of these organizations has to be 
certified by, report to, and is regularly monitored by the federal government. Given the 
substantial effort that is required to execute these requirements, countries which lack the 
necessary administrative capacity might be deterred from adopting them, even though they might 
be inclined to adopt them for other reasons. 
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H8 (capacity): The greater a country’s administrative capacity, the more likely it is to 
adopt mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants. 
 
 Lastly, it is no secret that many European countries have been struggling with low birth 
rates and ageing populations, which in some cases has led to labor shortages and put pressure on 
Europe’s social security systems. Many scholars and policymakers have pointed to migration as 
a possible way to offset some of these negative trends (Collier 2013, 123-125). As a result, 
several European countries now have policies in place that aim at recruiting immigrants, 
effectively putting these countries in competition with each other (UNDESA 2013). Migrants 
have information, though incomplete, about countries’ immigration policies, including their 
integration policies, and partly base their choice of destination on a comparison of these policies 
(Mayda 2010; Robinson and Segrott 2002; Schaeffer 2010). Many immigrants find mandatory 
language and civic education requirements to be arduous (Boecker and Strik 2011; Groenendijk 
2011; Van Oers 2013), and when faced with the decision of which country to settle in will prefer 
a destination with more lenient integration policies over a country with stricter requirements. 
Therefore, EU member states which seek to recruit immigrants to offset negative demographic 
and economic trends have a strong incentive to refrain from implementing stricter language and 
civic education requirements for immigrants. 
 
H9 (competition): Countries are less likely to adopt mandatory language and civic 
education requirements for immigrants if they depend on migration to offset negative 
demographic trends. 
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3.2 DATA AND METHODS 
In the previous section, I formulated nine hypotheses about the relationships between mandatory 
language and civic education requirements for immigrants and their determinants. I test these 
expectations against a sample of 15 EU member states between 2005 and 2014 as well as a 
sample of 25 EU members between 2007 and 2014. The outcome of interest is the intensity of a 
country’s language and civic education requirements for immigrants, which is measured via 
CIVIX and MIPEX-IRS (see Section 2.1). As for the determinants, to code government ideology 
I rely on data provided by the Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov). ParlGov places 
parties on a continuous scale ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating a more 
conservative ideology. My measure of government ideology takes the same value as the party 
that has been in government for the majority of a given year; in cases where there are coalition 
governments, I take the average of the coalition partners’ ParlGov scores weighted by their 
respective number of seats in parliament. 
Measuring public opinion in this context is challenging, as there are no cross-national 
public opinion data specifically on immigrant integration. As a proxy of a country’s public 
attitudes toward immigrant integration, I use the Eurobarometer item “What do you think are the 
most important issues facing your country at the moment?”. Higher percentages of respondents 
who answer the question with “migration” are taken to represent greater public concern about 
immigrant integration. Since the Eurobarometer surveys are conducted twice a year, I average 
the two to obtain a yearly value. To account for the possibility of policy legacies (or, 
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alternatively, ceiling effects), I include an independent variable that takes the starting value of 
the outcome variable for each country.22 
To measure integration deficits, I use the national unemployment rate among the foreign-
born population. Positive values indicate higher unemployment among immigrants and, 
therefore, greater integration deficits. Data on this variable are retrieved via Eurostat. 
(Un)employment is preferable to two other indicators of immigrant integration provided by 
Eurostat (2017) – education and citizenship acquisition – because there is no controversy among 
migration scholars whether it is really an indicator or rather an antecedent/determinant of 
integration. A fourth and final indicator of immigrant integration provided by Eurostat, the share 
of a country’s foreign-born population who is at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE), 
will be used in the robustness section as an alternative measure of integration deficits. 
Finding comprehensive information on the size of Europe’s immigrant populations is 
challenging. Multiple sources, including Eurostat and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), provide cross-national data on the number of foreign-
born individuals, but the data coverage for each of these sources is limited. Therefore, to 
maximize data coverage, I combine the data series provided by Eurostat and the OECD. This 
combination is justified by the fact that the two data sources are highly consistent (they are 
correlated at .966). For country-years where only Eurostat or OECD data are available, the 
combined series reports the available values from any source. For country-years where both 
sources are available, I take the mean value of the two. I then multiply the resulting variable by 
100 and divide it by the total population. Therefore, the size of a country’s immigrant population 
is measured as the number of foreign-born individuals in percent of the overall population. 
                                                 
22 Note that this means the variable is time-invariant. 
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 I have argued that there are two factors at the supranational level which can affect EU 
member states’ integration policies: socialization and learning. To measure the former, I generate 
a variable which captures for how many years a particular country has been a member of the 
European Union. As for the latter, I have argued that countries might emulate the integration 
policies of countries which have been relatively successful at integrating their immigrant 
communities. I consider countries with an immigrant unemployment rate below the 25th 
percentile for a given year to be successful at integrating their immigrants (lower values indicate 
less unemployment, and therefore greater success). I then take the mean of these countries’ 
integration policy scores for that year to measure the effect of learning processes on integration 
policy in the EU member states.23 
To measure administrative capacity, I rely on the government effectiveness estimates 
provided by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). To code government 
effectiveness, the World Bank uses a combination of enterprise, citizen, and expert surveys; the 
resulting index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating greater government 
effectiveness.24 Lastly, I have argued that EU member states now compete with each other over 
                                                 
23 This measure of learning is similar to the one Simmons and Elkins use in their study on the determinants 
of liberal financial policies: “Our ﬁrst set of information indicators taps learning from apparent success (rational 
Bayesian updating). Many complex measures of success could be devised, but we opt for a highly visible and well-
publicized bottom line: growth rates. Our measure is the proportion of liberal (or restrictive) policies of the top 
growth decile. The higher this proportion, the clearer the message that liberalization ‘works’” (2004, 179). 
24 The World Bank evaluates government effectiveness on an annual basis, which means that this index is 
time-variant. In fact, government effectiveness can change quite markedly over time. For example, Spain had a 
score of 1.507 in 2005; within one year, this value dropped to .837. For a more detailed overview of the WGI 
methodology, see Kaufmann et al. (2010). 
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third-country nationals, which are needed to ameliorate negative demographic and economic 
trends. Countries in which these negative trends are particularly pronounced have a strong 
incentive to refrain from implementing strict integration requirements for immigrants. I follow a 
recommendation by Eurostat (2017b) and measure labor demand via changes in a country’s 
employment rate between years (increased employment signals higher aggregate demand, and 
therefore greater need for immigrant labor). Data on this measure is provided by Eurostat. 
 I estimate the models with random country eﬀects rather than fixed effects. There are two 
justiﬁcations for this, one substantive and one statistical. The statistical reason for random eﬀects 
is that the Hausmann test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no systematic diﬀerence between 
random and ﬁxed eﬀects. As a result, random eﬀects take precedence given their eﬃciency 
(Clark and Linzer 2015). The substantive reason is that immigrant integration requirements, as 
well as many of their drivers, rarely change. For example, national governments are not 
reconﬁgured on a yearly basis. As a result, there is very little within-country variation to draw 
from, especially given the shortness of the time series (Clark and Linzer 2015).25 All models 
include year ﬁxed eﬀects. These are particularly important because they absorb any atypical 
year-to-year variation, i.e. they capture common shocks such as changes in EU leadership. 
Standard errors are heteroskedastic-robust and clustered by country. Lastly, all time-varying 
independent variables are lagged by one year. 
                                                 
25 In the robustness section, I also estimate the models as OLS regressions with a lagged dependent 
variable. 
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3.3 RESULTS 
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample. It illustrates that despite a general trend 
toward more robust language and civic education requirements for immigrants, the mean values 
for both CIVIX and MIPEX-IRS are still relatively low (3.27 and 29.56, respectively). The 
average government ideology score is 5.66 on a scale ranging from 0 (far-left) to 10 (far-right), 
and the mean value for public opinion is 10.34. This means that on average, around 10% of 
Europeans view immigration (and immigrant integration) as the most pressing issue facing their 
country. The average starting value, which is supposed to measure policy legacies, is somewhat 
higher for CIVIX than it is for MIPEX-IRS, which reflects the fact that the starting year for 
CIVIX in the sample is 2005 whereas MIPEX data is only available for 2007 onward. Several 
EU members adopted stricter integration requirements in 2005 or 2006, including Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands. These policy reforms are therefore captured in 
the starting value for MIPEX-IRS but not in the one for CIVIX. 
Foreign-born individuals account for an average of 12 percent of the total population, and 
the mean unemployment rate among immigrants is around 12 percent. The average length of EU 
membership is 25 years, and the mean administrative capacity is 1.25. The countries most 
successful at integrating their immigrant communities (defined as countries with an immigrant 
unemployment rate below the 25th percentile) have average CIVIX and MIPEX-IRS scores of 
4.17 and 32.21, respectively. Lastly, the average change in countries’ annual employment rates is 
close to 0. This is because some countries in some years experienced a drop in their employment 
rate while others saw an increase. Therefore, the negative and positive values largely cancel each 
other out and lead to a mean value close to 0. 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics I 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
CIVIX 150 3.268 2.336 0 8.75 
MIPEX-IRS 200 29.558 19.932 0 78.2 
Government ideology 250 5.657 1.472 2.436 8.440 
Public opinion 250 10.34 9.765 0 60.5 
Starting point (CIVIX) 150 1.85 1.035 0 4 
Starting point (MIPEX) 250 26.792 18.166 0 64.2 
Immigrant population 220 11.818 7.516 1.188 43.270 
Integration deficits 235 12.015 5.703 4.4 37.8 
Years in EU 250 24.74 19.459 1 57 
Learning (CIVIX) 250 4.170 1.243 1.9 5.5 
Learning (MIPEX) 200 32.211 4.520 26.4 39.967 
Capacity 250 1.250 .510 .198 2.354 
∆ Employment rate 250 .094 1.571 -8.8 4.1 
 
 Table 7 shows the means for several variables of interest by country. Some interesting 
insights emerge from this table. For example, public attitudes toward immigrants vary 
considerably across countries. In Eastern Europe, immigration is not a main concern for the vast 
majority of the population. Conversely, in Malta and the United Kingdom, around a third of the 
population views immigration as the most pressing issue facing their country. Similarly, the 
relative size of and unemployment rate among the immigrant population vary substantially 
across countries. Luxembourg has both the largest immigrant population (almost 40% of the total 
population) as well as the most well-integrated one, as the unemployment rate among foreign-
born individuals is only 6.18%. In contrast, most Eastern European countries have relatively 
small immigrant communities with comparatively high unemployment. 
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Table 7. Country-by-Country Means I 
Country 
Government 
ideology 
Public opinion 
Immigrant 
population 
Integration 
deficits 
EU 
Membership 
State capacity 
Difference 
employment 
Austria 5.389 16.5 15.433 9.35 14.5 1.703 .47 
Belgium 5.120 17.95 14.037 16.34 52.5 1.585 .17 
Cyprus 3.859 9.9 22.298 9.19 5.5 1.379 -.75 
Czech Rep. 6.230 4.05 5.333 8.83 5.5 .949 .34 
Denmark 6.239 17.85 8.061 10.47 36.5 2.118 -.17 
Estonia 7.284 2.05 15.598 11.66 5.5 1.044 .40 
Finland 5.519 7.7 4.414 14.75 14.5 2.142 .09 
France 6.164 10 11.517 13.9 52.5 1.485 .02 
Germany 5.324 10.15 12.361 11.8 52.5 1.589 .95 
Great Britain 5.645 30 11.046 7.68 36.5 1.604 .12 
Greece 6.197 5.85 10.527 18.92 28.5 .536 -1.06 
Hungary 4.798 1.55 4.030 7.36 5.5 .689 .46 
Ireland 5.800 7.8 15.759 12.67 36.5 1.510 -.48 
Italy 5.712 12.1 9.614 11.18 52.5 .390 -.17 
Lithuania 5.570 7.7 5.014 14.429 5.5 .761 .25 
Luxembourg 5.339 11.85 38.090 6.18 52.5 1.674 .44 
Latvia 7.020 5.95 14.459 13.19 5.5 .701 .28 
Malta 5.414 34.7 8.581 8.19 5.5 1.143 .85 
Netherlands 5.828 10.5 11.089 9.14 52.5 1.783 .05 
Poland 5.892 3.55 1.587 11.75 5.5 .573 .92 
Portugal 5.073 1.8 7.720 13.95 33.5 1.029 -.49 
Slovakia 5.172 1.25 4.106 14.7 5.5 .845 .22 
Slovenia 5.062 1.4 12.323 9.2 5.5 1.020 -.27 
Spain 5.281 15.6 13.140 23.41 33.5 1.066 -.55 
Sweden 6.498 10.75 14.313 14.11 14.5 1.936 .26 
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 In Section 2.2, I pointed out that previous research on the determinants of integration 
policy has largely failed to explore potential relationships between the individual determinants. 
To address this possibility, I create a correlation matrix including the nine independent variables 
described above. Several pairs of variables exhibit correlation values large enough for concern; 
for example, in the CIVIX sample, the unemployment rate among immigrants correlates fairly 
strongly with public opinion (-.382), state capacity (-.377), and annual changes in employment 
rates (-.342). In large samples, correlation values of this magnitude would likely not pose an 
issue, but in a sample as small as the one at hand, they can potentially lead to highly sensitive 
parameter estimators with inﬂated variances and improper model selection (Kroll and Song 
2013). Therefore, I estimate a series of reduced models with different combinations of predictors 
before estimating the full model including all independent variables. 
 Table 8 shows the results for four different model specifications. In Model 1, CIVIX is 
regressed on the lagged value of public opinion as well as the year dummies. The coefficient is 
insignificant, which indicates that public attitudes toward immigration do not systematically 
affect the intensity of a country’s integration requirements. In Model 2, CIVIX is regressed on 
the lagged value of immigrant population as well as the year dummies. Contrary to expectations, 
the coefficient is significant and negative, meaning that countries with larger immigrant 
populations have less stringent integration requirements. In Model 3, CIVIX is regressed on the 
lagged value of integration deficits as well as the year dummies. Again, contrary to expectations, 
the coefficient is significant and negative, which suggests that language and civic education 
requirements for immigrants are weaker in countries with greater integration deficits. 
In the full model (Model 4), the negative coefficient for public opinion becomes larger 
and significant, but since the coefficient was insignificant in Model 1, this effect appears to be 
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indicative of multicollinearity rather than a true relationship. The coefficient for integration 
deficits remains significant, which provides additional support for the presence of a negative 
relationship between unemployment among immigrants and mandatory integration requirements. 
Two additional covariates, starting point and learning, have a positive and significant effect on 
the level of a country’s integration requirements. For every additional point on a country’s 
CIVIX score in 2005, its subsequent CIVIX score increases by almost two points. Similarly, for 
every additional point on the most successful countries’ average CIVIX score, EU-15 countries’ 
CIVIX values increase by more than half a point. 
 Table 9 shows the results for the same models as in Table 8 but with MIPEX-IRS as the 
outcome variable instead of CIVIX. The results for the two dependent variables are quite similar. 
Integration deficits have a significant and negative effect on a country’s level of integration 
requirements for immigrants in both the reduced and the full model. The impact of both starting 
point and learning on MIPEX-IRS is positive and significant. For every additional point on a 
country’s MIPEX-IRS score in 2007, its subsequent MIPEX-IRS score increases by one point. 
Similarly, for every additional point on the most successful countries’ average MIPEX-IRS 
score, EU-25 countries’ MIPEX-IRS values increase by more than half a point. One difference 
between the two full models is that in the MIPEX-IRS model, changes in employment rate are 
negatively and significantly associated with the adoption of stricter integration requirements, 
although substantively this effect is fairly weak: as a country’s employment rate increases by 
1%, its MIPEX-IRS score goes up by half a point. 
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Table 8. Determinants of Integration Requirements (CIVIX) 
 
          Model 1 
          (RE) 
          Model 2 
          (RE) 
          Model 3 
          (RE) 
          Model 4 
          (RE) 
Government ideology    -0.070 
    (0.050) 
     
Public opinion -0.003   -0.027** 
 (0.014)   (0.013) 
     
Starting point    1.854*** 
    (0.223) 
     
Immigrant population  -0.136*  -0.050 
  (0.079)  (0.034) 
     
Integration deficits   -0.026* -0.050** 
   (0.014) (0.023) 
     
Years in EU    0.028 
    (0.019) 
     
Learning    0.637*** 
    (0.133) 
     
Capacity    0.204 
    (0.687) 
     
∆ Employment rate    -0.019 
    (0.045) 
     
Year dummies     
(not reported)     
     
     
Constant 1.899*** 3.559*** 2.022*** -2.117 
 (0.337) (0.838) (0.391) (1.481) 
N 135 128 134 127 
Within R2 .485 .489 .526 .556 
Between R2 .061 .053 .020 .845 
Overall R2 .057 .086 .079 .830 
Rho .922 .940 .923 .761 
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 9. Determinants of Integration Requirements (MIPEX-IRS) 
 
          Model 1 
          (RE) 
          Model 2 
          (RE) 
          Model 3 
          (RE) 
          Model 4 
          (RE) 
Government ideology    1.211 
    (0.922) 
     
Public opinion -0.122   0.258*** 
 (0.130)   (0.086) 
     
Starting point    0.980*** 
    (0.040) 
     
Immigrant population  0.365  -0.062 
  (0.509)  (0.194) 
     
Integration deficits   -0.277* -0.429** 
   (0.161) (0.204) 
     
Years in EU    0.054 
    (0.080) 
     
Learning    0.515* 
    (0.274) 
     
Capacity    0.257 
    (1.859) 
     
∆ Employment rate    -0.546** 
    (0.250) 
     
Year dummies     
(not reported)     
     
     
Constant 28.40*** 22.89*** 29.10*** -18.87* 
 (4.34) (6.48) (3.856) (11.10) 
N 200 178 187 153 
Within R2 .110 .103 .133 .091 
Between R2 .057 .048 .004 .934 
Overall R2 .001 .018 .020 .867 
Rho .922 .916 .910 .205 
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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 In terms of goodness of fit, the full models perform quite well. The overall R2 is .830 for 
CIVIX and .867 for MIPEX-IRS, though both models are much better at explaining variation in 
integration requirements between countries than they are at explaining variation within countries. 
The relatively large rho values suggest that a substantial part of the variation in integration 
requirements is between countries. This is particularly true for the full model with CIVIX as the 
outcome variable, where more than three quarters of the variance of the dependent variable is 
between subjects; this leads further credence to the use of random effects models rather than a 
fixed effects specification. 
 Overall, some of the results emerging from these analyses are puzzling. First, predictors 
which one would intuitively suspect to have a sizeable effect on the adoption of stricter language 
and civic education requirements for immigrants – primarily government ideology, public 
opinion, and size of the immigrant population – are not or only inconsistently associated with 
CIVIX and MIPEX-IRS. Second, contrary to expectations, countries with larger integration 
deficits (i.e. a relatively poorly integrated immigrant community) are less likely to adopt stricter 
integration requirements for immigrants. There is no theoretically compelling reason why this 
might be the case. One possibility is that this effect is indicative of simultaneity (reverse 
causality), meaning that stricter language and civic education requirements for immigrants cause 
lower unemployment rates among immigrants rather than the other way around. The standard 
random effects model is unable to account for this possibility. To explore the issue of reverse 
causality and probe the results reported in this section, I conduct a series of robustness tests. 
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3.3.1 Robustness 
I conduct a total of four robustness checks. First, I estimate the models as OLS regressions with a 
lagged dependent variable (LDV) rather than random effects. The variables in the LDV models 
are the same as in the random effects models except the former do not include the starting point 
variable; since the lagged dependent variable captures the effect of past policies, including the 
starting point variable would be redundant. The LDV models are estimated as AR(1) 
specifications, meaning that they include a one-year lag of the dependent variable on the right-
hand side. The results for these models are shown in Tables 10 and 11. One result that jumps out 
is that the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is quite large and significant across all 
models, meaning that mandatory integration requirements are highly stable. Therefore, like the 
random effects models, the LDV models support the notion that a country’s current integration 
policy is largely a function of its past policy. 
Aside from this one common finding, the results of the LDV models differ markedly 
from those of the random effects models. First, in the LDV models, government ideology is 
positively and significantly associated with both CIVIX and MIPEX-IRS, which suggests that 
more conservative governments are more likely to adopt stricter integration requirements for 
immigrants. Second, public opinion now has a significant and positive effect across all MIPEX-
IRS models, meaning that negative public attitudes toward immigration lead governments to 
implement more robust language and civic education requirements for immigrants. Third, the 
positive effect of learning on CIVIX and MIPEX-IRS is no longer significant. Fourth, the 
positive relationship between changes in employment rates and mandatory integration rates for 
MIPEX-IRS disappears but socialization is now a significant predictor. Fifth, the negative 
relationship between unemployment among immigrants and CIVIX becomes insignificant. 
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Table 10. Determinants of Integration Requirements – LDV Models (CIVIX) 
 
          Model 1 
          (OLS) 
          Model 2 
          (OLS) 
          Model 3 
          (OLS) 
          Model 4 
          (OLS) 
Government ideology    0.076** 
    (0.035) 
     
Public opinion 0.003   0.006 
 (0.009)   (0.008) 
     
Immigrant population  -0.002  -0.007 
  (0.004)  (0.005) 
     
Integration deficits   -0.004 -0.001 
   (0.008) (0.013) 
     
Years in EU    0.006 
    (0.005) 
     
Learning    0.001 
    (0.040) 
     
Capacity    -0.022 
    (0.142) 
     
∆ Employment rate    0.041 
    (0.042) 
     
Lagged CIVIX 1.019*** 1.017*** 1.019*** 0.998*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.020) 
     
Year dummies     
(not reported)     
     
     
Constant -0.075 -0.003 0.011 -0.581 
 (0.116) (0.065) (0.101) (0.413) 
N 135 128 134 127 
R2 .945 .949 .944 .952 
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 11. Determinants of Integration Requirements – LDV Models (MIPEX-IRS) 
 
          Model 1 
          (OLS) 
          Model 2 
          (OLS) 
          Model 3 
          (OLS) 
          Model 4 
          (OLS) 
Government ideology    0.480* 
    (0.281) 
     
Public opinion 0.116***   0.151*** 
 (0.036)   (0.039) 
     
Immigrant population  -0.015  -0.084*** 
  (0.023)  (0.026) 
     
Integration deficits   -0.099* -0.118* 
   (0.054) (0.061) 
     
Years in EU    0.036** 
    (0.016) 
     
Learning    0.048 
    (0.074) 
     
Capacity    -0.720 
    (0.630) 
     
∆ Employment rate    -0.181 
    (0.131) 
     
Lagged MIPEX-IRS 0.983*** 0.992*** 0.988*** 0.962*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
     
Year dummies     
(not reported)     
     
     
Constant -0.360 1.329 1.821* -1.724 
 (0.820) (1.020) (0.957) (2.817) 
N 175 161 164 153 
R2 .951 .950 .947 .953 
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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 Second, I use a series of alternative measures of integration deficits. While the 
unemployment rate among immigrants is a conceptually convincing measure of immigrant 
integration, one practical problem with this variable is that it is highly correlated with the overall 
unemployment rate (.873). Therefore, rather than measuring integration deficits, the 
unemployment rate among immigrants might capture general economic trends and the economic 
mood in a country. As stated in Section 3.2, I use the share of a country’s foreign-born 
population who is at risk of poverty or social exclusion as an alternative measure. The term “at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion” – abbreviated AROPE – refers to a situation where people 
“are either at risk of poverty, or severely materially deprived or living in a household with a very 
low work intensity” (Eurostat 2017a). Data on the share of a country’s foreign-born population 
AROPE are retrieved from Eurostat. Higher values on this variable indicate greater poverty and 
exclusion among a country’s immigrant population, and therefore larger integration deficits. In 
my sample, this variable exhibits a mean of 31.312, with a minimum value of 16 and a maximum 
value of 62.7. It correlates quite strongly with the unemployment rate among immigrants (.602) 
and somewhat less strongly with the overall unemployment rate (.488). 
 I estimate four models with CIVIX as the outcome variable: a random effects model 
which includes the lagged value of AROPE and the year dummies; a random effects model 
which includes the lagged value of AROPE, the year dummies, and the other covariates; an LDV 
model which includes the lagged value of AROPE, the lagged dependent variable, and the year 
dummies; and an LDV model which includes the lagged value of AROPE, the lagged dependent 
variable, the year dummies, and the other covariates. The results for these models are shown in 
Table 12. The effect of AROPE on mandatory integration requirements for immigrants is 
consistently insignificant, which is different from the results of the previous random effects 
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models which used unemployment among immigrants as a measure of integration deficits. Using 
MIPEX-IRS as the outcome variable yields the same results (see Table 13): whether a country’s 
immigrant population is poorly integrated has no bearing on the intensity of its integration 
requirements for immigrants. In addition, replacing the unemployment rate among immigrants 
with AROPE alters some of the other covariates’ effects. For example, the positive coefficient 
for learning is no longer significant in the random effects model using MIPEX-IRS as the 
outcome variable. Similarly, government ideology is no longer significant in the LDV using 
MIPEX-IRS as the outcome variable. The fact that changing the measure for one particular 
covariate is that consequential for the other covariates further illustrates the volatility of the 
models, which likely goes back to Kroll and Song’s (2013) argument about the severity of 
multicollinearity in small samples. 
 
Table 12. Determinants of Integration Requirements – AROPE (CIVIX) 
               Random Effects           Lagged DV 
               Reduced               Full           Reduced           Full 
Integration deficits 0.012 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.004) (0.006) 
     
Year dummies     
(not reported)     
     
Other covariates     
(not reported)     
     
Constant 1.460 -3.035* -0.006 -0.487 
 (0.888) (1.800) (0.123) (0.444) 
N 135 128 135 128 
Within R2 .487 .493   
Between R2 .004 .857   
(Overall) R2 .056 .830 .944 .953 
Rho .927 .585   
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 13. Determinants of Integration Requirements – AROPE (MIPEX-IRS) 
               Random Effects           Lagged DV 
               Reduced               Full           Reduced           Full 
Integration deficits 0.078 0.006 0.000 -0.028 
 (0.166) (0.151) (0.034) (0.032) 
     
Year dummies     
(not reported)     
     
Other covariates     
(not reported)     
     
Constant 24.445 -18.698* 0.850 -0.916 
 (6.309) (1.800) (0.873) (2.565) 
N 200 161 175 161 
Within R2 .098 .094   
Between R2 .026 .906   
(Overall) R2 .018 .845 .948 .954 
Rho .909 .376   
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
 Recently, some integration scholars have suggested that immigrant integration should be 
measured in a different way. According to these scholars (e.g. Burgoon 2014; Goodman and 
Wright 2015), rather than using the level of a particular outcome variable, a more valid way of 
measuring integration is to use the difference between the immigrant community and native-born 
population for the same outcome. The rationale behind this new approach is that integration is a 
relational concept, meaning that whether integration is successful can only be judged when 
comparing a country’s immigrants to its native-born population. For example, it seems 
questionable to refer to a materially deprived immigrant community as poorly integrated when 
the native-born population in the same country is equally or more materially deprived. Therefore, 
I create two new measures of integration deficits. First, I subtract the unemployment rate for the 
native-born population from that of the foreign-born population. The resulting variable has a 
mean of 4.050, meaning that on average, the unemployment rate among immigrants is four 
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percentage points higher than it is among the natives. Second, I subtract the share of the native-
born population AROPE from that of the foreign-born population. The mean of the resulting 
variable is 9.902, meaning that on average, the poverty rate among immigrants is almost ten 
percentage points higher than it is among immigrants. These variables have the added benefit 
that they correlate only weakly with the overall unemployment rate (< .200 for both). 
 Tables 14 through 17 show the results for the models using the two new outcome 
variables. They illustrate that when integration deficits are measured as the difference in 
unemployment rates among immigrants and natives, integration deficits are negatively and 
significantly associated with mandatory integration requirements in two of the eight models. 
Again, there is no theoretically compelling reason why countries with a well-integrated 
immigrant community would be more likely to adopt stricter integration requirements for 
immigrants. Therefore, this relationship appears to be due to simultaneity, meaning that stricter 
integration requirements cause lower unemployment among immigrants, not the other way 
around. The variable capturing the difference in poverty rates among foreign-born and native-
born individuals is insignificant in all eight models. Overall, then, these results suggest that 
mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants are significantly associated 
with unemployment among immigrants but not with other measures of integration, though this 
relationship is not entirely robust to alternative model specifications. 
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Table 14. Determinants of Integration Requirements – ∆ Unemployment (CIVIX) 
               Random Effects           Lagged DV 
               Reduced               Full           Reduced           Full 
Integration deficits -0.062* -0.118** -0.011 -0.009 
 (0.032) (0.053) (0.016) (0.023) 
     
Year dummies     
(not reported)     
     
Other covariates     
(not reported)     
     
Constant 2.027*** -2.342 0.019 -0.572* 
 (0.401) (1.476) (0.097) (0.311) 
N 134 127 134 127 
Within R2 .527 .560   
Between R2 .008 .854   
(Overall) R2 .076 .835 .944 .953 
Rho .924 .686   
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 15. Determinants of Integration Requirements – ∆ Unemployment (MIPEX-IRS) 
               Random Effects           Lagged DV 
               Reduced               Full           Reduced           Full 
Integration deficits -0.555 -0.585 -0.054 -0.229 
 (0.388) (0.393) (0.134) (0.163) 
     
Year dummies     
(not reported)     
     
Other covariates     
(not reported)     
     
Constant 28.299*** -20.845* 1.135 -2.748 
 (3.853) (11.929) (0.982) (2.930) 
N 187 153 164 153 
Within R2 .128 .095   
Between R2 .012 .922   
(Overall) R2 .021 .858 .946 .953 
Rho .910 .306   
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 16. Determinants of Integration Requirements – ∆ AROPE (CIVIX) 
               Random Effects           Lagged DV 
               Reduced               Full           Reduced           Full 
Integration deficits 0.014 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.006) (0.005) 
     
Year dummies     
(not reported)     
     
Other covariates     
(not reported)     
     
Constant 1.685*** -3.035* -0.007 -0.595* 
 (0.478) (1.800) (0.077) (0.314) 
N 135 128 135 128 
Within R2 .487 .492   
Between R2 .001 .859   
(Overall) R2 .059 .832 .945 .953 
Rho .927 .563   
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 17. Determinants of Integration Requirements – ∆ AROPE (MIPEX-IRS) 
               Random Effects           Lagged DV 
               Reduced               Full           Reduced           Full 
Integration deficits 0.094 0.066 0.030 0.002 
 (0.168) (0.145) (0.035) (0.038) 
     
Year dummies     
(not reported)     
     
Other covariates     
(not reported)     
     
Constant 26.046*** -18.127 0.628 -1.450 
 (4.000) (11.018) (0.726) (2.795) 
N 200 161 175 161 
Within R2 .099 .106   
Between R2 .020 .901   
(Overall) R2 .018 .844 .948 .954 
Rho .909 .423   
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Third, I add additional variables to my baseline models to further explore the effects of 
public opinion and salience. The first addition is an interaction term between public opinion and 
a binary variable coded 1 for election years and 0 otherwise. 26 It seems plausible that 
governments are responsive to public opinion when they are up for reelection, but during normal 
times are inclined to ignore the public’s policy preferences. Tables 18 and 19 show the results for 
these interaction models. The interaction term is insignificant across models, meaning that 
governments are no more (or less) responsive to their constituents’ concerns about immigrant 
integration during election years than they are during other times. 
The second set of models adds a dummy variable for Luxembourg to my baseline 
models. Luxembourg represents a special case in Europe in the sense that a) the relative size of 
its immigrant population is much greater than that of other European countries, and b) the vast 
majority of its immigrant population consists of individuals from other EU member states rather 
than third-country nationals. In 2007, immigrants made up almost 40% of Luxembourg’s 
population; less than 14% of these immigrants were not from the EU (Kollwelter 2007). Thus, 
Luxembourg represents an outlier that could potentially distort some of my findings, particularly 
the coefficient for the variable that captures the relative size of a country’s immigrant population. 
The results for these models are shown in Tables 18 and 19. The inclusion of the Luxembourg 
dummy wipes out the effect of integration deficits in the random effects model with MIPEX-IRS 
as the outcome variable. 
                                                 
26 Data for this variable comes from the ParlGov database. 
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Table 18. Determinants of Integration Requirements – Additional Models (CIVIX) 
         Random Effects      Lagged DV 
           Interaction         Luxembourg           Interaction       Luxembourg 
Public opinion -0.001  -0.001  
 (0.016)  (0.008)  
     
Election year 0.293  -0.259  
 (0.230)  (0.367)  
     
Opinion * election -0.016  0.023  
 (0.018)  (0.033)  
     
Immigrant population  -0.185*  -0.007 
  (0.099)  (0.016) 
     
Luxembourg  3.841  0.141 
  (2.744)  (0.411) 
     
Lagged DV   1.021*** 1.016*** 
   (0.010) (0.016) 
     
Year dummies     
(not reported)     
     
Constant 1.84*** 3.88*** -0.02 0.04 
 (0.36) (1.02) (0.12) (0.19) 
N 135 128 135 128 
Within R2 .491 .492   
Between R2 .059 .079   
(Overall) R2 .057 .120 .945 .949 
Rho .932 .943   
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 19. Determinants of Integration Requirements – Additional Models (MIPEX-IRS) 
         Random Effects      Lagged DV 
           Interaction         Luxembourg           Interaction       Luxembourg 
Public opinion -0.112  0.122***  
 (0.129)  (0.129)  
     
Election year 1.058  -0.567  
 (0.793)  (0.827)  
     
Opinion * election -0.078  -0.029  
 (0.055)  (0.085)  
     
Immigrant population  0.716  0.013 
  (0.518)  (0.051) 
     
Luxembourg  -40.57**  -1.30 
  (15.68)  (1.67) 
     
Lagged DV   0.983*** 0.992*** 
   (0.018) (0.020) 
     
Year dummies     
(not reported)     
     
Constant 28.21*** 20.67*** -0.16 1.09 
 (4.38) (6.69) (0.85) (1.10) 
N 200 178 175 161 
Within R2 .113 .112   
Between R2 .058 .011   
(Overall) R2 .001 .018 .951 .950 
Rho .912 .919   
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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 Lastly, I have argued that the negative relationship between unemployment among 
immigrants and the intensity of a country’s integration requirements that has emerged from some 
of the models is likely due to reverse causality, i.e. the latter causing the former. Testing (and 
correcting) for simultaneity is a very challenging enterprise that requires the estimation of an 
instrumental variable model (Shepherd 2010). Since good external instruments are incredibly 
difficult to find, scholars have resorted to a number of alternative approaches to dealing with 
reverse causality. One such approach is the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimator (Arellano 
and Bond 1991). Arellano–Bond estimation starts by transforming all regressors, usually by 
diﬀerencing, and uses the generalized method of moments (GMM); it is therefore also referred to 
as difference GMM (Roodman 2009). 
One advantage of the Arellano-Bond estimator is that it does not require the specification 
of external instruments because it makes use of the lagged explanatory variables in level and in 
difference. Because of this advantage, I re-estimate the full model shown in Table 11 using the 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimator.27 The results indicate that when the reverse effect of 
mandatory integration requirements on unemployment among immigrants is accounted for, 
integration deficits do not have a significant effect on a country’s MIPEX-IRS score. This 
supports my previous argument that mandatory language and civic education requirements affect 
immigrants’ level of integration, not the other way around. The model fails to reject the null 
hypotheses for both the Sargan test and the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences, 
which suggests that the assumptions for the validity of the difference GMM are met (Roodman 
2009). 
                                                 
27 This is done by using the xtabond2 command in Stata v15 (see Roodman 2009). 
 85 
3.4 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, I have examined the determinants of mandatory integration requirements for 
immigrants in Europe. Analyzing data on 25 EU member states between 2005 and 2014, I found 
that which covariates are significantly associated with the adoption of stricter language and civic 
integration requirements for immigrants is highly dependent on model specification. Table 20 
summarizes the results for the various model specifications used throughout this chapter. More 
specifically, it shows the direction of the effect and significance level for each of the nine 
covariates by model specification.28 The results vary considerably across three dimensions: 
analytical approach (random effects model vs. LDV model), dependent variable (CIVIX vs. 
MIPEX-IRS), and measure of integration (unemployment vs. AROPE). For example, one major 
difference between the random effects models and the LDV models is that in the former, learning 
generally has a positive effect on the adoption of stricter integration requirements for immigrants 
while in the latter it has not. Similarly, public opinion has a strong and positive effect on a 
country’s MIPEX-IRS score in the LDV models, whereas the random effects models suggest that 
public opinion has no bearing on the intensity of a country’s integration requirements for 
immigrants. 
 
                                                 
28 For public opinion, immigrant population, and integration deficits to be marked as significant, they have 
to exhibit a significant effect in both the reduced and the full model. If they are significant in both models but the 
significance levels differ between reduced and full model, I use the significance level of the reduced model. Note 
that in the random effects models, policy legacies are measured via a time-invariant starting point variable, whereas 
in the LDV models they are captured by a one-year lag of the dependent variable. 
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Table 20. Summary of Results 
 
Random Effects Model 
Immigrant Unemployment 
LDV Model 
Immigrant Unemployment 
Random Effects Model 
AROPE 
 CIVIX MIPEX-IRS CIVIX MIPEX-IRS CIVIX MIPEX-IRS 
Gov. ideology   positive ** positive *   
Public opinion    positive ***   
Policy legacies positive *** positive *** positive *** positive *** positive *** positive *** 
Immigrant pop.       
Integration deficits negative * negative *  negative *   
Socialization    positive **   
Learning positive *** positive *   positive ***  
State capacity       
∆ Employment rate  negative *   positive *  
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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Table 20. Summary of Results (Continued) 
 
LDV Model 
AROPE 
Random Effects Model 
Difference Unemployment 
LDV Model 
Difference Unemployment 
 CIVIX MIPEX-IRS CIVIX MIPEX-IRS CIVIX MIPEX-IRS 
Gov. ideology positive **    positive **  
Public opinion  positive ***    positive *** 
Policy legacies positive *** positive *** positive *** positive *** positive *** positive *** 
Immigrant pop.       
Integration deficits   negative * negative *   
Socialization  positive *    positive * 
Learning   positive *** positive *   
State capacity       
∆ Employment rate    negative **   
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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Table 20. Summary of Results (Continued) 
 
Random Effects Model 
Difference AROPE 
LDV Model 
Difference AROPE 
Random Effects Model 
Immigrant Unemployment 
Opinion * Election Year 
 CIVIX MIPEX-IRS CIVIX MIPEX-IRS CIVIX MIPEX-IRS 
Gov. ideology   positive *    
Public opinion    positive ***   
Policy legacies positive *** positive *** positive *** positive *** positive *** positive *** 
Immigrant pop.       
Integration deficits     negative * negative * 
Socialization    positive *   
Learning positive ***    positive *** positive * 
State capacity       
∆ Employment rate positive *      
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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Table 20. Summary of Results (Continued) 
 
LDV Model 
Immigrant Unemployment 
Opinion * Election Year 
Random Effects Model 
Immigrant Unemployment 
Luxembourg Dummy 
LDV Model 
Immigrant Unemployment 
Luxembourg Dummy 
 CIVIX MIPEX-IRS CIVIX MIPEX-IRS CIVIX MIPEX-IRS 
Gov. ideology positive *    positive **  
Public opinion  positive ***    positive *** 
Policy legacies positive *** positive *** positive *** positive *** positive *** positive *** 
Immigrant pop.       
Integration deficits  negative * negative * negative *  negative * 
Socialization  positive **    positive ** 
Learning   positive *** positive *   
State capacity       
∆ Employment rate    negative **   
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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 The results also differ based on which measure of language and civic education 
requirements for immigrants is used, CIVIX or MIPEX-IRS. For example, socialization is 
positively and significantly associated with MIPEX-IRS in several models but never with 
CIVIX. This goes back to Goodman’s (2015) study, which showed that index-dependency is a 
common phenomenon in the field of integration research.29 Lastly, it matters whether integration 
and, by extension, integration deficits are measured via unemployment or AROPE. When 
integration is captured via the unemployment rate among immigrants, it has a negative and 
significant effect in a number of models; AROPE, however, is never a significant predictor of 
mandatory integration requirements. In addition, the choice of integration measure has 
consequences for the effects of some of the other covariates. For example, in the random effects 
model using MIPEX-IRS as the outcome and unemployment among immigrants as the measure 
of integration, learning has a positive and significant impact; however, when unemployment is 
replaced with AROPE, the positive coefficient of learning is no longer significant.30 These 
discrepancies are likely the result of multicollinearity, which poses a serious challenge for 
inference with small samples (Kroll and Song 2013). 
 Despite this lack of robustness across model specifications, four important inferences can 
be (cautiously) drawn from the results. First, they suggest that government ideology and public 
                                                 
29 To further investigate this difference in results, I restrict the sample to cases common to CIVIX and 
MIPEX-IRS, that is, the EU-15 countries between 2007 and 2014. This, however, did not cause the results to 
become more consistent across indices, which suggests that the divergent findings between CIVIX and MIPEX-IRS 
are due to measurement issues (i.e. the two indices do not measure the same exact concept) rather than differences in 
sample selection (Goodman 2012b; 2015). 
30 I also estimate a bivariate random effects model, using MIPEX-IRS as the outcome and learning as the 
predictor (plus the year dummies). In this model, the coefficient for learning is positive and significant. 
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opinion are only inconsistently associated with mandatory integration requirements, thereby 
calling into question conventional wisdom in integration research (Akkerman 2012; Bale 2008; 
Facchini and Mayda 2010; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Hix and Noury 2007; Howard 2010). On 
second thought, it might not be all that surprising that these two variables are not reliable 
predictors of mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants. In recent 
years, several left-leaning parties have warmed up to the idea of language and civic integration 
requirements for immigrants, including the social democrats (Parti Socialiste) in France (Morin 
2017), the social democrats (SPD) in Germany (Abadi 2017), and even the socialists (Syriza) in 
Greece (Maronitis 2017). Examining when, why, and how parts of the European center-left came 
to embrace mandatory integration requirements promises to be an interesting avenue for future 
research. As for public opinion, governments routinely ignore the preferences of their 
constituents in other policy areas, and publics often fail to translate their preferences into policy 
due to a lack of political participation (Lutz et al. 2014). 
 That being said, it is possible that party politics and public opinion affect the adoption of 
stricter integration requirements in more complex ways than I hypothesized in this chapter. For 
example, it might be that policy adoption is driven by the presence of strong far-right parties, 
which forces the established parties – both center-right and center-left – to appear “tough” on 
immigration by implementing stricter language and civic education requirements for immigrants. 
It could also be the case that the effect of party politics and/or public opinion varies by electoral 
system (see Wlezien and Soroka 2015). Lastly, my measure of public opinion is potentially 
problematic in that it captures the level of public concern about immigration rather than the 
public’s feelings toward immigrants. It is possible that societies which are relatively welcoming 
toward immigrants adopt stricter integration requirements with the goal of helping immigrants, 
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but even without mandatory integration requirements immigrants would have likely fared well in 
these societies. This, if true, could introduce endogeneity in analyses of the requirements’ 
effects. I leave it to future research to address these possibilities and issues more systematically 
and in greater detail. 
Second, the only variable significantly affecting language and civic education 
requirements for immigrants across all model specifications is past policy. Goodman appears to 
be correct when she argues that existing integration policies define “the parameters of the debate 
in which policy actors propose and implement change” (2014, 6). In other words, policy options 
which deviate too far from previous integration policies are somewhat unimaginable and fall 
outside of the mainstream political discourse. For example, Swedish national identity involves a 
strong notion of multiculturalism, which has led most parties – both center-left and center-right – 
to firmly resist the European trend toward stricter integration requirements (Borevi 2014). 
 Third, though not entirely robust to alternative model specifications, learning appears to 
have a positive and significant effect on the adoption of stricter integration requirements for 
immigrants. EU member states seem to emulate the integration policies of those members most 
successful at integrating their immigrant communities. As countries with relatively well 
integrated immigrant communities adopt language and civic education requirements (or, 
alternatively, immigrants in countries with these requirements become more integrated), other 
EU members are likely to adopt them as well. This suggests that policy diffusion through 
learning is not limited to economic policies where it is most often applied (e.g. Simmons and 
Elkins 2004; Quinn and Toyoda 2007) but operates in other policy areas as well. While this 
finding is consistent with efforts by the European Union to promote mandatory integration 
requirements through information sharing and “best practices”, I cannot ascertain the extent to 
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which the common EU framework for immigrant integration (see Section 1.2. on the EIF) is 
actually responsible for these learning processes. In other words, it might be possible that absent 
the EU/EIF, these learning processes would still have taken place. I leave it to future research to 
disentangle the specific impact of the EU/EIF from general learning processes that take place 
outside of the EU framework for immigrant integration. 
Fourth, one of the more consistent relationships uncovered in this chapter is that between 
unemployment among immigrants and mandatory language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants. Using difference GMM, I found that the negative effect of unemployment among 
immigrants on the intensity of a country’s integration requirements is due to reverse causality. It 
is not the case that successful integration prompts countries to implement tougher integration 
policies; rather, stricter language and civic education requirements lead to lower unemployment 
among immigrants. The fact that integration deficits do not have a significant effect on policy 
adoption casts doubt on technocratic explanations of integration policy, since governments do 
not appear to respond to such objective immigration conditions in their country. Moreover, this 
finding is important in that it suggests that mandatory language and civic education requirements 
for immigrants work, that is, they lead to improved integration outcomes. It should be noted, 
however, that this positive effect of mandatory integration requirements on integration outcomes 
appears to be exclusive to the realm of economic integration, as I did not find a significant 
relationship between immigrants’ level of social integration (measured via the share of the 
foreign-born population AROPE) and integration policy. In the next chapter, I further examine 
the effect of stricter integration requirements on immigrants’ level of integration. 
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4.0  EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF INTEGRATION POLICIES 
As the introductory chapter illustrated, immigrant integration and integration policy have been 
important and controversial issues in contemporary Europe. Over the past two decades, several 
European countries drastically altered their immigrant integration policies due to an acute and 
widespread sense that European states and societies had failed to integrate their migrant and 
ethnic minority populations. In response to this (perceived) integration crisis, distinct national 
policy models, which were in many cases rooted in multicultural ideals and practices, gave way 
to more restrictive integration policies based on language acquisition, civic training, and liberal 
value commitment (Goodman 2014; Joppke 2007a; 2007b). While the majority of Europe’s 
leaders seem convinced that these mandatory integration requirements are beneficial for the 
immigrant community as well as their host societies, this new approach has been subject to two 
kinds of criticism. First, scholars have criticized these new policy models on normative grounds 
(Kostakopoulou 2010; Schinkel 2013). Second, it has been suggested that restrictive integration 
policies based on language acquisition, civic training, and liberal value commitment do more 
harm than good, i.e. they actually hinder integration (Boecker and Strik 2011; Groenendijk 2011; 
Van Oers 2013). 
 This chapter addresses the second kind of criticism by examining the effects of 
mandatory language and civic education requirements on immigrant integration: Are mandatory 
integration requirements effective, that is, do they lead to improved integration outcomes? By 
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answering this question, I make two contributions to the ongoing debate on the subject. First, I 
bring new and improved evidence to bear on the question of whether mandatory integration 
matters. By using a large dataset that is rich in temporal and cross-national variation as well as a 
sophisticated analytical approach, I am able to obtain estimates of the effect of restrictive 
integration policy on various outcome measures of integration that are more generalizable and 
lend themselves more to a causal interpretation than those of previous studies. Second, this 
chapter combines a number of recent advances in the econometrics of policy evaluation into a 
robust analytical approach. This approach can not only serve as a guideline for the analysis of 
other policy areas, but also serves as a reminder on the importance of proper research design and 
methodological rigor in the analysis of observational data. 
 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I lay out the data and measures 
employed in this chapter. I use data from the seven waves of the European Social Survey (2002-
2015) to assess the impact of restrictive integration policies on three different dimensions of 
integration: social, political, and economic integration. The fact that some European countries 
substantially altered their approach to immigrant integration during the time period under 
investigation while others did not allows me to use a difference-in-differences design; the 
specifics and advantages of this analytical approach are discussed in Section 4.2. Using this 
approach, I find that mandatory integration policies are positively associated with measures of 
economic integration. These results, which are reasonably robust across various alternative 
model specifications, are reported in Section 4.3. Next, I discuss different mechanisms through 
which restrictive integration policies could potentially lead to improved economic integration, 
and provide suggestive evidence regarding the plausibility of each of these mechanisms, 
including original interviews with practitioners of and experts on integration policy in Germany. 
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A concluding section then summarizes the main findings of this chapter, connects them with the 
broader literature, and indicates possible directions for future research on the subject. 
4.1 DATA AND MEASURES 
To examine the effect of integration policy on immigrants’ attitudes and behavior in Europe, I 
generate a dataset using the seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted 
between 2002 and 2015. The ESS contains several relevant social, political, and economic 
integration outcome measures, and has been used by a number of recent studies examining 
immigrants’ attitudes and behavior (Burgoon 2014; Goodman and Wright 2015; Just and 
Anderson 2015). Given the purpose of this chapter as well as issues with data availability, I 
restrict the dataset to respondents who identify as foreign-born and reside in one of the 23 EU 
member states that regularly participate in the ESS.31 In addition, to ensure that the dataset only 
includes relevant cases, i.e. immigrants who have been exposed to the treatment (mandatory 
integration requirements), I also restrict the sample to immigrants with residence of ten years or 
fewer. Ten years is around the average time in which an immigrant would apply for either 
permanent residence or citizenship, and therefore be exposed to the bulk of a host country’s 
language and civic integration requirements (see Goodman and Wright 2015). This process leads 
to a total of 5,621 observations, which are the unit of analysis for all subsequent models. 
 
                                                 
31 The 23 sample countries are the EU-25 (see footnote 13) minus Latvia and Malta. 
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The dependent variable is integration, which is broadly defined as the process of 
dismantling all barriers to full participation in society (Kymlicka 2012). As pointed out in 
Section 2.3, scholars have measured integration in various ways,32 but usually tend to distinguish 
between three different dimensions of integration: social/cultural, political, and economic 
integration (Akresh et al. 2014; Dancygier and Laitin 2014; Goodman and Wright 2015). Since 
there are no universally agreed upon measures of integration, it is at my own discretion to find 
suitable outcome variables. To identify these outcomes, I rely on previous operationalizations of 
immigrant integration, not just in the literature on the effects of mandatory integration 
requirements but in integration research more generally. In identifying these outcomes, I am 
constrained by data availability issues. For example, while host country language proficiency, 
identification with the host country, and contacts with members of the host society are intuitively 
convincing and somewhat widely used measures of social integration, the ESS does not include 
information on any of them. 
Therefore, I use the following two measures of social integration. First, I take the average 
of three eleven-point ordinal scales to generate a measure of respondents’ level of social trust 
(Goodman and Wright 2015). Each of these ordinal scales ranges from 0 to 10, with higher 
values representing higher levels of trust. They are based on the following three questions: (1) 
“Would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?” (2) “Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the 
chance, or would they try to be fair?” (3) “Would you say that most of the time people try to be 
helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?” Second, I use tolerance of 
                                                 
32 The literature on social, political, and economic integration is too vast to review in its entirety. For 
excellent overviews, see Massey 1981; Waters and Jimenez 2005; and Dancygier and Laitin 2014. 
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homosexuals as a proxy for respondents’ strength of identification with Western European values 
(Burgoon 2014). This variable is coded as a five-point ordinal scale ranging from disagreeing 
strongly with the statement that gays and lesbians are free to live as they wish to strongly 
agreeing with it.  
 As for political integration, I examine two measures which are intended to tap into the 
educative overtones of civic integration courses and tests. First, political interest is measured via 
a four-point ordinal scale that captures respondents’ level of interest in politics, ranging from 
“not at all interested” to “very interested” (Goodman and Wright 2015). Second, I take the 
average of five eleven-point ordinal scales to create a measure of respondents’ level of 
institutional trust (Adman and Stromblad 2015; Gidron and Superti 2016). These scales range 
from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust) and capture respondents’ feelings toward the 
following political and legal institutions: the parliament, the legal system, the police, political 
parties, and politicians in general. As one of the stated goals of integration policy is to promote 
economic self-sufficiency and improvement for immigrants, I examine two measures of 
economic integration. First, I use a four-point ordinal scale that captures respondents’ subjective 
financial well-being and ranges from “very difficult to get by on present income” to “living 
comfortably on present income” (Goodman and Wright 2015; Kislev 2014). Second, I use a 
dummy variable which measures respondents’ employment status; it is coded 0 if a respondent 
was actively looking for employment during the last seven days and 1 otherwise (Burgoon 2014; 
Goodman and Wright 2015). 
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 The key explanatory variable are mandatory language and civic integration requirements 
for immigrants, which, as in the previous chapter, are measured via CIVIX33 and MIPEX-IRS.34 
Of course, integration policy is not the only factor potentially influencing immigrants’ levels of 
integration. Therefore, I include a number of individual-level and country-level controls in my 
models. As for the individual-level controls, research suggests that immigrants’ religious 
affiliation affects their willingness to integrate, with Muslims on average being less willing than 
immigrants belonging to other denominations (Adida et al. 2014; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011). 
To account for this, I include a battery of dummy variables in my models that represent whether 
or not a particular immigrant identifies with one of the following: Catholicism, Protestantism, 
other types of Christianity, Islam, other religions (such as Judaism and Eastern religions), and no 
religion (the latter being the omitted category). Similarly, scholars have argued that immigrants’ 
region of origin impacts their level of integration, even when controlling for a variety of other 
determinants such as religion. For example, looking at immigrants in the United States, Akresh 
                                                 
33 Since CIVIX data are only available for certain years, I impute the years for which no CIVIX scores are 
provided with the CIVIX value for the closest year in which data are available (see Section 2.1). Combining the ESS 
sample with CIVIX data yields 154 discrete country-years for analysis. The seven waves of the ESS were conducted 
over the course of 14 years (2002-2015). Thus, if every country were surveyed in every year, it would lead to a total 
of 210 discrete country-years (15 sample countries times 14 years). However, this is not the case, as some countries 
did not participate in all seven waves of the ESS. For example, Greece did not participate in waves three, six, and 
seven. As a result, there are 154 discrete country-years instead of 210. 
34 Combining the ESS sample with MIPEX data yields 124 discrete country-years for analysis. If every 
country were surveyed in every year for which MIPEX data are available (2007-2014), it would lead to a total of 
184 discrete country-years (23 sample countries times 8 years). However, for the reasons elaborated on in the 
previous footnote, this is not the case. 
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et al. (2014) find that Western Europeans and Australasians are much more likely to integrate 
than immigrants from other regions. Therefore, my analysis includes a battery of dummy 
variables, one for each of the following regions: Western hemisphere (North America, 
Australasia, and Western Europe), Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Latin America, sub-Saharan 
Africa, Asia, and North Africa and the Middle East (the latter being the omitted category). 
 In addition, I control for immigrants’ level of education, as previous research has shown 
that more educated immigrants exhibit higher levels of integration (Banting and Soroka 2012; 
Burgoon 2014; De Vroome et al. 2014; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011; Ten Teije et al. 2013). As 
previously stated, some migration scholars view education as an integration outcome rather than 
a driver of integration, but given that a) the majority of studies on the subject use it as an 
independent variable, and b) I examine only newly arriving immigrants that have most likely 
acquired the majority of their education in their home country, I opt to treat education as a 
predictor. Respondents’ level of education is measured via a five-point ordinal scale ranging 
from “less than lower secondary education” to “tertiary education completed”. The ESS provides 
similar scales for the education of respondents’ mothers and fathers. I take the average of these 
two scales to create a measure of the average educational attainment of respondents’ parents, 
which is supposed to account for relevant pre-migration characteristics that potentially affect 
integration (Akresh et al. 2014). 
I also control for immigrants’ family status, as existing research suggests that immigrants 
who were married by the time of their entry integrate less well on certain dimensions, 
particularly language acquisition (Akresh et al. 2014). Family status is measured via a binary 
variable coded 0 for respondents who live alone and 1 for respondents who live with a spouse 
and/or children. Previous studies also show that certain demographic characteristics are related 
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with a number of relevant outcome measures, with females and younger immigrants exhibiting 
lower levels of integration (Akresh et al. 2014). Therefore, I include respondents’ gender and age 
in my analysis, the former being coded as a binary variable that takes the value 1 for male 
respondents and 0 for female ones, and the latter being coded as a count variable that captures 
respondents’ age in years. 
 As a final individual-level control, I include respondents’ domicile in my analyses. It has 
been suggested that when given the opportunity to exclusively interact with other immigrants 
and/or individuals from the same ethnicity, immigrants are less likely to integrate on a number of 
dimensions, such as acquiring the host country language and forming social relationships with 
members of the host society. In rural areas, there are generally less immigrants relative to the 
native-born population, which increases their incentive to integrate (De Vroome et al. 2014; Ten 
Teije et al. 2013). Therefore, I include a binary variable in my models that is coded 1 for 
respondents who describe their domicile as a big city and 0 for those who describe it as a suburb, 
small city/town, country village, or farm/home in countryside. As for the country-level controls, 
states which suffer from poor macroeconomic conditions might find it more difficult to integrate 
their immigrant population economically. I control for two such conditions: the national GDP per 
capita (in thousands of US dollars) and national unemployment rate; I expect the former to be 
positively related and the latter to be negatively associated with my measures of economic 
integration. Data for these two variables are retrieved from the World Bank and Eurostat 
respectively. 
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4.2 ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
Determining if and to what extent integration policy affects immigrants’ attitudes and behavior is 
challenging. As I have described in Section 2.3, a number of insightful studies on the subject 
exist, yet their potential for causal inference is limited due to various methodological issues. 
Estimating the causal effects of integration policy requires comparing immigrants subject to a 
particular set of policy measures with a similar group of immigrants not subject to it. The fact 
that some European states substantially altered their approach to immigrant integration during 
the past ten to fifteen years while others did not allows me to use a difference-in-differences 
approach and compare the policy exposure and integration rates of these two groups. Difference-
in-differences, or DID for short, has been a popular approach to estimate the effects of macro-
level policy (changes) on individual-level outcomes (Angrist and Pischke 2015; Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2009). 
 DID models come in different variants, with the most popular one being a specification 
that Imbens and Wooldridge refer to as “repeated cross sections with multiple time periods and 
multiple groups” (2009, 67). In this particular version of the DID approach, which is expressed 
in equation (1), individuals are nested within groups Gi (such as countries), some of which have 
received the “treatment” (i.e. the policy or program) while others did not (Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2009, 68). At each time period Ti, random samples are drawn from the populations 
for each group. Therefore, individual i’s group identity and time period can be treated as random 
variables. The β coefficient represents the impact of time common to both groups (i.e. a series of 
time dummies), γ represents the effect of time-invariant unobervables idiosyncratic to each 
group/country (i.e. a series of group/country dummies), and ε represents unobservable 
characteristics of the individual. 
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The τDID term in equation (1) represents the effect of the treatment on Y:35 The average 
change in outcome over time in the non-exposed (control) group is subtracted from the change 
over time in the exposed (treatment) group. “This double differencing removes biases in second 
period comparisons between the treatment and control group that could be the result from 
permanent differences between those groups, as well as biases from comparisons over time in the 
treatment group that could be the result of time trends unrelated to the treatment” (Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2009, 67; see also Angrist and Pischke 2015, 178-208). Therefore, the DID 
approach provides us with considerable leverage for estimating the causal effect of integration 
policy on immigrant’s attitudes and behavior. It should be noted, however, that a causal 
interpretation of the results of a DID model depends crucially on the assumption of common 
trends. In other words, the DID approach presumes that “the average change in the outcome 
variable for the treated in the absence of the treatment is equal to the observed average change in 
the outcome variable for the controls” (Mora and Reggio 2012, 2). This assumption implies that 
differences between the controls and the treated if untreated are time-invariant. Therefore, the 
common trends assumption is consistent with unobservable group-specific time-invariant 
heterogeneity. If the common trends assumption is violated, the result will be biased parameter 
estimates. 
                                                 
35 For ease of presentation, the equation ignores the presence of other covariates, which introduce no 
special complication. 
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Unfortunately, there is no statistical test that would provide a definitive assessment of 
whether the common trends assumption is violated. Scholars therefore generally resort to 
inspecting trends in the outcome variable(s) prior to the implementation of the policy (Angrist 
and Pischke 2015, 183-187; Friedman 2013). Figure 2 plots the unemployment rate among 
immigrants for six EU member states between 1995 and 2004.36 It suggests that European 
countries did not follow a common trend in immigrant integration during this time period. In 
Belgium, France, and Spain, unemployment among foreign-born individuals generally declined 
between 1995 and 2004, which can be interpreted as a movement toward improved integration. 
In Denmark, however, unemployment among immigrants first declined but then rose again, 
while in Germany and Luxembourg there was a general trend toward higher unemployment. 
Therefore, the assumption of common trends seems implausible in the context of my analysis, 
and needs to be addressed moving forward. 
                                                 
36 These data are obtained via Eurostat. 
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Figure 2. Immigrant Unemployment Rates in Six EU Member States, 1995-2004 
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A number of methodological innovations have been proposed that are intended to address 
this type of confounding (e.g. Abadie et al. 2010; Autor 2003; Ryan et al. 2015; Stuart et al. 
2014; Waldinger 2010). One relatively easy-to-implement innovation that has gained increasing 
popularity among scholars using DID models are unit-specific time trends (Angrist and Pischke 
2015; Bertrand et al. 2004; Carpenter and Dobkin 2011). Researchers sometimes supplement the 
DID specification with a time trend of some parametric form such as a state- or country-specific 
linear trend. In the context of my analysis, the inclusion of country dummies in combination with 
the country-specific time trends means that the model will return estimates of how mandatory 
integration programs affect immigrants’ attitudes and behavior in a typical country, while 
adjusting for any country-specific trends in outcomes that preceded the change in immigrant 
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integration policy (Carpenter and Dobkin 2011, 140). Simply put, the inclusion of the country-
specific time trends allows me to relax the common trends assumption. Adding country-specific 
linear trends to the previous specification leads to the model expressed in equation (2). This 
model presumes that in the absence of a treatment effect, integration levels in country g deviate 
from common year effects by following the linear trend captured by the coefficient 𝜃g (Angrist 
and Pischke 2015, 197). 
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 For each of the six outcome variables/measures of integration, I estimate two DID 
models: a baseline model which includes the treatment (CIVIX or MIPEX-IRS), the country 
dummies, the year dummies, and the country-specific linear time trends; and an extended model 
which includes all the variables included in the baseline model plus the individual-level and 
country-level controls described in the previous section. All models are estimated using robust 
standard errors clustered by country-year to account for any heteroskedasticity of observation 
(Beck et al. 1998). Additionally, all analyses are conducted using the ESS post-stratification and 
population size weights in order to maximize the representativeness of the sample (Angrist and 
Pischke 2015, 201-203). The post-stratification weights are a sophisticated weighting strategy 
that uses auxiliary information to reduce the sampling error and potential non-response bias. In 
other words, the post-stratification weights correct for the fact that in some countries respondents 
have different probabilities to be part of the sample due to the sampling design used. Similarly, 
the population size weights correct for the fact that countries taking part in the ESS have 
different population sizes but similar sample sizes. 
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 Aside from the issue of parallel trends and bias in difference-in-differences models 
discussed above, two additional objections to my analytical approach are worth addressing. First, 
immigrants responding to the ESS might be more likely to exhibit high levels of integration than 
a country’s overall immigrant population because the questionnaire is conducted in the host 
country’s official language. This raises concerns about the extent to which the ESS sample of 
immigrants is representative of its constituent countries’ immigrant populations, since migrants 
have to be able to speak the host country’s official language to make it into the sample. As a 
result, sample respondents may have higher average levels of integration than the immigrant 
population at large. Therefore, one might argue that this chapter is an analysis of the effects of 
mandatory language and civic education requirements on immigrants with a certain base level of 
integration rather than their effects on immigrants in general. 
While it is impossible to fully address this concern, this type of sampling bias does likely 
not pose an impediment to causal inference here. Research has repeatedly shown that language 
learning – and skill acquisition in general – follow a logic of diminishing returns (Ericsson 1996; 
Foer 2011; Fredrick and Walberg 1980; Walberg et al. 1978). This means that in the early stages 
of learning a foreign language, a small amount of effort leads to relatively large skill gains. In the 
later stages, the same amount of effort produces smaller gains in skill. In other words, the closer 
one gets to mastering a foreign language, the more difficult it becomes to progress. Therefore, it 
stands to reason to expect that mandatory language requirements have a greater positive effect on 
language acquisition among immigrants with no knowledge of the host country’s language than 
among those with some knowledge of it. Since the ESS data and, by extension, my sample only 
contain responses from immigrants with enough knowledge of the host society’s language to 
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answer a survey, I would argue that my research design likely underestimates the effect of 
mandatory integration requirements on immigrant integration.37 
 Second, as with most policy evaluations, there is the issue of non-random treatment 
assignment. The European states that have adopted stricter immigrant integration policies might 
have done so for reasons that are related to one or more of the outcome measures of integration, 
which might lead us to overestimate the effects of the policy treatment. While this concern 
cannot be ruled out completely, it does likely not bias the estimates here. The extensive set of 
control variables in combination with the country dummies and country-specific linear time 
trends takes care of a wide range of potential confounding factors. In addition, as suggested by 
the discussion in Section 1.2 of this dissertation, the EU members which have adopted more 
restrictive integration policies are the ones which previously had difficulties in integrating their 
comparatively large immigrant populations. Therefore, if anything, the analytical approach 
employed here will bias the results downwards, that is, produce more conservative estimates of 
the effect of mandatory integration requirements on integration outcomes. 
4.3 RESULTS 
Table 21 illustrates the descriptive statistics for the sample respondents. The average sample 
respondent exhibits a moderate level of social trust (x̅ = 5.262). In terms of values, the 
immigrants in the sample seem rather well-integrated, with tolerance having a mean score of 
3.765 on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. Politically, the sample respondents appear somewhat less 
                                                 
37 For a supporting viewpoint, see Goodman and Wright (2015, 1893-1894). 
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integrated: they are marginally interested in politics (x̅ = 2.181 on a 4-point scale) and exhibit a 
moderate level of institutional trust (x̅ = 5.374). Nine out of ten immigrants in the sample are not 
actively seeking work, and they seem rather content with their financial situation (x̅ = 2.810 on a 
4-point scale). Sample respondents primarily have their origins in Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans (34%), the Western hemisphere (24%), and the Middle East and North Africa (13%). 
Relatively few immigrants come from Latin America (12%), sub-Saharan Africa (10%), and 
Asia (8%). A large number of immigrants report they do not belong to any particular religion or 
denomination (31%); those who do identify primarily as Catholic (27%) or Muslim (15%). 
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Table 21. Descriptive Statistics II 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
CIVIX 5,295 2.516 1.960 0 8.75 
MIPEX-IRS 3,367 23.587 23.189 0 78.2 
Social trust 5,604 5.262 1.868 0 10 
Tolerance 5,345 3.765 1.209 1 5 
Political interest 5,594 2.181 .983 1 4 
Institutional trust 5,522 5.374 2.060 0 10 
Employment 5,621 .892 .310 0 1 
Income 5,505 2.810 .905 1 4 
Western 5,396 .243 .429 0 1 
East European 5,396 .336 .472 0 1 
Latin American 5,396 .117 .322 0 1 
Sub-Saharan 5,396 .096 .295 0 1 
Mid Eastern 5,396 .129 .335 0 1 
Asian 5,396 .078 .269 0 1 
Catholic 5,377 .269 .444 0 1 
Protestant 5,377 .070 .256 0 1 
Other Christian 5,377 .168 .374 0 1 
Muslim 5,377 .147 .354 0 1 
Other religion 5,377 .036 .186 0 1 
No religion 5,377 .309 .462 0 1 
Education migrant 5,527 3.364 1.450 1 5 
Education parents 5,211 2.575 1.455 1 5 
Family status 5,584 .655 .475 0 1 
Male gender 5,614 .472 .499 0 1 
Age 5,572 34.171 11.356 15 93 
Domicile 5,593 .307 .461 0 1 
GDP per capita 5,621 40.806 12.636 16.606 88.610 
Unemployment 5,621 9.378 4.626 3.4 26.1 
 
The average sample respondent is quite educated (x̅ = 3.354 on a 5-point scale), more so 
than their parents. Two thirds of the immigrants in the sample share their household with at least 
one other person. The sample is almost evenly divided between males (47.2%) and females 
(52.8%), and the average respondent is 34 years of age. About a third of the immigrants in the 
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sample report living in a big city. As for the country-level variables, the average scores for both 
CIVIX and MIPEX-IRS are rather low, which reflects the fact that at the beginning of the time 
period under investigation, almost none of the sample countries had implemented mandatory 
integration requirements. With $40.806, the average GDP per capita is relatively high. This 
mean, however, masks considerable variation, with GDP values ranging from $16,606 to 
$88,610. National unemployment rates also vary substantially across countries and time, with 
values ranging from 3.4% to 26.1%. 
Given the structure of the data, it might be informative to provide additional descriptive 
statistics for each country. Table 22 shows the mean value for each variable by country. It 
illustrates a number of interesting differences between immigrant communities in different 
European countries. For example, Portugal and Spain are the only two countries in the sample 
with a sizeable number of immigrants from Latin America. For most countries in the sample, the 
majority of immigrants come from Western countries, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, or the 
Middle East and North Africa. Immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Balkans account for a 
particularly large portion of the overall immigrant population in the EU-N10 countries. For most 
of the EU-15 countries, the mean values suggest that the sample respondents are reasonably 
representative of the larger immigrant community in their country. For example, 18.4% of the 
sample respondents in Germany come from the Middle East and North Africa, which is 
consistent with the overall figures for the country. For the EU-N10 countries in the sample, the 
mean values suggest that the respondents are less representative of the overall immigrant 
population, likely due to the relatively low number of respondents living in these countries. 
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Table 22. Country-by-Country Means II 
Country CIVIX MIPEX-IRS Soc. trust Tolerance Pol. interest Inst. Trust Employment 
Austria 3.951 43.480 5.094 3.918 2.267 5.034 .902 
Belgium 1.115 6.085 5.187 3.783 2.364 5.596 .926 
Cyprus  26.744 4.404 3.705 1.928 5.043 .921 
Czech Rep.  21.800 4.702 3.259 1.893 3.788 .929 
Denmark 6.783 52.022 6.214 4.014 2.752 6.183 .856 
Estonia  18.082 5.041 2.886 2.533 4.856 1 
Finland 2.177 10 6.236 3.620 2.398 6.653 .911 
France 3.712 58.397 4.878 3.529 2.438 5.159 .850 
Germany 4.756 40.251 5.277 3.503 2.294 5.555 .889 
Great Britain 4.335 48.958 5.699 3.672 2.433 5.850 .944 
Greece 3.054 45.533 4.072 3.562 1.710 5.135 .892 
Hungary  26.316 4.658 3.135 2.100 4.280 .950 
Ireland 1 0 5.566 3.878 1.997 5.091 .864 
Italy 2.806 45.000 4.935 3.833 2.278 4.426 .889 
Lithuania  45.800 5.400 2.800 1.200 3.040 1 
Luxembourg 1  5.353 4.018 2.168 6.342 .949 
Netherlands 4.757 68.568 5.556 3.931 2.256 5.630 .900 
Poland  15.500 4.857 3.667 2.857 3.229 1 
Portugal 1.170 11.200 4.590 3.917 2.014 3.914 .882 
Slovakia  47.800 5.333 3.385 2.231 4.554 .692 
Slovenia  6 4.431 3.178 1.694 4.376 .878 
Spain 2.348 32 4.939 3.826 1.966 5.036 .831 
Sweden 0 0 5.944 3.926 2.574 6.305 .930 
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Table 22. Country-by-Country Means II (Continued) 
Country Income Western E. European Latin Sub-Saharan Mid Eastern Asian 
Austria 2.717 .382 .376 .029 .029 .147 .035 
Belgium 2.825 .379 .218 .035 .116 .223 .030 
Cyprus 2.540 .328 .518 0 .044 .066 .044 
Czech Rep. 2.615 .087 .783 0 0 .043 .087 
Denmark 3.171 .326 .268 .022 .029 .239 .116 
Estonia 2.864 .089 .822 0 0 .067 .022 
Finland 2.866 .145 .552 .023 .076 .099 .105 
France 2.838 .221 .088 .080 .252 .319 .040 
Germany 2.724 .107 .475 .027 .027 .184 .181 
Great Britain 3.101 .205 .222 .031 .191 .121 .230 
Greece 2.115 .132 .742 .009 .039 .066 .012 
Hungary 2.615 .059 .941 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 2.846 .308 .427 .039 .096 .034 .096 
Italy 3.167 .222 .333 .194 0 .250 0 
Lithuania 3.200 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 3.086 .750 .100 .019 .085 .015 .031 
Netherlands 2.886 .273 .181 .150 .119 .220 .057 
Poland 2.571 .429 .429 0 0 .143 0 
Portugal 2.554 .085 .146 .510 .241 .010 .007 
Slovakia 2.385 .091 .727 0 .091 .091 0 
Slovenia 2.959 .064 .915 0 0 0 .021 
Spain 2.677 .094 .213 .446 .047 .167 .034 
Sweden 3.161 .263 .223 .072 .076 .299 .068 
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Table 22. Country-by-Country Means II (Continued) 
Country Catholic Protestant 
Other 
Christian 
Muslim Other Religion No Religion 
Education 
Migrant 
Austria .218 .067 .106 .207 .028 .374 3.049 
Belgium .253 .075 .093 .253 .026 .300 3.406 
Cyprus .016 .008 .896 .032 .032 .016 3.630 
Czech Rep. .259 .037 0 0 .074 .630 3.464 
Denmark .139 .139 .097 .236 .049 .340 3.683 
Estonia 0 .044 .489 .044 .067 .356 4.133 
Finland .039 .140 .162 .095 .045 .520 3.616 
France .170 .062 .077 .309 .026 .356 3.502 
Germany .157 .177 .118 .165 .044 .339 3.266 
Great Britain .187 .109 .050 .136 .084 .434 3.664 
Greece .060 .021 .610 .202 .009 .097 2.754 
Hungary .382 .294 .088 0 0 .235 3.282 
Ireland .426 .059 .108 .053 .041 .312 3.961 
Italy .389 0 .083 .250 0 .278 3.088 
Lithuania .200 0 .600 0 0 .200 4.600 
Luxembourg .372 .035 .146 .111 .021 .316 3.129 
Netherlands .276 .044 .066 .154 .035 .425 3.261 
Poland .571 0 .143 0 0 .286 3.571 
Portugal .491 .062 .192 .027 .024 .203 2.800 
Slovakia .538 0 .154 .231 0 .077 3.538 
Slovenia .188 .042 .271 .146 0 .354 2.939 
Spain .383 .024 .172 .194 .022 .206 2.755 
Sweden .103 .082 .089 .228 .043 .456 3.433 
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Table 22. Country-by-Country Means II (Continued) 
Country 
Education 
parents 
Family 
status 
Male 
gender 
Age Domicile 
GDP per 
capita 
Unemployment 
Austria 2.778 .552 .492 35.376 .497 42.233 5.244 
Belgium 2.595 .708 .461 34.742 .398 40.652 7.882 
Cyprus 2.568 .654 .403 34.388 .381 33.468 8.086 
Czech Rep. 3.071 .593 .643 36.889 .286 26.145 7.250 
Denmark 3.028 .655 .473 33.973 .308 44.609 5.592 
Estonia 3.512 .867 .511 47.386 .489 25.286 8.287 
Finland 2.925 .708 .406 34.766 .255 39.337 8.232 
France 2.594 .721 .416 34.969 .434 37.101 9.006 
Germany 2.999 .690 .423 34.370 .306 39.865 8.095 
Great Britain 2.912 .631 .506 32.242 .283 36.911 6.244 
Greece 2.032 .669 .405 33.766 .603 28.456 11.404 
Hungary 2.528 .725 .400 38.410 .250 22.169 8.553 
Ireland 2.890 .662 .517 35.037 .146 47.052 11.885 
Italy 2.243 .611 .361 33.444 .250 35.688 10.189 
Lithuania 3.200 .600 .400 30.800 .600 25.877 10.720 
Luxembourg 2.254 .711 .480 33.990 .221 86.186 4.322 
Netherlands 2.484 .626 .461 34.043 .413 44.636 5.215 
Poland 3.286 1 .571 41.429 .286 21.126 11.157 
Portugal 1.860 .546 .443 31.970 .340 26.723 10.686 
Slovakia 3.038 .846 .462 33.167 .077 22.807 14.631 
Slovenia 2.734 .714 .449 33.673 .417 28.466 7.518 
Spain 1.870 .608 .503 34.147 .287 32.663 15.603 
Sweden 3.040 .651 .473 32.535 .223 42.404 7.349 
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 Tables 23 through 25 illustrate the relationship between CIVIX scores and the various 
outcome measures of immigrant integration. Contrary to my expectations, mandatory language 
and civic education requirements for immigrants have no significant impact on social and 
political integration. Immigrants in countries with stricter integration requirements are no more 
likely to develop social trust and adopt Western European values (measured as tolerance of 
homosexuals) than immigrants in countries without such policies. Similarly, mandatory language 
and civic education requirements are not significantly associated with immigrants’ levels of 
political interest and institutional trust. However, these integration policies do have a strong and 
positive effect on both measures of economic integration: immigrants in countries with higher 
CIVIX scores report significantly higher rates of employment as well as greater satisfaction with 
their financial situations than those in countries with lower scores. 
Substantively, these effects are quite large in size. Holding all other variables constant at 
their mean, immigrants in countries with a low CIVIX score (x = 0) have a .831 probability of 
being employed. In states with a moderate CIVIX score (x = 4), this probability increases to 
.934. In countries with a high CIVIX score (x = 8), immigrants have a .980 probability of being 
employed. Figure 3 plots the predicted probabilities for subjective financial well-being at various 
levels of the CIVIX scale. The graph illustrates that the probability of immigrants saying they are 
living comfortably on their present income increases substantially as countries’ CIVIX scores go 
up, while the probability of immigrants saying they find it very difficult or difficult to live on 
their present income decreases considerably. 
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Table 23. Determinants of Social Integration (CIVIX) 
 Social Trust (OLS) Tolerance (Ordered Probit) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX -0.004 0.007 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.067) (0.063) (0.051) (0.066) 
     
Education migrant  0.020  0.083*** 
  (0.034)  (0.023) 
     
Education parents  0.082**  0.030 
  (0.035)  (0.022) 
     
Family status  -0.077  0.085 
  (0.083)  (0.065) 
     
Male gender  -0.035  -0.063 
  (0.074)  (0.053) 
     
Age  0.006  -0.008*** 
  (0.004)  (0.003) 
     
Domicile  0.054  0.089 
  (0.085)  (0.056) 
     
GDP per capita  -0.032  0.020 
  (0.034)  (0.033) 
     
Unemployment  -0.043**  0.017 
  (0.019)  (0.015) 
Religion dummies 
(not reported) 
    
     
Region dummies 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 5,281 4,419 5,039 4,237 
(Pseudo) R2 0.076 0.087 0.014 0.077 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 24. Determinants of Political Integration (CIVIX) 
 Political Interest (Ordered Probit) Institutional Trust (OLS) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX -0.029 -0.039 0.075 0.053 
 (0.047) (0.051) (0.108) (0.098) 
     
Education migrant  0.168***  0.000 
  (0.020)  (0.035) 
     
Education parents  0.051***  0.034 
  (0.016)  (0.042) 
     
Family status  0.021  0.041 
  (0.050)  (0.109) 
     
Male gender  0.362***  0.005 
  (0.052)  (0.092) 
     
Age  0.010***  0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.004) 
     
Domicile  0.065  0.071 
  (0.059)  (0.091) 
     
GDP per capita  -0.050**  -0.075 
  (0.023)  (0.056) 
     
Unemployment  -0.015  -0.137*** 
  (0.019)  (0.029) 
Religion dummies 
(not reported) 
    
     
Region dummies 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 5,269 4,412 5,205 4,365 
(Pseudo) R2 0.023 0.074 0.079 0.095 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 25. Determinants of Economic Integration (CIVIX) 
 Employment Status (Probit) Income (Ordered Probit) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX 0.151* 0.137* 0.108** 0.149*** 
 (0.086) (0.072) (0.048) (0.054) 
     
Education migrant  -0.008  0.096*** 
  (0.030)  (0.026) 
     
Education parents  0.020  0.087*** 
  (0.038)  (0.025) 
     
Family status  -0.019  -0.047 
  (0.094)  (0.062) 
     
Male gender  -0.129  -0.067 
  (0.085)  (0.074) 
     
Age  -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.004)  (0.003) 
     
Domicile  -0.009  -0.034 
  (0.091)  (0.040) 
     
GDP per capita  -0.099***  -0.001 
  (0.031)  (0.025) 
     
Unemployment  -0.114***  -0.008 
  (0.025)  (0.017) 
Religion dummies 
(not reported) 
    
     
Region dummies 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 5,295 4,429 5,183 4,370 
(Pseudo) R2 0.053 0.080 0.035 0.079 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Figure 3. Effect of CIVIX on Income 
 
 
Holding all other variables constant at their mean, immigrants in countries with a low 
CIVIX score (x = 0) have a .116 probability of saying they are living comfortably on their 
present income, and a .419 probability of saying they find it difficult or very difficult to live on 
their present income. In stark contrast, immigrants in countries with a high CIVIX score (x = 8) 
have a .481 probability of saying they are living comfortably on their present income, and a .088 
probability of saying they find it difficult or very difficult to live on their present income. 
Interestingly, the marginal effects of CIVIX are declining with increasing CIVIX levels: going 
from no mandatory integration requirements at all to some requirements has a stronger effect on 
immigrants’ income and employment than going from some mandatory integration requirements 
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to numerous/very stringent requirements. Examining the reasons behind these declining marginal 
effects promises to be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
Several control variables also have a significant impact on certain outcome measures of 
integration. Younger immigrants are more likely to embrace Western European values (measured 
as tolerance of homosexuals) than older ones, but they are less likely to show an interest in 
politics. Male immigrants are more likely to show an interest in politics than female ones. 
Respondents’ level of education and, to a lesser extent, their parents’ level of education are 
positively related to social trust, tolerance of homosexuals, political interest, and subjective 
financial well-being. As for the country-level controls, high unemployment rates lead to 
decreased social trust, institutional trust, and employment prospects among immigrants. GDP per 
capita is negatively associated with immigrants’ interest in politics and, surprisingly, 
employment prospects. However, the negative relationship between GDP per capita and 
immigrant employment may simply be a statistical artifact due to the high correlation between 
GDP per capita and national unemployment rates. 
Next, I estimate the same models using MIPEX-IRS as a measure of integration 
requirements instead of CIVIX. The results of these analyses are shown in Tables 26 through 28. 
The results are similar to my previous analyses in that mandatory integration requirements 
appear to have no effect on immigrants’ level of social and political integration. However, the 
results are different in regards to economic integration; here, using CIVIX leads to a positive and 
significant effect of language and civic education requirements on immigrant employment and 
income, while using MIPEX-IRS suggests the absence of a significant impact. This goes back to 
Goodman’s (2015) discussion of different integration policy indices and their incompatibility 
(see Section 2.1). To further investigate this difference in results, I restrict the sample to cases 
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common to CIVIX and MIPEX-IRS, that is, the EU-15 countries between 2007 and 2014. Table 
29 shows the results for this reduced sample. The coefficients for CIVIX remain positive but 
they are no longer statistically significant. In the case of MIPEX-IRS, the coefficients remain 
negative and insignificant. Similar to the results in Chapter 3, this suggests that the divergent 
findings between CIVIX and MIPEX-IRS are due to measurement issues (i.e. the two indices do 
not measure the same exact concept) rather than differences in sample selection (Goodman 
2012b; 2015). 
 
Table 26. Determinants of Social Integration (MIPEX-IRS) 
 Social Trust (OLS) Tolerance (Ordered Probit) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
MIPEX-IRS 0.007 0.014 -0.002 0.008 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 3,359 2,977 3,216 2,862 
(Pseudo) R2 0.077 0.105 0.012 0.077 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 27. Determinants of Political Integration (MIPEX-IRS) 
 Political Interest (Ordered Probit) Institutional Trust (OLS) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
MIPEX-IRS -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.005 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 3,353 2,975 3,307 2,938 
(Pseudo) R2 0.023 0.080 0.119 0.131 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
Table 28. Determinants of Economic Integration (MIPEX-IRS) 
 Employment Status (Probit) Income (Ordered Probit) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
MIPEX-IRS -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 3,367 2,985 3,327 2,955 
(Pseudo) R2 0.086 0.115 0.036 0.086 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 29. Determinants of Economic Integration (CIVIX vs. MIPEX-IRS) 
 Employment Status (Probit) Income (Ordered Probit) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CIVIX 0.281  0.093  0.363  0.154  
 (0.261)  (0.497)  (0.316)  (0.275)  
         
MIPEX-IRS  -0.006  -0.004  -0.003  -0.007 
  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
         
Controls         
(not reported)         
         
Constant(s)         
(not reported)         
Country dum. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dum. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lin. trends Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2,633 3,124 2,362 2,758 2,599 3,084 2,336 2,728 
(Pseudo) R2 0.105 0.086 0.142 0.116 0.033 0.036 0.088 0.085 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
 Given these divergent findings, the question becomes: which set of results should be 
believed? I argue that using the original sample (EU-15, 2002-2015) with CIVIX as the key 
independent variable is likely to produce the most trustworthy results, for the following three 
reasons. First, as I have elaborated on in Section 2.1, CIVIX is a more valid measure of the 
intensity of a country’s language and civic education requirements for immigrants than MIPEX-
IRS. Second, MIPEX-IRS is not well suited for analyzing immigrants’ responses to the ESS. In 
countries other than the EU-15, the ESS not only skips relatively many waves but also surveys 
comparatively few respondents. Therefore, compared to the models using CIVIX, the models 
using MIPEX-IRS have a much smaller number of years, country-years, and observations.38 
                                                 
38 Of the 5,621 sample respondents, 5,295 (94.2%) reside in one of the EU-15 countries and only 326 
(5.8%) in one of the other eight sample countries. For some of these eight countries, the number of respondents is 
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Third, in the reduced sample (Table 29), half of the initial time period under investigation is 
being omitted (seven out of 14 years), including the crucial period between 2002 and 2006. The 
omission of these years represents a substantial loss of information, which stacks the deck 
against finding a significant effect of mandatory integration requirements. In the following sub-
section, I subject the results from the original sample (EU-15, 2002-2015) with CIVIX as the key 
independent variable to a number of additional robustness checks. 
4.3.1 Robustness 
I undertake a total of four robustness checks to ensure that my findings are not sensitive to 
alternative model specifications. First, one might argue that my measure of the treatment variable 
– language and civic education requirements for immigrants – is somewhat problematic: 
assignment to these requirements is assumed, and noncompliance is not measured. In other 
words, it is impossible to rigorously ascertain a given immigrant’s “treatment status”, i.e. 
whether, to what extent, and to what kinds of integration requirement a given immigrant was 
actually exposed to. This concern is already in part mitigated by the fact that I restricted the 
sample to immigrants who recently arrived (duration < ten years) and were therefore likely 
exposed to language and/or civic education requirements as they went through the entry, 
residency, and/or naturalization process (Goodman and Wright 2015). To mitigate this concern 
even further, I restrict my sample in ways which additionally increase the likelihood that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
alarmingly low. For example, there are only seven respondents for Poland and five for Lithuania. In the context of 
this particular analysis, the ESS therefore does not allow for drawing meaningful inferences for countries other than 
the EU-15. 
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sample respondents actually received the treatment (i.e. the policy). If I can show that the effect 
of CIVIX on measures of economic integration is stronger for these reduced samples than it is 
for the full sample, it would lend additional support to my previous finding that mandatory 
language requirements improve immigrants’ employment prospects and financial well-being. 
 I restrict the sample in the following two ways: First, I exclude immigrants who were 
born in another EU member state, since integration requirements are generally less pervasive for 
them than they are for immigrants from other regions (Goodman and Wright 2015). Tables 30 
through 32 report the results for this reduced sample. According to my expectations, the 
coefficients for the CIVIX variable in the models predicting economic integration become larger 
and their p-values smaller, while the results for social and political integration remain 
unchanged. Second, I exclude female immigrants, since male immigrants are overrepresented in 
integration courses in many European countries. For example, in Germany, two thirds of course 
participants between 2014 and 2016 were male (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
2018). This overrepresentation is due to newly arriving immigrants in Germany being mostly 
male as well as female immigrants oftentimes being exempt from attending integration courses 
because they cannot afford to have someone take care of their children while they attend the 
courses (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2017). Tables 33 through 35 report the 
results for this reduced sample. Again, the coefficients for the CIVIX variable in the models 
predicting economic integration become larger and their p-values smaller, while the results for 
social and political integration remain unchanged. Therefore, these results strengthen my 
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confidence in the results previously mentioned, namely that mandatory integration requirements 
have a positive effect on immigrants’ level of economic integration.39 
 
Table 30. Determinants of Social Integration – No EU Migrants (CIVIX) 
 Social Trust (OLS) Tolerance (Ordered Probit) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX 0.060 0.012 -0.044 -0.029 
 (0.066) (0.072) (0.067) (0.079) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 3,132 2,697 2,956 2,557 
(Pseudo) R2 0.082 0.097 0.018 0.060 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
                                                 
39 A more precise test would have been to distinguish sample respondents by immigration category, as 
mandatory language and civic education requirements most consistently apply to refugees and immigrants that fall 
under the category of family reunification. Other categories of immigrants, for example foreign military personnel 
and foreign-born individuals with a student visa, are generally exempt from having to partake in these requirements. 
Therefore, restricting the sample to respondents within the former immigration categories would increase the 
precision of my key independent variable, as it would increase the likelihood that a given sample respondent 
actually received the treatment. Unfortunately, the ESS does not provide information on respondents’ immigration 
category, which makes it impossible to conduct such a test. 
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Table 31. Determinants of Political Integration – No EU Migrants (CIVIX) 
 Political Interest (Ordered Probit) Institutional Trust (OLS) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX -0.020 -0.041 0.111 0.108 
 (0.047) (0.051) (0.147) (0.105) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 3,121 2,690 3,089 2,669 
(Pseudo) R2 0.026 0.081 0.077 0.098 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
Table 32. Determinants of Economic Integration – No EU Migrants (CIVIX) 
 Employment Status (Probit) Income (Ordered Probit) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX 0.219* 0.223*** 0.144** 0.161** 
 (0.128) (0.086) (0.070) (0.066) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 3,137 2,701 3,049 2,657 
(Pseudo) R2 0.061 0.098 0.030 0.074 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 33. Determinants of Social Integration – Male Migrants Only (CIVIX) 
 Social Trust (OLS) Tolerance (Ordered Probit) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX 0.062 -0.001 -0.046 -0.089 
 (0.077) (0.097) (0.050) (0.068) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 2,490 2,084 2,382 2,008 
(Pseudo) R2 0.083 0.109 0.019 0.084 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
Table 34. Determinants of Political Integration – Male Migrants Only (CIVIX) 
 Political Interest (Ordered Probit) Institutional Trust (OLS) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX -0.018 -0.062 0.129 0.133 
 (0.067) (0.076) (0.148) (0.148) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 2,489 2,084 2,466 2,066 
(Pseudo) R2 0.031 0.083 0.111 0.134 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 35. Determinants of Economic Integration – Male Migrants Only (CIVIX) 
 Employment Status (Probit) Income (Ordered Probit) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX 0.172* 0.192* 0.094** 0.171** 
 (0.089) (0.100) (0.044) (0.075) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 2,503 2,093 2,460 2,068 
(Pseudo) R2 0.086 0.139 0.042 0.088 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
Second, it has been argued that a more valid way for measuring integration is to 
benchmark an immigrant’s score on a particular outcome measure against the host population’s 
average value for the same outcome measure; after all, the goal of integration is to render 
immigrants close to or indistinguishable from the host population in terms of attitudes and 
behavior (Burgoon 2014; Goodman and Wright 2015). For example, it would be unfair to expect 
immigrants to become more tolerant of homosexuals throughout the integration process if the 
natives themselves are rather intolerant. Similarly, an immigrant having a substantially higher 
level of institutional trust than the average member of the host population would hardly be 
indicative of successful integration.  
Therefore, I create benchmark values by taking the absolute value (modulus) of the 
difference between an immigrant’s value for a particular outcome measure and natives’ average 
score for the same country-year. This coding process results in six new outcome measures, each 
of them continuous and censored at 0. A value of 0 represents “perfect integration”, i.e. no 
 131 
difference between an immigrant’s score on a particular integration measure and natives’ average 
score for the same outcome. Greater values represent lower levels of integration in the sense that 
the distance between an immigrant’s response and the average native’s response becomes larger 
(Burgoon 2014). Tables 36 through 38 show the results for the models using these benchmark 
values as the dependent variables. Note that in these models, negative coefficients should be 
interpreted as decreasing the distance between immigrants’ and natives’ attitudes and behavior, 
thereby leading to improved integration outcomes. The results only provide partial support for 
the existence of a positive relationship between mandatory integration requirements and 
measures of economic integration, as all four coefficients point in the expected direction but only 
one of them achieves statistical significance. 
 
Table 36. Determinants of Social Integration – Benchmark Values (CIVIX) 
 Social Trust (OLS) Tolerance (OLS) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX -0.001 -0.013 0.023 0.037 
 (0.049) (0.064) (0.050) (0.054) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 5,281 4,419 5,039 4,237 
(Pseudo) R2 0.031 0.050 0.052 0.132 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 37. Determinants of Political Integration – Benchmark Values (CIVIX) 
 Political Interest (OLS) Institutional Trust (OLS) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX 0.003 0.008 0.038 0.026 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.044) (0.065) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 5,269 4,412 5,205 4,365 
(Pseudo) R2 0.032 0.048 0.027 0.049 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
Table 38. Determinants of Economic Integration – Benchmark Values (CIVIX) 
 Employment Status (Probit) Income (Ordered Probit) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX -0.021 -0.017* -0.042 -0.024 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.028) (0.023) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y Y 
N 5,295 4,429 5,183 4,370 
(Pseudo) R2 0.056 0.076 0.019 0.049 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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 Third, I conduct a series of “placebo tests” by re-running the baseline models and 
examining the impact of CIVIX on the native-born population rather than newly arriving 
immigrants. While mandatory integration requirements can have certain effects on native-born 
individuals, particularly on their attitudes toward immigrants (see Section 2.4 and Chapter 5), 
there is no theoretically compelling reason as to why these requirements should affect their 
employment prospects and financial well-being. Therefore, if I can show that CIVIX has no 
effect on natives’ employment and financial well-being, it would strengthen my argument that 
the positive impact of mandatory integration requirements on immigrants’ level of economic 
integration that I found in this section is indicative of a true relationship rather than being driven 
by omitted variables, time trends, or other endogenous processes (i.e. being a false positive). 
Tables 39 through 41 show the results for these placebo tests. According to my expectations, 
mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants do not have a significant 
effect on any of the six outcome measures for the host population. 
 
Table 39. Determinants of Social Integration – Placebo Test (CIVIX) 
 Social Trust (OLS) Tolerance (Ordered Probit) 
CIVIX -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.018) (0.013) 
   
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
  
Country dummies Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y 
N 164,477 161,064 
(Pseudo) R2 0.096 0.024 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 40. Determinants of Political Integration – Placebo Test (CIVIX) 
 Interest (Ordered Probit) Institutional Trust (OLS) 
CIVIX 0.018 0.001 
 (0.021) (0.034) 
   
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
  
Country dummies Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y 
N 164,314 164,207 
(Pseudo) R2 .028 .101 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 41. Determinants of Economic Integration – Placebo Test (CIVIX) 
 Employment (Probit) Income (Ordered Probit) 
CIVIX 0.027 -0.004 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
   
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
  
Country dummies Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y 
N 164,602 160,001 
(Pseudo) R2 .019 .028 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
 Fourth, in Section 4.2, I have argued that country-specific linear time trends are a way to 
relax the common trends assumption and reduce bias in DID models. However, one potential 
problem with this approach is that by including these linear trends, the “identifying assumption 
shifts from common trends to what can be termed ‘common growths’, since now deviation from 
a trend line identifies impact” (Friedman 2013). Differently put, linear time trends require the 
assumption that absent any treatment, integration outcomes would have developed linearly over 
time rather than, say, followed a curvilinear trend. Again, it is impossible to definitively test 
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whether a counterfactual trend would have been linear, curvilinear, etc. (Friedman 2013). 
Researchers using DID models therefore mostly rely on theoretical justifications for the 
parametric form (linear, quadratic, cubic) of their unit-specific time trends. Another (admittedly 
crude) approach is to estimate models with different types of time trends to examine a) whether 
the effect of the treatment is the same across different specifications, and b) which model 
specification performs best in terms of goodness of fit. 
 Given the developments in immigrant integration prior to 2004 illustrated in Figure 2, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the trends are linear for a majority of the countries in the 
sample. To further probe this assumption, I re-run my main models but this time include country-
specific quadratic time trends in addition to the country-specific linear trends. This specification 
presumes that in the absence of a treatment effect, integration levels in a given country deviate 
from common year effects by following curvilinear trend rather than a linear one. Tables 42 
through 44 show the results for these analyses. The coefficients for CIVIX in the models 
predicting economic integration remain positive and – with the exception of the full model 
predicting employment status – all of them retain their significance. In addition, CIVIX now has 
a positive and significant effect on social trust as well as institutional trust (at least in the 
baseline model). In terms of goodness of fit, the quadratic models perform slightly better than the 
linear models for some of the outcome measures but slightly worse for others. This suggests that 
whether immigrant integration would have followed a linear or quadratic trend absent the 
treatment depends on which particular measure of integration is being used. Overall, the 
relationship between mandatory integration requirements and economic integration appears 
robust to the inclusion of country-specific quadratic time trends. In conclusion, then, the 
robustness tests increase my confidence in the validity of the findings outlined in this section. 
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Table 42. Determinants of Social Integration – Quadratic Trends (CIVIX) 
 Social Trust (OLS) Tolerance (OLS) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX 0.173** 0.163** -0.041 -0.032 
 (0.073) (0.077) (0.047) (0.071) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear trends Y Y Y Y 
Quadratic trends Y Y Y Y 
N 5,281 4,419 5,039 4,237 
(Pseudo) R2 0.084 0.091 0.016 0.079 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
Table 43. Determinants of Political Integration – Quadratic Trends (CIVIX) 
 Political Interest (OLS) Institutional Trust (OLS) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX -0.012 0.007 0.249*** 0.129 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.080) (0.108) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear trends Y Y Y Y 
Quadratic trends Y Y Y Y 
N 5,269 4,412 5,205 4,365 
(Pseudo) R2 0.024 0.076 0.089 0.098 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 44. Determinants of Economic Integration – Quadratic Trends (CIVIX) 
 Employment Status (Probit) Income (Ordered Probit) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Baseline Model Full Model 
CIVIX 0.231** 0.126 0.184*** 0.229*** 
 (0.092) (0.091) (0.051) (0.056) 
     
Control variables 
(not reported) 
    
     
Constant(s) 
(not reported) 
    
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Linear trends Y Y Y Y 
Quadratic trends Y Y Y Y 
N 5,295 4,429 5,183 4,370 
(Pseudo) R2 0.062 0.098 0.036 0.084 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
4.4 TREATMENT OR SELECTION EFFECT? 
The previous section has shown that immigrants in countries with higher CIVIX scores are more 
likely to be employed and satisfied with their financial situation than those in states with lower 
scores. But the question remains how exactly mandatory language and civic education 
requirements for immigrants lead to improved economic integration outcomes. Three possible 
mechanisms come to mind. The first mechanism is a true treatment effect, meaning that 
immigrants who undergo language courses, civics classes, etc. experience genuine changes in 
attitudes in behavior which make it easier for them to find well-paying jobs. The second 
mechanism is a selection effect, meaning that migrants who are unwilling to integrate 
intentionally avoid countries with restrictive policy regimes and rather choose a host society that 
does not demand acculturation programs for immigrants, that is, language training and civic 
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education. Third, there might be another type of selection effect at play where immigrants who 
are unwilling or unable to integrate fail to pass the mandatory integration tests and subsequently 
leave the country voluntarily or are ordered to return to their home country by the authorities. 
Note that these three mechanisms are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
 While the research design and analytical approach employed in this chapter are unable to 
distinguish between the three mechanisms, I provide suggestive evidence regarding the 
plausibility of each of these mechanisms. This evidence includes original, open-ended interviews 
with 23 practitioners of and experts on immigrant integration policy in Germany.40 By and large, 
the responses from interview participants lend support to the presence of a true treatment effect 
while simultaneously casting doubt on the plausibility of the two selection mechanisms. 
Respondents argued that mandatory language courses and tests are quite effective in helping 
immigrants acquire the host country’s language, and that these language skills are vital to their 
success on the labor market. In addition, respondents stated that newly arriving migrants have 
not become more willing to integrate over time (as implied by the second mechanism), and that 
immigrants are generally not ordered to leave as a result of failing to attend integration courses 
or pass integration tests; rather, they face different kinds of repercussions, most prominently cuts 
in social benefits. 
 For example, one practitioner who has taught mandatory language courses since 2005 
stated that “course participants have changed little over time” in terms of educational 
                                                 
40 A more detailed description of these interviews, including subject recruitment and interview questions, is 
provided in Appendix A. The anonymized interview transcripts can be requested from the author. The interviews 
have been approved as exempt research by the University of Pittsburgh’s Institutional Review Board (study number 
PRO16100462). 
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background and motivation. In addition, she argued that their “graduates have been rather 
successful on the job market” and that Germany’s “post-2005 approach to immigrant integration 
has been a success story”. When asked if she would change anything about Germany’s current 
integration requirements, the respondent stated that she would “raise the required language level 
to help immigrants be even more successful on the job market”. Another practitioner who has 
owned and led a language school for immigrants since 1984 stated that if anything, “immigrants 
have become more difficult to integrate over time due to an increasing lack of pre-arrival 
education and skills”, especially since the beginning of the European refugee crisis in 2015. Yet, 
despite this, mandatory language courses and tests since 2005 have been “quite successful at 
integrating newly arriving immigrants” and “course graduates were generally able to find a job”. 
Again, when asked if she would change anything about Germany’s current integration policy, the 
respondent stated that “the B1 language level is not sufficient” and raising the requirement to 
“B2 or even higher would help immigrants find better jobs”. 
 The experts I interviewed spoke about Germany’s mandatory integration requirements in 
a similarly positive manner. One of the interview participants who works in the research division 
of the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees argued that “every single piece of data 
and research indicates that immigrants have been better integrated into the labor market since 
2005”, and that this increased integration is in large part due to the mandatory language 
requirements for immigrants. He kept referring back to a study carried out by his division 
(Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2011; see also Section 2.3) which found a large and 
positive effect of these requirements on immigrants’ employment status. Another expert argued 
that during his 20 years as an immigration lawyer, he “has not seen a single immigrant being 
ordered to leave due to not having passed an integration test or having refused to participate in an 
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integration course”. He also argued that during his countless talks with refugees and other 
immigrants, he “never got the impression that Germany’s integration requirements were 
deterring any immigrants from coming here”. Again, these remarks suggest that a true treatment 
effect is at play rather than any of the two selection mechanisms described above. 
 In addition to these interviews, I examine country-year data on the EU-15 countries for 
the time period 2001-2015 (n = 225). If the second mechanism (i.e. the first of the two selection 
mechanisms) were at play, we would expect to observe at least some decline in migrant flows to 
countries which have adopted stricter integration requirements, especially relative to states which 
did not adopt such policies. However, as Table 45 shows,41 regressing the annual number of 
arriving migrants (in absolute numbers and relative to all immigrants coming to the EU-15 that 
year) on the lagged value of CIVIX does not yield significant results, which suggests the absence 
of a systematic effect of mandatory integration requirements on migrant flows. 
                                                 
41 Data on migrant flows are retrieved from Eurostat. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country. 
Both models are estimated as LDV models with an AR(1) specification, which means they include the dependent 
variable lagged by one year on the right-hand side. In addition, I estimate both models as AR(2), AR(3), random 
effects, and fixed effects specifications. The coefficient for CIVIX remains insignificant across specifications, which 
provides additional evidence for the absence of a systematic effect of language and civic education requirements on 
migrant flows. 
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Table 45. Effect of CIVIX on Number of Incoming Migrants (OLS) 
 Total Number (in millions) In Percent of EU-15 
CIVIX 1.242 0.069 
 (1.647) (0.072) 
   
Lagged DV 0.970*** .971*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) 
   
Constant 4.283 -0.001 
 (5.163) (0.169) 
N 195 195 
R2 0.933 0.956 
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
In addition, if the second mechanism were at play, we would expect to observe newly 
arriving immigrants in countries with stricter integration requirements to become more willing to 
integrate over time, since those unwilling to integrate should be deterred by these requirements. 
Since education is sometimes viewed as a proxy for willingness to integrate, I analyze ESS data 
to compare the education levels of migrants who have arrived within the past year (migrants who 
arrived less than one year ago likely acquired their education in their country of origin rather 
than the host country). The ESS data show the opposite of the pattern suggested by this 
mechanism. The average level of education of immigrants coming to a country with a high 
CIVIX score (> 2.5) between 2004 and 2009 was 3.8 on a scale ranging from 1 to 5; this value 
decreases to 3.6 for immigrants arriving between 2011 and 2015. The average education level of 
immigrants coming to a country with a low CIVIX score (2.5 or below) between 2004 and 2009 
was 3.2; this value increases to 4.0 between 2011 and 2015. Therefore, countries which have 
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adopted stricter integration requirements do not seem to have attracted more educated immigrant 
cohorts over time, which casts further doubt on the plausibility of the second mechanism.42 
Similarly, if the third mechanism were at play, we would expect states which adopt more 
restrictive integration policies to exhibit at least some increase in the number of immigrants who 
are leaving the country or ordered to return to their home country. The models in Table 46 
regress the number of annual emigrants (in absolute numbers and relative to the country’s 
immigrant population) on the lagged value of CIVIX, while those in Table 47 regress the number 
of migrants ordered to leave (in absolute numbers and relative the country’s immigrant 
population) on the same independent variable.43 With the exception of a marginally significant 
effect on the total number of immigrants ordered to leave, the coefficient for CIVIX is 
insignificant across models. In sum, then, the evidence I have presented in this section provides 
support for the presence of a true treatment effect while calling into question the plausibility of 
the two selection mechanisms. I leave it to future research to provide a more definitive 
assessment of these mechanisms and how exactly stricter integration requirements for 
immigrants lead to improved economic integration outcomes. 
                                                 
42 It should be noted that the number of respondents on which these figures are based is relatively low (n < 
200), which casts doubt on the extent to which the information presented in this paragraph is representative of  
trends. Yet, it is certainly admissible as an additional piece of information in a larger set of suggestive evidence. 
43 Data on migrant stock, emigration, and the number of third country nationals ordered to leave are 
retrieved from Eurostat. All models are estimated as an AR(1) specification with robust standard errors clustered by 
country. Again, these models are also estimated as AR(2), AR(3), random effects, and fixed effects specifications. 
The coefficient for CIVIX remains insignificant across all specifications except the AR(2) and AR(3) specifications 
for the total number of immigrants ordered to leave, which provides additional evidence for the absence of a 
systematic effect of language and civic education requirements on emigration. 
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Table 46. Effect of CIVIX on Number of Emigrants (OLS) 
 Total Number (in millions) In Percent of Migrant Stock 
CIVIX -0.939 -0.012 
 (0.998) (0.047) 
   
Lagged DV 0.956*** 0.925*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
   
Constant 11.204* 0.689** 
 (5.888) (0.281) 
N 186 174 
R2 0.930 0.901 
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
Table 47. Effect of CIVIX on Number of Migrants Ordered to Leave (OLS) 
 Total Number (in millions) In Percent of Migrant Stock 
CIVIX 0.743* 0.014 
 (0.404) (0.022) 
   
Lagged DV 0.878*** 0.891*** 
 (0.030) (0.013) 
   
Constant 0.502 0.126 
 (1.324) (0.084) 
N 97 96 
R2 0.904 0.880 
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
4.5 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Do mandatory integration requirements matter? The answer is “yes”, but only for certain types of 
integration. The positive effect of these requirements appears to be restricted to economic 
integration, as immigrants in countries with higher CIVIX scores are more likely to be employed 
and satisfied with their financial situation. Mandatory language classes and civic training seem to 
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do a good job at equipping immigrants with the knowledge and skills that make them more 
attractive to potential employers. Therefore, to the extent that we consider immigrants’ access to 
the labor market a desirable goal, restrictive integration policies perform an important function. 
In addition, if Alarian (2016) is correct and economic integration serves as a foundation for other 
forms of integration, then rigid integration requirements may indirectly lead to improved social 
and political integration outcomes in the long run. Overall, then, this chapter supports the notion 
that stricter integration requirements produce better integration results than laissez-faire policies 
(Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Goodman and Wright 2015; Koopmans 2010). At the same time, 
it contradicts studies which have found a detrimental impact of mandatory language training and 
civics classes on integration (Boecker and Strik 2011; Van Oers 2013), as no negative effects 
were found in any of the various model specifications. 
 The findings presented in this chapter raise the interesting question why mandatory 
integration requirements affect economic integration outcomes but not social and political ones. 
Several explanations seem plausible. For example, psychologists and other scholars in the 
Maslowian tradition have long argued that humans will only focus on higher-order goals and 
needs such as social contacts, cultural life, and political participation when their basic economic 
needs are met. Therefore, it seems plausible that initially immigrants focus all their energy on 
integrating economically, and only later turn their attention to other dimensions of integration 
(Alarian 2016). Alternatively, it could be the case that immigrants are more willing to integrate 
economically while they are relatively resistant to the idea of social and political integration. 
Economic integration offers immediate and tangible benefits, primarily in the form of money. 
Conversely, immigrants’ often view their cultural identity as a good and fear that integrating 
socially and culturally into the host society could potentially diminish that good (Birman and 
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Trickett 2001). One last possible explanation elaborated on here is that by design, integration 
courses and tests primarily focus on language acquisition with the goal of promoting economic 
self-sufficiency and improvement among immigrants. In all European countries that have both 
language and civic education courses for immigrants, the required course hours for the former far 
outweigh those of the latter (Goodman 2014). Further exploration of the reasons behind this 
differential impact of mandatory integration requirements promises to be a fruitful area for future 
research. 
 The data, measures, and analytical approach utilized in this chapter possess a number of 
properties that allow me to draw more robust inferences about the relationship between policy 
regimes and immigrants’ level of integration than previous research on the subject. Therefore, 
this chapter can not only serve as a guideline for other policy evaluations, but also serves as a 
reminder on the importance of proper research design and methodological rigor in the analysis of 
observational data. This is illustrated by the fact that I obtain results that are quite different from 
those of Goodman and Wright (2015), despite them using similar data. Goodman and Wright 
argue that restrictive integration policies have a positive effect on political integration but not on 
economic and social integration, and that this effect is due to selection processes. In stark 
contrast, I find that the immediate impact of mandatory integration requirements on immigrant 
integration is confined to the economic sphere, and that this relationship is in fact representative 
of a true treatment effect. 
 Why do my results differ that much from those of Goodman and Wright (2015) despite 
them using similar data? One potential reason is that Goodman and Wright only use the first six 
waves of the ESS, so it could be that the seventh wave is somewhat driving my results. However, 
my findings remain unchanged when I exclude the seventh wave from my analyses, so this is not 
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the reason for the divergent results. Another potential reason is that Goodman and Wright appear 
to not be using the post-stratification and population size weights provided by the ESS, since 
they are not mentioned anywhere in their study. However, when re-running my models without 
the weights, I find that the effect of CIVIX on measures of political integration remains 
insignificant while its effect on measures of economic integration remains positive.44 A third 
obvious culprit could be differences in the control variables used. But even in the baseline 
models, my results differ markedly from theirs, so it is not the different sets of control variables 
that are causing these divergent results. 
Therefore, since these three explanations do not hold, the divergent results are likely 
driven by differences in method. Goodman and Wright’s methodological approach is to 
“compare the intercept values produced when outcomes are regressed on the predictors in a 
baseline individual-level model pooled within each policy regime category” (2015, 1894). This 
approach, unlike my DID specification, is unable to control for stable unobservables. In addition, 
Goodman and Wright’s design does not account for any temporal dynamics; their models do not 
include year dummies or time trends, much less country-specific time trends. Therefore, it seems 
likely that their results are spurious. Conversely, I went to great lengths in this chapter to rule out 
possible confounding stemming from unobservables and temporal dynamics, and therefore was 
able to produce more trustworthy results. 
However, the research design employed in this chapter is not without its limitations. Most 
importantly, it is impossible to rigorously ascertain a given immigrant’s “treatment status”, i.e. 
whether, to what extent, and to what kinds of integration requirement a given immigrant was 
                                                 
44 It should be noted, however, that in the baseline model with employment status as the outcome variable, 
the coefficient for CIVIX slightly misses conventional levels of significance (p = .136). 
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actually exposed to. The question about the relative importance of different types of integration 
requirements (classes vs. tests, language vs. civics, etc.) also remains. Addressing these 
remaining issues and questions would require an original, EU-wide survey specifically targeted 
at immigrants, and while implementing such a survey would pose many logistical challenges, the 
insights it would provide for both policymakers and academics seem well worth the effort. 
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5.0  THE EFFECTS OF POLICY ON PUBLIC OPINION 
The literature on attitudes toward immigrants and research on the effects of mandatory language 
and civic education requirements for immigrants have largely developed in isolation.45 The 
former has mostly ignored immigrant integration policy as a potential determinant of public 
attitudes toward immigrants, and the latter has paid little attention to possible effects of 
integration policy on public opinion on immigrants. This chapter represents one of the first 
attempts to link these two phenomena, thereby making two important contributions. First, 
previous research explaining individual attitudes toward immigrants has largely failed to develop 
practical suggestions on how to mitigate prejudice against immigrants. This chapter does just that 
by arguing that the introduction of mandatory language and civic integration requirements for 
immigrants can lead to more positive attitudes toward immigrants. In cases where such 
requirements already exist, the same result can be achieved by communicating their existence 
more effectively to the public. Second, the benefits and drawbacks of mandatory language and 
civic education requirements for immigrants are still subject to much debate among scholars and 
policymakers alike. As elected officials ponder the tightening or loosening of these requirements, 
it is important that they are presented with information on all their effects, including a potential 
reduction of anti-immigrant sentiments. 
                                                 
45 For notable exceptions, see Hooghe and de Vroome (2015a) and Schlueter et al. (2013). 
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 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, drawing on existing research on 
the determinants of attitudes toward immigrants (see Section 2.4.1), I develop a theoretical 
framework which outlines two mechanisms through which mandatory integration requirements 
can lead to more positive public attitudes toward immigrants Specifically, I argue that these 
requirements mitigate perceptions of threat as well as concerns about fairness and deservingness 
among native-born Europeans. In Section 5.2, I test these arguments by examining data from the 
seven waves of the European Social Survey (2002-2015). According to my theoretical 
expectations, I find that public attitudes toward immigrants are more favorable in countries with 
stricter integration requirements, particularly among individuals who are aware of the existence 
of these requirements. 
Next, I examine additional evidence from two original survey experiments in the United 
Kingdom (n1 = 1,651; n2 = 7,732). These data suggest that respondents exhibit more positive 
attitudes toward immigrants who are culturally closer to them, do not have full access to the 
welfare state, and are required to participate in integration courses aimed at language acquisition 
and civic education. Fourth, I estimate a series of additional models using ESS data as well as 
country-level data (see Section 3.2) to explore the relationship between immigrants’ level of 
integration/integration deficits and public opinion. Contrary to my expectations, I do not find a 
relationship between the two, which in turn casts doubt on the presence of an indirect effect of 
mandatory integration requirements on public opinion by increasing immigrants’ level of 
integration. A concluding section then summarizes the main findings of this chapter, connects 
them with the broader literature, and indicates possible directions for future research on the 
subject. 
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5.1 FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
As Section 2.3 has shown, scholars have only recently begun to systematically examine the 
effects of mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants. Some studies 
find a positive effect of these requirements on integration outcomes such as language 
proficiency, labor market participation, and tolerance values; others find a negative effect; and 
yet others find no effect at all. While these existing analyses differ in the conclusions they reach, 
they are similar in the sense that their examination of the effects of mandatory language and civic 
education requirements is limited to the immigrants that are required to participate in them. I 
make the case for conceiving policy effects more broadly by arguing that the effects of a 
particular policy are not necessarily confined to the individuals targeted by it. In the context of 
immigrant integration policy, this means that to fully appreciate mandatory language and civic 
education requirements for immigrants, we need to evaluate their effects on immigrants as well 
as native-born Europeans. Specifically, this chapter aims to show that mandatory integration 
requirements lead to more positive attitudes toward immigrants among the host population. 
Only few studies have attempted to link immigrant integration policies and public 
attitudes toward immigration (see Section 2.4). In contrast to these studies, I argue that stricter 
integration policies – particularly mandatory language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants – lead to more positive public attitudes toward immigration. They do so directly and 
indirectly. Mandatory language and civic education requirements have a direct effect in the sense 
that their mere presence affects public attitudes toward immigrants, regardless of whether these 
requirements actually lead to improved integration outcomes. This effect works through two 
distinct and complementary mechanisms. First, research in the cultural threat tradition has long 
argued that individuals who dislike immigrants often do so because they are afraid that 
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immigration could potentially erode local customs, morals, and values (e.g. Bloom et al. 2015; 
Chandler and Tsai 2001; Fasel et al. 2013; Zarate et al. 2004). In short, these individuals perceive 
immigrants as a threat to their country’s culture and, ultimately, their own cultural identity. 
Certain immigrants are perceived as more threatening than others: the greater the cultural 
distance between the average host society member and an immigrant, the more negative the host 
society’s attitudes toward that immigrant. 
Previous research has shown that the extent of cultural distance between a host society 
and a particular immigrant is determined by a number of factors, most importantly the 
immigrant’s (in)ability to speak the host country’s language (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; 
Newman et al. 2012; Schildkraut 2005) and level of support for the host society’s core values 
and norms (Citrin and Sides 2008; Sobolewska et al. 2017). Simply put, immigrants who speak 
the local language and are familiar with their host country’s history, values, and laws are 
generally perceived as less of a threat. Based on this research, I argue that mandatory integration 
requirements can reduce perceptions of threat and lead to more positive attitudes toward 
immigrants by helping immigrants learn about the local language and culture. Whether language 
and civic education classes and tests are actually successful at integrating immigrants is only 
secondary here; more important for public attitudes toward immigrants is whether members of 
the host society believe them to be effective. From these arguments, it follows that the positive 
effect of mandatory language and civic education requirements on public attitudes toward 
immigrants should be greatest for immigrants that are culturally very distant from the host 
society, since culturally similar migrants should not pose much of a threat to begin with. 
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H10: Public attitudes toward immigrants become more positive as language and civic 
integration requirements for immigrants become more rigorous. 
 
H11a: The greater the cultural distance between a host society and an immigrant, the 
more negative public attitudes toward that immigrant. 
 
H11b: The greater the cultural distance between a host society and an immigrant, the 
greater the positive effect of language and civic education requirements on public 
attitudes toward that immigrant. 
 
 As for the second mechanism, studies have repeatedly shown that large numbers of 
native-born Europeans are opposed to immigrants accessing public assistance and welfare 
benefits (Osipovich 2015; van Oorschot 2006). Immigrants are often seen as “outsiders” and 
“newcomers” by members of the host society, and therefore as undeserving of the host society’s 
wealth they feel they worked long and hard to create (Helbling and Kriesi 2014). However, 
despite significant public opposition, most European countries (and virtually every Western 
European country) grant immigrants quite generous access to social benefits; certainly more 
generous than most host societies outside of Europe, including the United States (Horn 2016; 
Nowrasteh 2016; Porter 2015). This discrepancy between individual preferences and actual 
government policy can cause a backlash among native-born Europeans who oppose immigrants’ 
access to the welfare state, which leads to negative perceptions of the government that grants 
immigrants said access as well as the immigrants themselves (Louis et al. 2007). 
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Previous research suggests that certain immigrants are viewed as more deserving of 
receiving welfare than others, including those that are educated/highly skilled, law-abiding, and 
have paid taxes into the host society’s welfare system (Helbling and Kriesi 2014; Osipovich 
2015). In the same vein, I argue that immigrants who participate in mandatory language and 
civic education requirements are viewed as more deserving than those who do not. The reason is 
that by partaking in integration courses and tests, immigrants appear more industrious and 
committed to integrating in the host society. Mandatory integration requirements signal to the 
public that immigrants are not just “takers” but also contribute to the host society, and are 
therefore just as deserving as native-born individuals. Differently put, by introducing mandatory 
language and civic integration requirements for immigrants and communicating their existence 
effectively to the public, governments can signal the extent of immigrants’ obligations and 
responsibilities, and thereby mitigate concerns about fairness and deservingness. Therefore, the 
positive effect of mandatory language and civic education requirements on public attitudes 
toward immigrants should be greatest for countries in which immigrants have significant access 
to the welfare state, since in countries without such access there should be little concern about 
fairness and deservingness to begin with. 
 
H12a: The more generous the social benefits provided to immigrants, the more negative 
public attitudes toward immigrants. 
 
H12b: The more generous the social benefits provided to immigrants, the greater the 
positive effect of language and civic education requirements on public attitudes 
toward immigrants. 
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For language and civic education requirements to have a direct effect on an individual’s 
attitudes toward immigrants, said individual has to actually be aware of the existence of these 
requirements. Beyond the two direct mechanisms outlined above, mandatory integration 
requirements may also have an indirect effect on public attitudes toward immigrants. Previous 
research suggests that members of the host society view immigrants more positively if they are 
well integrated, that is, have high levels of employment, speak the host country’s language, etc. 
(Chandler and Tsai 2001; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Hainmueller et al. 2015). In Chapter 
4, I found that stricter language and civic education requirements for immigrants have a strong 
and positive effect on economic integration. Therefore, I argue that by increasing immigrants’ 
employment prospects and financial well-being, mandatory integration requirements indirectly 
improve public perceptions of immigrants. 
 
H13: The relationships specified in hypotheses H10, H11b, and H12b are stronger for 
individuals who are aware of their country’s integration policy. 
 
H14: Stricter language and civic education requirements for immigrants lead to more 
positive public attitudes toward immigrants by increasing immigrants’ level of 
integration. 
 
To test these hypotheses, I conduct three sets of analyses. First, I examine cross-national 
survey data provided by the ESS to test whether public attitudes toward immigrants is more 
positive in countries with stricter integration requirements (H10), and whether this effect is 
confined to individuals with knowledge of their country’s integration policy (H13). Second, I 
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analyze data from two original survey experiments in Great Britain, which allow me to test the 
same relationships as the ESS data plus the two mechanisms for the direct effect outlined in this 
section (H11a; H11b; H12a; H12b). Lastly, I revisit the ESS data as well as country-level data on 
25 EU member states between 2005 and 2014 (see Section 3.2) to test whether mandatory 
integration requirements have an indirect (H14) effect on public attitudes toward immigrants. In 
the following sections, I describe each of these analyses in greater detail. 
5.2 EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY 
5.2.1 Data and Methods 
To examine the direct effect of integration policy on individuals’ attitudes toward immigration, I 
generate a dataset using the seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted 
between 2002 and 2015. Given the purpose of this chapter as well as issues with data 
availability, I restrict the dataset to respondents who identify as native-born and reside in one of 
the 23 EU member states that regularly participate in the ESS.46 This selection process leads to a 
total of 235,577 observations, which are the unit of analysis for all subsequent models. The ESS, 
which has been used by a number of recent studies on the subject (e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox 
2007; Meuleman et al. 2009; Rustenbach 2010), contains three questions pertaining to the 
perceived impact of immigrants on their host society. Specifically, respondents are asked 
whether immigrants have a positive or negative influence on (a) the economy, (b) local culture, 
                                                 
46 For a list of these countries, see footnote 31. 
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and (c) the country in general. For each of these three questions, respondents can choose a 
number between 0 and 10, with 0 indicating an entirely negative perception of the effects of 
immigration and 10 denoting a completely positive perception. These three survey items 
constitute the dependent variables of the analyses that follow. 
The key explanatory variable are mandatory language and civic integration requirements 
for immigrants, which are again measured via CIVIX47 and MIPEX-IRS.48 As Section 2.4.1 has 
illustrated, there are numerous factors other than integration policy that can potentially influence 
individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants. Therefore, I include a number of country-level and 
individual-level controls in my models. As for the former, research suggests that public attitudes 
toward immigrants are more negative during times of economic downturn (Bohman 2011; Checa 
Olmos and Garrido 2012). I measure macroeconomic conditions via national unemployment 
rates, data on which are available through Eurostat. 
It has also been shown that certain characteristics of a country’s immigrant population 
affect its public opinion on immigration (Bohman 2011; Checa Olmos and Garrido 2012; 
Jakobsson and Blom 2014; Legewie 2013). I control for two such characteristics: the size of the 
immigrant population and its prior level of integration. In contrast to Chapter 3, the former is 
measured as the number of foreign nationals relative to the overall population rather than the 
                                                 
47 CIVIX data are available for 15 of the 23 sample countries for all seven waves of the ESS (2002-2015). 
Therefore, combining the ESS sample with CIVIX data yields 154 discrete country-years for analysis (see footnote 
33).  
48 MIPEX-IRS data are available for all 23 sample countries but only for the time period 2007-2014. As a 
result, combining the ESS sample with MIPEX-IRS data leads to 124 discrete country-years for analysis (see 
footnote 34). 
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number of foreign-born individuals relative to the overall population. The reason for this 
substitution is that data on the number of foreign-born individuals are relatively sparse prior to 
2005 (and for some countries even after), while there are no gaps in the data on the number of 
foreign nationals. The two measures are highly correlated (.950), which justifies this substitution. 
Similar to Chapter 3, prior levels of integration/integration deficits are measured via 
unemployment among immigrants. Prior levels of integration are measured via the percentage of 
immigrants at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rather than unemployment among 
immigrants, since data on the latter are unavailable for several countries prior to 2005.49 I expect 
both variables to be negatively associated with attitudes toward immigration. Data for both 
variables are retrieved from Eurostat. 
 As for the individual-level controls, previous research suggests that certain demographic 
characteristics are related to attitudes toward immigration, with females and younger individuals 
exhibiting more positive attitudes (Bohman 2011; Byrne 2011). Therefore, I include gender and 
age in my analysis, the former being a binary variable that is coded 1 for male respondents and 0 
for female ones, and the latter being a count variable that measures respondents’ age in years. 
Similarly, education and financial well-being have been shown to be positively related to 
attitudes toward immigration (Checa Olmos and Garrido 2012; Creighton and Jamal 2015; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). The former is measured via a five-point ordinal scale ranging 
from “less than lower secondary education” to “tertiary education completed”, the latter via a 
four-point ordinary scale that captures respondents’ subjective financial well-being and ranges 
from “very difficult to get by on present income” to “living comfortably on present income”. In 
addition, I control for respondents’ employment status, as individuals without a job can be 
                                                 
49 In the results section, I also report results for models with AROPE as the measure of integration deficits. 
 158 
expected to hold more negative attitudes toward immigration (Bohman 2011). Employment 
status is measured via a dummy variable which is coded 0 if a respondent was actively looking 
for employment during the last seven days and 1 otherwise. 
 Research has also shown that ideology affects attitudes toward immigration, with liberals 
being more supportive of immigration than their conservative counterparts (Knoll et al. 2011; 
Merolla et al. 2013). I measure ideology via respondents’ self-placement on an eleven-point 
scale, with 0 indicating far-left political attitudes and 10 indicating far-right ones. In addition, I 
include a measure of general trust in my models, which has been shown to be positively 
associated with attitudes toward immigrants (Hooghe and de Vroome 2015b). This variable is the 
average of three individual indices, each ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values representing 
greater levels of trust.50 It has also been suggested that political interest has a positive effect on 
individual attitudes toward immigration (Bohman 2011); this variable is measured via a four-
point ordinal scale ranging from “not at all interested” to “very interested”. Lastly, I control for 
respondents’ domicile, as individuals living in urban areas have been shown to exhibit more 
positive attitudes toward immigration than their rural counterparts, likely as a result of increased 
interactions with immigrants (Checa Olmos and Garrido 2012). This binary variable is coded 1 if 
a respondent described his/her domicile as a big city, and 0 otherwise. 
 To analyze these data, I employ the same analytical approach as in Chapter 4, that is, the 
DID specification that Imbens and Wooldridge refer to as “repeated cross sections with multiple 
time periods and multiple groups” (2009, 67-72). Again, it should be noted that a causal 
interpretation of the results of a difference-in-differences model depends crucially on the 
assumption of common trends. To examine whether this assumption holds in the context of a 
                                                 
50 For a more detailed description of these indices, see Section 4.1. 
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particular analysis, one has to inspect trends in the outcome variable (public attitudes toward 
immigrants) prior to the implementation of the policy. There are no systematic data on European 
public attitudes toward immigrants prior to 2004, though there is some evidence suggesting that 
public opinion in the 1990s and early 2000s followed divergent paths in different European 
countries (Lahav 2004). Therefore, the assumption of common trends is likely violated, which 
leads me to include country-specific linear time trends in all my models. The inclusion of 
country dummies in combination with the country-specific time trends means that the model will 
return estimates of how mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants 
affect individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants in a typical country, while adjusting for any 
country-specific trends in outcomes that preceded the change in immigrant integration policy 
(Carpenter and Dobkin 2011, 140). 
 For each of the three outcome measures, I estimate three DID models: a baseline model 
which includes the treatment variable (CIVIX or MIPEX-IRS), the country dummies, the year 
dummies, and the country-specific linear time trends; an extended model which includes all the 
variables included in the baseline model plus the country-level and individual-level controls 
described in this section; and an interaction model which includes the variables of the extended 
model plus a multiplicative term consisting of the treatment variable multiplied by political 
interest. The intuition behind estimating the interaction model is that the direct effect of 
mandatory language and civic education requirements on attitudes toward immigrants should be 
exclusive to individuals who are actually aware of the existence of said requirements. 
Unfortunately, there is no item in the ESS that would allow me to test individuals’ awareness of 
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their country’s integration policies directly, so I use political interest as a proxy;51 individuals 
with a greater interest in politics can be expected to pay closer attention to the (integration) 
policies implemented by their government. All models are estimated using robust standard errors 
clustered by country-year to account for any heteroskedasticity of observation (Beck et al. 1998). 
Additionally, all analyses are conducted using the ESS post-stratification and population size 
weights in order to maximize the representativeness of the sample (see Section 4.2). 
5.2.2 Results 
Table 48 illustrates the descriptive statistics for the 235,577 sample respondents. Interestingly, 
sample respondents are somewhat warier of immigrants’ impact on the economy (x̅ = 4.711) and 
the country in general (x̅ = 4.735) than they are of their cultural effects (x̅ = 5.471). The average 
value for CIVIX is rather low with 2.992 on a scale ranging from 0 to 9, which is due to the fact 
that at the beginning of the time period under investigation, only two countries (Austria and the 
Netherlands) had robust language and civic integration requirements for immigrants in place. 
Over time, more countries adopted stricter measures; by the early 2010s, eight of the 15 sample 
countries had a CIVIX score of 5 or higher. The mean for MIPEX-IRS is similarly low with a 
value of 29.046 on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. On average, foreign nationals account for 
almost 7% of the population. 
Prior levels of integration appear to be somewhat low, with an average immigrant 
unemployment rate of almost 12%; this is three percentage points higher than the average overall 
                                                 
51 A more accurate proxy would be respondents’ political knowledge, but the ESS does not include any 
such item. 
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unemployment rate. The sample is almost evenly divided between men and women (46.5% 
male), and the average respondent is 48 years old. The average respondent has completed upper 
secondary education (x̅ = 3.012) and is coping on his/her present income (x̅ = 2.978). In addition, 
the average respondent is ideologically moderate (x̅ = 5.095), moderately trusting (x̅ = 5.123), 
and somewhat interested in politics (x̅ = 2.357). Only 4.3% of respondents describe themselves 
as unemployed, and 39% describe their domicile as a big city. 
 
Table 48. Descriptive Statistics III 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
CIVIX 164,608 2.992 2.235 0 8.75 
MIPEX-IRS 130,134 29.046 21.578 0 78.2 
Impact economy 225,209 4.711 2.393 0 10 
Impact culture 225,530 5.471 2.505 0 10 
Impact overall 225,331 4.735 2.263 0 10 
Unemployment 235,577 8.838 3.960 3.4 26.1 
Immigrant pop. 213,848 6.894 5.122 .130 39.809 
Immi. unemploy. 236,957 11.851 4.844 4.4 35 
Age 234,616 48.131 18.664 15 95 
Male gender 235,333 .465 .499 0 1 
Education 234,328 3.012 1.337 1 5 
Income 229,922 2.978 .843 1 4 
Ideology 205,303 5.095 2.174 0 10 
Employed 235,577 .957 .202 0 1 
Social trust 235,341 5.123 1.948 0 10 
Political interest 234,955 2.357 .904 1 4 
Domicile 234,905 .188 .391 0 1 
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Table 49. Country-by-Country Means III 
Country CIVIX MIPEX-IRS 
Impact 
economy 
Impact 
culture 
Impact  
overall 
Unemployment 
Austria 3.780 42.010 5.062 5.092 4.314 5.213 
Belgium 1.079 5.375 4.486 5.663 4.555 7.876 
Cyprus  26.142 3.756 3.538 4.007 6.979 
Czech Rep.  19.788 4.033 4.244 4.114 6.976 
Denmark 6.758 50.819 5.038 5.948 5.681 5.525 
Estonia  18.339 4.659 5.156 4.422 8.784 
Finland 2.083 10 5.299 7.075 5.435 8.142 
France 3.583 58.599 4.653 5.147 4.499 9.032 
Germany 5.131 40.003 5.100 5.911 4.874 7.762 
Great Britain 4.122 47.879 4.365 4.773 4.383 6.107 
Greece 3.612 45.861 3.334 3.303 3.056 12.015 
Hungary  26.714 3.757 5.101 4.018 8.521 
Ireland 1 0 4.939 5.420 5.229 10.002 
Italy 1.809 45 4.977 5.133 4.187 8.650 
Lithuania  45.800 5.058 5.015 4.916 11.776 
Luxembourg 1  6.211 6.617 5.231 4.414 
Netherlands 4.845 68.147 4.985 6.021 5.005 5.218 
Poland  15.279 5.127 6.390 5.670 12.778 
Portugal 1.170 11.200 4.645 5.147 3.989 10.855 
Slovakia  47.800 4.216 5.073 4.478 13.781 
Slovenia  6 4.207 5.060 4.467 6.935 
Spain 2.319 32 5.120 5.775 4.875 15.784 
Sweden 0 0 5.461 7.029 6.210 7.241 
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Table 49. Country-by-Country Means III (Continued) 
Country 
Immigrant 
population 
Immigrant 
unemploy. 
Age Male gender Education Income 
Austria 10.185 9.608 45.763 .466 2.976 3.177 
Belgium 9.519 16.213 46.371 .493 3.193 3.159 
Cyprus 17.800 8.558 47.416 .471 3.007 2.782 
Czech Rep. 3.973 9.462 47.664 .483 3.160 2.606 
Denmark 5.757 10.495 48.477 .508 3.479 3.618 
Estonia 16.214 10.878 45.780 .430 3.417 2.715 
Finland 2.686 15.919 48.855 .486 3.143 3.073 
France 5.900 14.047 49.137 .462 3.073 3.128 
Germany 8.866 11.918 48.546 .503 3.461 3.137 
Great Britain 6.433 7.437 50.512 .446 2.925 3.176 
Greece 8.068 13.477 49.067 .439 2.572 2.366 
Hungary 1.646 7.137 47.958 .446 3.030 2.446 
Ireland 11.044 12.641 48.279 .456 3.003 3.053 
Italy 4.633 11.144 47.470 .478 2.552 3.014 
Lithuania .801 12.190 49.514 .386 3.372 2.587 
Luxembourg 38.585 5.908 43.891 .502 2.623 3.517 
Netherlands 4.211 8.761 50.009 .448 3.067 3.358 
Poland .194 9.499 44.139 .477 2.994 2.701 
Portugal 3.538 12.841 52.339 .401 1.891 2.512 
Slovakia 2.290 17.370 47.208 .429 3.107 2.528 
Slovenia 3.690 8.671 46.287 .461 3.097 3.215 
Spain 9.263 17.973 47.636 .488 2.519 3.052 
Sweden 5.970 13.341 47.803 .504 3.159 3.492 
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Table 49. Country-by-Country Means III (Continued) 
Country Ideology Employed Social trust Political interest Domicile 
Austria 4.706 .975 5.333 2.573 .202 
Belgium 4.986 .966 5.144 2.388 .105 
Cyprus 5.142 .959 4.170 2.241 .380 
Czech Rep. 5.295 .962 4.605 1.943 .244 
Denmark 5.413 .970 6.804 2.827 .162 
Estonia 5.439 .968 5.391 2.337 .261 
Finland 5.692 .969 6.397 2.469 .173 
France 4.863 .956 4.946 2.392 .186 
Germany 4.512 .953 5.215 2.743 .168 
Great Britain 5.064 .966 5.571 2.458 .064 
Greece 5.423 .950 3.588 2.068 .435 
Hungary 5.370 .955 4.473 2.154 .254 
Ireland 5.221 .939 5.725 2.318 .064 
Italy 4.765 .941 4.337 2.231 .112 
Lithuania 5.014 .959 4.912 2.033 .327 
Luxembourg 5.099 .988 5.178 2.454 .087 
Netherlands 5.267 .977 5.912 2.682 .191 
Poland 5.576 .942 4.100 2.272 .253 
Portugal 4.910 .944 4.183 1.984 .239 
Slovakia 4.859 .940 4.199 2.260 .161 
Slovenia 4.783 .957 4.534 2.300 .093 
Spain 4.498 .940 4.921 2.058 .204 
Sweden 5.223 .969 6.340 2.651 .121 
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Given the structure of the data, it might be informative to provide additional descriptive 
statistics for each country. Table 49 illustrates the mean value for each variable by country. One 
interesting piece of information gleaned from the table is that attitudes toward immigrants are the 
most negative in Greece, which, at first glance, might have something to do with the fact that the 
Greeks have one of the highest average unemployment rates in the sample, they feel the least 
financially secure, and they exhibit by far the lowest level of social trust. Another interesting 
pattern that emerges from the table is that the Scandinavian countries in the sample exhibit the 
highest levels of social trust; aside from Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, no other country in the 
sample has an average level of social trust greater than 6 on a scale ranging from 0 to 10. 
Tables 50 through 52 show the results of the models using CIVIX as the key independent 
variable. The tables demonstrate that in accordance with my expectations, the coefficient for 
CIVIX is generally positive but insignificant in the baseline and extended models. However, 
when CIVIX is interacted with respondents’ level of political interest, the coefficient becomes 
positive and significant for all three outcome variables. This finding suggests that stricter 
language and civic integration requirements for immigrants are associated with more positive 
attitudes toward immigrants, but only among politically interested individuals who are aware of 
the existence of these requirements. The effect is greatest for respondents’ perceptions of 
immigrants’ impact on the economy, followed by perceptions of their overall impact on the 
country, followed by their impact on the local culture. 
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Table 50. Determinants of Perceptions of Immigrants’ Economic Impact (CIVIX) 
 
Baseline Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
Full Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
Interaction Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
CIVIX 0.010 -0.012 -0.045*** 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.017) 
CIVIX * interest   0.012*** 
   (0.004) 
Political interest  0.194*** 0.149*** 
  (0.009) (0.019) 
Unemployment  -0.053*** -0.052*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) 
Immigrant population  -0.056*** -0.055*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
Immi. unemployment  0.012*** 0.011** 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Age  -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Male gender  0.118*** 0.118*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) 
Education  0.118*** 0.118*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Income  0.116*** 0.116*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
Employed  -0.062*** -0.062*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Ideology  0.091*** 0.092*** 
  (0.028) (0.029) 
Social trust  0.144*** 0.144*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
    
Domicile  0.131*** 0.131*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
Constants 
(not reported) 
   
Country dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y 
N 159,104 135,909 135,909 
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.050 0.050 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 51. Determinants of Perceptions of Immigrants’ Cultural Impact (CIVIX) 
 
Baseline Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
Full Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
Interaction Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
CIVIX 0.014 0.015 -0.006 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) 
CIVIX * interest   0.008** 
   (0.003) 
Political interest  0.178*** 0.149*** 
  (0.007) (0.014) 
Unemployment  -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.011) (0.011) 
Immigrant population  -0.014 -0.013 
  (0.017) (0.017) 
Immi. unemployment  0.005 0.005 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Age  -0.006*** -0.006*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Male gender  -0.048*** -0.049*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) 
Education  0.129*** 0.129*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Income  0.077*** 0.077*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Employed  -0.092*** -0.092*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Ideology  0.024 0.024 
  (0.028) (0.028) 
Social trust  0.140*** 0.140*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Domicile  0.128*** 0.128*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) 
Constants 
(not reported) 
   
Country dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y 
N 159,388 136,425 136,425 
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.058 0.058 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 52. Determinants of Perceptions of Immigrants’ Overall Impact (CIVIX) 
 
Baseline Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
Full Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
Interaction Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
CIVIX 0.021 0.023 -0.003 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
CIVIX * interest   0.009*** 
   (0.003) 
Political interest  0.170*** 0.136*** 
  (0.007) (0.015) 
Unemployment  -0.027*** -0.026*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) 
Immigrant population  -0.036** -0.036** 
  (0.014) (0.014) 
Immi. unemployment  0.013*** 0.012*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Age  -0.007*** -0.007*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Male gender  0.000 -0.000 
  (0.012) (0.012) 
Education  0.107*** 0.107*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Income  0.100*** 0.100*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
Employed  -0.079*** -0.079*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Ideology  0.058* 0.058* 
  (0.032) (0.032) 
Social trust  0.163*** 0.163*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Domicile  0.097*** 0.096*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) 
Constants 
(not reported) 
   
Country dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y 
N 160,216 136,645 136,645 
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.057 0.058 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Figure 4. Conditional Effect of CIVIX on Attitudes toward Immigrants (95% CIs) 
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To better illustrate the conditional effect of mandatory integration requirements on public 
attitudes toward immigrants, Figure 4 plots the predicted probabilities for perceptions of 
immigrants’ overall impact at different levels of CIVIX and political interest. Specifically, the 
upper left quadrant shows the effect of CIVIX on the probability of saying that immigrants have 
an entirely negative impact (y = 0) for respondents who are not at all interested in politics; the 
upper right quadrant shows its effect on the probability of saying that immigrants have an 
entirely positive impact (y = 10) for respondents who are not at all interested in politics; the 
lower left quadrats shows its effect on the probability of saying that immigrants have an entirely 
negative impact (y = 0) for respondents who are very interested in politics; and the lower right 
quadrant shows its effect on the probability of saying that immigrants have an entirely positive 
impact (y = 10) for respondents who are very interested in politics. 
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 The figure shows that for respondents who are not interested in politics, CIVIX has no 
significant impact on attitudes toward immigrants. At the lowest possible level of CIVIX (x = 0), 
respondents who are not at all interested in politics have a probability of .086 of saying that 
immigrants’ overall impact on the country is entirely negative (upper left quadrant). Changing 
CIVIX to its maximum value (x = 9) reduces this probability to .072. These two figures are not 
significantly different from one another, meaning they are statistically indistinguishable. The 
same pattern holds for the probability of saying that immigrants’ impact on the country is 
entirely positive (upper right quadrant). Conversely, for respondents who are very interested in 
politics, CIVIX has a positive and significant impact on attitudes toward immigrants. At the 
lowest possible level of CIVIX (x = 0), respondents who are very interested in politics have a 
probability of .042 of saying that immigrants’ overall impact on the country is entirely negative 
(lower left quadrant). Increasing CIVIX to its maximum value (x = 9) reduces this probability to 
.020. These two values are significantly different from one another, with the same pattern 
holding for the probability of saying that immigrants’ impact on the country is entirely positive 
(lower right quadrant). In sum, the graph shows that as CIVIX values increase, the likelihood of 
perceiving immigrants’ impact on the country as negative significantly decreases while the 
likelihood of perceiving it as positive significantly increases, but only among politically 
interested respondents. Assuming that political interest is a somewhat valid proxy for knowledge 
about integration policy, these results suggest that mandatory integration requirements have a 
positive effect on attitudes toward immigrants but only among individuals who are aware of their 
existence. Therefore, I consider H13 to be supported by the evidence. 
Several control variables also have a significant impact on public attitudes toward 
immigrants. In fact, with the exception of gender, all individual-level controls have a significant 
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effect in the expected direction for most of the models. Interestingly, male respondents are 
significantly more likely to perceive immigrants’ impact on the economy as positive while they 
simultaneously exhibit significantly more negative perceptions of immigrants’ cultural impact. 
As for the country-level controls, overall unemployment rates and the size of the immigrant 
population are negatively and significantly associated with two of the three outcome measures. 
Contrary to expectations, unemployment among immigrants has a positive effect on public 
attitudes toward immigrants. However, this result is driven by multicollinearity: unemployment 
among immigrants correlates strongly with the overall unemployment rate (.750); when the 
models are estimated as a bivariate specification, the relationship between integration deficits 
and public opinion disappears. Using an alternative measure of integration deficits yields similar 
results, as the coefficient for AROPE is insignificant across model specifications. Therefore, it 
appears that individuals do not consider immigrants’ prior level of integration when forming 
opinions about them. This finding casts doubt on the existence of an indirect effect of mandatory 
integration requirements on public opinion (H14), since for such an effect to exist, public 
attitudes need to be at least in part a function of immigrants’ level of integration. 
 Tables 53 through 55 replicate the previous models using MIPEX-IRS as the key 
independent variable instead of CIVIX. As with Chapters 3 and 4, MIPEX-IRS and CIVIX yield 
dissimilar results. The interaction between MIPEX-IRS and political interest is insignificant for 
all three measures of attitudes toward immigrants. Again, this is in line with Goodman’s (2015) 
finding that index-dependency is a common occurrence in research on the causes and effects of 
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immigrant integration policies.52 However, given the discussion in Section 2.1, I am more 
inclined to trust the results of the models using CIVIX as the measure of integration 
requirements for immigrants. Therefore, the findings presented in this section provide support for 
the notion that stricter language and civic integration requirements for immigrants are associated 
with more positive attitudes toward immigrants, but only among politically interested individuals 
who are aware of the existence of these requirements. In addition, these findings run counter to 
those of Schlueter et al. (2013) and Hooghe and de Vroome (2015a), who argue that more 
laissez-faire integration policies are associated with improved perceptions of immigrants. 
 
Table 53. Determinants of Perceptions of Immigrants’ Economic Impact (MIPEX-IRS) 
 
Baseline Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
Full Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
Interaction Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
MIPEX-IRS 0.001 0.004*** 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
    
MIPEX-IRS * interest   0.001 
   (0.000) 
    
Controls    
(not reported)    
    
Constants 
(not reported) 
   
Country dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y 
N 125,320 101,583 101,583 
Pseudo R2 0.011 0.054 0.054 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
                                                 
52 Again, I restrict the sample to cases common to CIVIX and MIPEX-IRS, that is, the EU-15 countries 
between 2007 and 2014. This does not lead to the results becoming more similar, which means that the divergent 
findings are caused by measurement issues rather than sample selection. 
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Table 54. Determinants of Perceptions of Immigrants’ Cultural Impact (MIPEX-IRS) 
 
Baseline Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
Full Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
Interaction Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
MIPEX-IRS 0.003* 0.003 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
    
MIPEX-IRS * interest   0.000 
   (0.000) 
    
Controls    
(not reported)    
    
Constants 
(not reported) 
   
Country dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y 
N 125,470 101,780 101,780 
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.060 0.060 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 55. Determinants of Perceptions of Immigrants’ Overall Impact (MIPEX-IRS) 
 
Baseline Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
Full Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
Interaction Model 
(Ordered Probit) 
MIPEX-IRS 0.002 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
    
MIPEX-IRS * interest   -0.000 
   (0.000) 
    
Controls    
(not reported)    
    
Constants 
(not reported) 
   
Country dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Linear time trends Y Y Y 
N 125,216 101,583 101,583 
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.057 0.057 
Robust SEs clustered by country-year shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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5.3 EVIDENCE FROM TWO SURVEY EXPERIMENTS 
The previous section has demonstrated that public opinion toward immigration is more favorable 
in countries with mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants than it is 
in countries without. This finding calls into question the results of previous studies, which 
suggest that multiculturalist policies (i.e. less restrictive integration requirements) lead to more 
positive attitudes toward immigration (Hooghe and de Vroome 2015a; Schlueter et al. 2013). In 
addition, it has important implications for the ongoing debate about the merits of mandatory 
language and civic education requirements for immigrants. To the extent that one considers 
combating anti-immigrant sentiments and improving public perceptions of immigration desirable 
goals, mandatory language and civic education requirements can perform an important and 
hitherto overlooked function. However, the evidence presented in the previous section is not 
without its limitations. While I was able to show that stricter integration requirements are 
associated with more positive public attitudes toward immigrants, the question remains why 
exactly this is the case. In other words, I am unable to test the mechanisms posited by my 
theoretical framework with existing public opinion data. 
In addition, one might question the validity of the finding presented above due to 
concerns about non-random treatment assignment. While the extensive set of control variables in 
combination with the country dummies and country-specific linear time trends takes care of a 
wide range of potential confounding factors, such concerns cannot be ruled out completely. It is 
possible that the states which have adopted stricter immigrant integration policies did so for 
reasons that are related to the outcome measure (i.e. public attitudes toward immigrants), which 
if true could potentially bias my results. Therefore, to address questions about the mechanism(s) 
as well as concerns about non-random treatment assignment, I conduct two original survey 
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experiments in the United Kingdom. Before I elaborate on the set-up and findings of each 
experiment, I provide important background information on immigration, immigrant integration, 
and integration policy in the United Kingdom. 
5.3.1 The British Context 
Like many other European countries, the United Kingdom has been a major migration 
destination since 1945. Immediately after World War II, the British government brought in 
90,000 workers from Italy through the European Voluntary Worker (EVW) scheme. An 
additional 100,000 workers, mainly from Southern Europe, migrated to Britain between 1946 
and 1951 (Castles et al. 2014, 106). Foreign workers continued to enter the United Kingdom in 
large numbers until the mid-1970s. Due to economic stagnation, immigration to the United 
Kingdom slowed down between the mid-1970s and 1990. In addition, during this time, family 
reunification replaced labor migration as the main source of migration to Britain. Beginning in 
the mid-1990s, immigrant numbers started to pick up again and have remained at relatively high 
levels since. In 1993, there were 3.2 million foreign-born individuals in the United Kingdom, 
accounting for 7% of the total population. By 2015, these figures had increased to 8.7 million 
and 13.5%, respectively (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva 2017). 
 A large portion of immigrants in the United Kingdom come from other EU member 
states. Another major source of immigration are individuals from former British colonies, 
particularly those in South Asia. In 2015, Polish immigrants represented the largest immigrant 
community in Britain, accounting for almost 10% of the foreign-born population. The next 
largest groups were immigrants from India, Pakistan, Ireland, and Germany, making up 9%, 
5.9%, 4.5%, and 3.3% of the foreign-born population, respectively (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva 
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2017). In terms of immigration status, Britain’s current foreign-born population consists 
primarily of foreign workers and individuals who entered under provisions of family 
reunification. An estimated 123,000 of the 8.7 million immigrants in 2015 were refugees. 
Despite the absence of shared land borders, irregular (“illegal”) migration has become 
increasingly a concern. Recent estimates suggest that there are about 600,000 over-stayers in the 
UK, that is, migrants who entered the country legally but overstayed their residence permit 
(Duevell and Vollmer 2014). This means that irregular migrants account for almost 7% of the 
foreign-born population in Britain. 
 Britain’s immigration and integration policy has undergone significant changes in the 
2000s. British immigration and integration law is currently governed by five major pieces of 
legislation: the Asylum and Immigration Act of 2004; the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality 
Act of 2006; the UK Border Act of 2007; the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act of 2008; and 
the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act of 2009 (Duevell and Vollmer 2014). As part of 
Britain’s current integration regime, most third-country nationals have to pass a language test 
(A1 level) in order to enter the country. Preparatory language courses are available to immigrants 
abroad who are unable to pass the test. To obtain permanent residence, third-country nationals 
have to pass another language test, this time at the level of B1. In addition, they are required to 
participate in a civic education class at the end of which there is an exam. The pass rates for 
these tests vary from year to year; the average is around 80% for the language test and 70% for 
the civics exam (Goodman 2014, 155-158). Third-country nationals who fail these tests can 
retake them after participating in the class again; only a very small portion of immigrants fail 
repeatedly which can negatively affect a potential application for citizenship later on. Once they 
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have been a resident for five years, immigrants can apply for citizenship, which requires them to 
participate in an official ceremony during which they pledge allegiance to the United Kingdom. 
 Immigrant integration has been a major concern in the United Kingdom for the past 
years. In December 2016, the British government released the “Casey Review”, a report which 
details the state of immigrant integration in the country (Ministry of Housing, Communities & 
Local Government 2016). The report finds that a significant portion of the British immigrant 
community is poorly integrated. For example, it estimates that around 760,000 immigrants 
cannot speak English well or at all; that is 8.7% of the total immigrant population. Lack of 
language skills is particularly pronounced among immigrants from Poland (25%), Bangladesh 
(22%), and Pakistan (19%). Integration deficits can be found in other areas as well, including 
employment, income, educational attainment, and crime rates. Another big difference between 
immigrants and native-born Britons, according to the Casey Review, is their values: 52% of 
Muslims in Britain think that homosexuality should be made illegal, compared to 11% among 
the rest of the population. 
 The British public has become increasingly concerned about immigration and immigrant 
integration in recent years. According to a 2016 survey by Ipsos MORI, the second largest 
market research organization in the United Kingdom, immigration is currently the biggest 
concern of the British public: 34% of Britons picked immigration as the most important issue 
facing their country, topping other important issues such as the EU, the economy, and 
international terrorism (Blinder and Allen 2016). Since the 1990s, a majority of the British public 
(> 50%) has consistently been of the opinion that migration to Britain should be reduced, rather 
than increased or kept at its current level. Interestingly (and somewhat surprisingly), Britons are 
almost as concerned about immigration from other EU member states as they are about 
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immigration from countries outside of Europe. This distinguishes Britain from a number of other 
European countries where concerns about immigration from third countries are much greater 
than those about intra-EU migration (Blinder and Allen 2016). Concerns about immigration 
played a major role in the British referendum of 2016, in which 52% of votes were cast in favor 
of leaving the European Union. Gietel-Basten (2016) points out that immigration was featured 
prominently in the leave campaign, which served to exacerbate fears about immigration among 
the British public. Similarly, analyzing public opinion data, Hobolt (2016) finds that opposition 
to immigration is one of the strongest predictors of voting “leave” in the referendum. 
 In many ways, the United Kingdom is representative of general migration and integration 
trends in Europe. First, Britain’s immigrant population consists to almost equal parts of third-
country nationals and migrants from other EU member states. Second, the United Kingdom has 
been having issues with persistent integration deficits. Third, Britain has implemented stricter 
language and civic education requirements for immigrants during the 2000s. Fourth, public 
attitudes toward immigration and immigrants have been relatively negative for quite some time. 
In addition, the fact that the official language in the United Kingdom is English makes it very 
accessible to Western researchers. As a result, much of the existing case study research on 
immigrant integration and integration policy has been using Great Britain as a case (e.g. 
Goodman 2014; Green 2007; van Oers 2013). Therefore, I consider the United Kingdom an ideal 
case for implementing my survey experiments. 
5.3.2 Experiment #1: YouGov 
To implement my first survey experiment I hired YouGov, an international Internet-based 
market research firm. YouGov administered the survey online to a representative sample of 
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1,651 British adults in March of 2017.53 Table 56 shows the basic set-up of this experiment. 
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of eight experimental groups. Respondents in each 
group were presented with a hypothetical scenario including a particular group of immigrants 
and type of integration policy, and were then asked about their level of support for admitting said 
immigrants. Put differently, there are two treatments, the first being the origins of the immigrants 
(Europe vs. Middle East) and the second being the type of integration policy (no policy vs. 
language requirements vs. civic requirements vs. language and civic requirements). A template 
of the experimental items is provided below, and the detailed question wording for each 
experimental group is available in Appendix B. 
 
Table 56. Set-up of YouGov Survey Experiment 
 European Immigrants Middle Eastern Immigrants 
No Mention of Policy 1A 1B 
Mention of Language 2A 2B 
Mention of Civic 3A 3B 
Mention of Language + Civic 4A 4B 
 
“There are several possible immigration laws being discussed. Imagine a policy proposal 
stating that immigrants coming to the United Kingdom will have similar access to social 
benefits and public services as other residents of the United Kingdom. [No policy / 
Language / Civic / Language + Civic]. With this policy in mind, to what extent do you 
think the United Kingdom should allow immigrants from [other European / Middle 
Eastern] countries to come and live here? 
0 Allow no immigrants from [other European / Middle Eastern] countries. 
1 Allow some immigrants from [other European / Middle Eastern] countries. 
2 Allow many immigrants from [other European / Middle Eastern] countries.” 
 
                                                 
53 For a more detailed description of YouGov’s survey methodology, see Twyman (2008) and the official 
website of YouGov UK (https://yougov.co.uk/find-solutions/omnibus/gb-and-uk-ond/). 
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 To test whether randomization was successful (i.e. whether treatment and control groups 
are balanced), I examine balance measures for five important respondent characteristics: political 
interest, age, gender, social class, and political ideology. Political interest is measured via a 4-
point ordinal scale ranging from “not at all interested” to “very interested”. Age is measured via 
a continuous variable capturing the number of years since a respondent was born. Gender is 
measured via a dummy variable coded 1 for male respondents and 0 for females. Social class is 
captured via respondents’ social grade. A social grade is a socio-economic classification 
produced by the British Office for National Statistics (ONS), which places individuals into one 
of four categories based on their level of education, income, and type of profession. Therefore, 
class is a 4-point ordinal scale, with higher values representing greater social status. Lastly, 
political ideology is measured via a dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who voted “leave” 
in the British referendum of 2016 (“Brexit”) and 0 for those who voted “remain”. For each of 
these five covariates, I examine two balance measures: the weighted difference in means and the 
weighted variance ratio. Table 57 reports these balance measures for the policy treatment (any 
integration requirement vs. no requirement) as well as the immigrant origin treatment (Middle 
Eastern immigrants vs. European immigrants). Since all five covariates exhibit differences in 
means close to 0 and variance ratios close to 1, the sample appears to be well balanced. 
 
Table 57. Covariate Balance Summary (YouGov) 
 Policy Treatment Immigrant Origin Treatment 
 
Difference in 
Means 
Variance Ratio 
Difference in 
Means 
Variance Ratio 
Pol. interest -.002 1.121 .000 .938 
Age .004 1.006 -.000 .950 
Male gender -.003 .999 .000 1.000 
Social class .001 1.057 -.000 1.033 
Pol. ideology -.001 1.000 -.000 1.000 
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 This survey experiment allows me to test the first mechanism outlined in Section 5.1. 
According to cultural threat theory, the greater the cultural distance between a host society and 
an immigrant, the more negative the host society’s attitudes toward that immigrant. I have argued 
that mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants can improve public 
perceptions of immigrants by teaching immigrants about the local language, customs, and laws. 
This, presumably, makes immigrants culturally more similar to the host society, and therefore 
makes them appear less “threatening”. If this argument is correct, I would expect mandatory 
language and civic education requirements for immigrants to have a relatively modest effect on 
respondents’ attitudes toward admitting immigrants from other European countries. The reason is 
that European immigrants are already relatively similar to Britons in terms of culture; therefore, 
there is no cultural threat which mandatory integration requirements could mitigate to begin 
with. Conversely, mentioning immigrants from the Middle East is supposed to invoke feelings of 
cultural threat; therefore, the positive impact of mandatory integration requirements on public 
attitudes toward said immigrants is supposedly greater for this group. 
 Figure 5 shows the average response to the question how many immigrants the United 
Kingdom should admit.54 In this figure, European and Middle Eastern immigrants are pooled. In 
addition, the three different policy types (language; civic; language + civic) are pooled into a 
single group, which allows me to test the effect of any type of integration requirements on public 
attitudes relative to no requirements at all. The mean value for the baseline group (no policy) is 
.828, meaning that the average respondent supports admitting “some” immigrants rather than 
                                                 
54 Note that while the outcome variable ranges from 0 to 2 (1-point increments), for illustrative purposes the 
y-axis of the graph only ranges from 0 to 1 (.2-point increments). 
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“none” or “many”.55 With a value of .841, the value for the pooled treatment group is only 
slightly higher. The difference between the two values is statistically insignificant, meaning that 
integration policy has no discernable effect on attitudes toward immigrants in the pooled sample. 
 
Figure 5. Mean Values (YouGov) 
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Figure 6 splits the sample into respondents who received the “European immigrants” 
condition and those who received the “Middle Eastern immigrants” condition. The mean for the 
“European immigrants, no policy” condition is .958. When integration requirements are 
introduced, the average level of support for admitting immigrants from other European countries 
actually decreases slightly (x̅ = .936), but this difference is statistically insignificant. The average 
                                                 
55 All analyses are conducted using the weighting scheme provided by YouGov. 
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level of support for admitting immigrants from Middle Eastern countries is .676 in the “no 
policy” condition and .736 in the “policy” condition. The difference between these two groups is 
statistically insignificant, meaning that mandatory integration requirements have no effect on 
attitudes toward immigrants regardless of whether the immigrants in question are from Europe or 
the Middle East. The average level of support for admitting immigrants from Europe is 
significantly greater than the mean level of support for admitting immigrants from Middle 
Eastern countries in both policy conditions. This finding is in line with the predictions of cultural 
threat theory and provides support for H11a. 
 
Figure 6. Mean Values by Immigrant Origin (YouGov) 
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Figure 7 further disaggregates the sample, showing the mean levels of support for 
admitting immigrants for all eight experimental groups. Across all four policy scenarios, 
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respondents exhibit significantly (p < .05) greater support for admitting immigrants from other 
European countries than from the Middle East, which provides additional support for H11a. For 
immigrants from Europe, support is highest in the “civic” condition, followed by “no policy”, 
“language + civic”, and “language”. It seems counterintuitive that support for admitting 
immigrants from Europe is greater when they are not required to participate in language courses, 
though it should be noted that none of these differences reach conventional levels of 
significance. Support for admitting immigrants from the Middle East is higher when they have to 
partake in integration requirements (particularly civic education courses), but again, these 
differences are not statistically significant. 
 
Figure 7. Mean Values by Experimental Group (YouGov) 
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Table 58. Differences between Mean Values (YouGov) 
 Means 
Differences 
between Means 
Difference in 
Differences 
Europe, no policy (1A) .958 -.087 
(2A – 1A) 
.149* 
((2B – 1B) –  
(2A – 1A)) 
Europe, language (2A) .871 
Middle East, no policy (1B) .676 .062 
(2B – 1B) Middle East, language (2B) .738 
Europe, no policy (1A) .958 .043 
(3A – 1A) 
.038 
((3B – 1B) –  
(3A – 1A)) 
Europe, civic (3A) 1.001 
Middle East, no policy (1B) .676 .081 
(2B – 1B) Middle East, civic (3B) .757 
Europe, no policy (1A) .958 -.016 
(4A – 1A) 
.053 
((4B – 1B) –  
(4A – 1A)) 
Europe, lang. + civic (4A) .942 
Middle East, no policy (1B) .676 .037 
(4B – 1B) Middle East, lang. + civic (4B) .713 
 
 Table 58 illustrates the differences between the mean values for the various experimental 
groups, and whether these differences are statistically significant.56 For both immigrant origins, 
the mentioning of any integration policy scenario does not significantly change respondents’ 
level of support for admitting immigrants. All three policy conditions (language; civic; language 
+ civic) increase respondents’ willingness to admit immigrants from the Middle East, but none of 
these effects reach conventional levels of significance. Interestingly, the effect of civic education 
requirements on respondents’ level of support is greater than that of language requirements 
(although the difference between the two effects is statistically insignificant), which indicates 
that immigrants’ familiarity with the local history, laws, and culture might matter slightly more 
for public opinion than their ability to speak the host society’s language. In accordance with my 
theoretical expectations, the positive effect of integration policy on support for admitting 
                                                 
56 These differences and their significance levels are calculated by regressing the experimental outcome on 
a set of dummy variables, one for each experimental group, and then using the lincom command in Stata v.15 to 
compute point estimates and p-values for linear combinations of regression coefficients. 
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immigrants is greater when the immigrants in question are from the Middle East as opposed to 
Europe, though this difference is only statistically significant in the “language” condition (p < 
.10). Overall, then, these findings are in line with the predictions of H11a, but provide only 
partial support for H11b and no significant support for H10.  
 To further investigate these results, I conduct three multiple regression analyses. In the 
first model, I regress the experimental outcome on a policy dummy (coded 0 for no policy; 1 for 
language, civic, and language + civic), an immigrant origin dummy (coded 0 for Europe; 1 for 
the Middle East), and the interaction of both dummies. In the second model, I include the five 
covariates previously mentioned (political interest, age, gender, social class, and political 
ideology). In the third model, I interact respondents’ level of political interest with the policy and 
immigrant origin dummies. This is done to avoid a situation in which politically interested 
individuals, who presumably have knowledge of Britain’s actual integration requirements, ignore 
the prime in the “no policy” condition. In other words, politically interested respondents in the 
control condition might overreport their support for admitting immigrants because they know 
these immigrants will have to partake in mandatory integration requirements. If this were the 
case, it would artificially diminish the effect of the treatment and bias my results downward.  
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Table 59. Multiple Regression Analysis of YouGov Experiment (OLS) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Interaction Model 
Integration policy -0.022 0.044 -0.214 
 (0.051) (0.045) (0.199) 
    
Middle East -0.282*** -0.249*** -0.709*** 
 (0.061) (0.055) (0.227) 
    
Policy * Middle East 0.082 0.038 0.537** 
 (0.072) (0.064) (0.256) 
    
Political interest  0.099*** 0.015 
  (0.019) (0.061) 
    
Policy * interest   0.092 
   (0.067) 
    
Middle East * interest   0.165** 
   (0.079) 
    
Policy * Mid East * interest   -0.179** 
   (0.089) 
    
Age  -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Male gender  -0.024 -0.025 
  (0.028) (0.028) 
    
Social grade  0.039*** 0.038*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) 
    
Brexit vote  -0.472*** -0.474*** 
  (0.030) (0.030) 
    
Constant 0.958*** 1.597*** 1.843*** 
 (0.043) (0.101) (0.201) 
N 1,651 1,456 1,456 
R2 0.035 0.281 0.284 
Standard errors shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 59 shows the results for the three multiple regression analyses. The baseline model 
replicates the bar graphs shown in Figure 6. The coefficient of the constant is equal to the mean 
for the “European immigrants, no policy” condition, which is .958. When integration 
requirements are introduced, the average level of support for admitting immigrants from other 
European countries actually decreases by .022 points, but this difference is statistically 
insignificant. Compared to the baseline condition (European immigrants, no policy), the average 
level of support for admitting immigrants from Middle Eastern countries is significantly lower 
(.282 points). The full model introduces the five control variables, which do not meaningfully 
alter the results of the baseline model. Looking at the effects of the control variables themselves, 
social grade is positively and significantly associated with the outcome, meaning that individuals 
in higher social classes are more supportive of admitting immigrants to the UK. Age has a 
negative but small effect, while the coefficient for the Brexit vote variable is negative and fairly 
large (almost half a point on a scale ranging from 0 to 2). This finding supports scholars who 
argue that anti-immigrant sentiments played a pivotal role in the British referendum of 2016 
(Gietel-Basten 2016; Hobolt 2016). 
Regarding the interaction model, the negative coefficient for the three-way interaction 
between political interest, the policy treatment, and the immigrant origin treatment suggests that 
lower levels of political interest are in fact associated with a greater positive effect of the policy 
treatment on respondents’ level of support for admitting immigrants from the Middle East. This 
provides additional support for H11b. To further illustrate the conditional effect of the policy 
treatment, Figure 8 plots the marginal effects of the policy treatment at different levels of 
political interest and the policy origin treatment. The figure shows that for immigrants from 
Europe the marginal effect of the policy increases with political interest (i.e. awareness of the 
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UK’s actual integration requirements), whereas for immigrants from the Middle East the 
opposite is the case. While the confidence intervals are fairly wide and overlap, this finding is in 
line with my expectation that the positive effect on the policy treatment is greatest among 
politically uninterested individuals who likely have little to no knowledge of Britain’s actual 
integration requirements. In addition, this positive effect is confined to immigrants from the 
Middle East, which supports my argument that mandatory integration requirements are 
particularly effective at improving public attitudes toward immigrants when the immigrants in 
question are generally perceived as culturally distant (H11b). 
 
Figure 8. Conditional Effect of Policy Treatment (95% CIs) 
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5.3.3 Experiment #2: British Election Studies 
My second survey experiment was implemented as an add-on to the 11th wave of the British 
Election Study (BES) between April and May of 2017; it was administered online to a 
representative sample of 7,732 British adults.57 Table 60 illustrates the basic set-up of this 
experiment. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of five experimental groups, including 
four treatment groups and one control group. Respondents in each group were presented with a 
hypothetical scenario involving different policy proposals, and were then asked about their level 
of support for said proposal. These scenarios varied across two dimensions: (a) whether 
mandatory language and civic education requirements for immigrants were mentioned or not, 
and (b) whether immigrants were described as having full or limited access to social benefits and 
public assistance. A template of the experimental items is provided below, and the detailed 
question wording for each experimental group is available in Appendix B.58 
 
Table 60. Set-up of BES Survey Experiment 
 Full Access to Benefits Limited Access to Benefits 
No Mention of Policy 1C 1D 
Mention of Policy 2C 2D 
 
                                                 
57 For a more detailed description of the BES, see Scarbrough (2000) and the official website of the British 
Election Study (http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/faqs/#.WdaQ-bpFxPY). 
58 In addition to the experimental items, the 11th wave of the BES includes a wealth of other variables. A 
detailed description of the BES survey questions and variables is available in the official codebook 
(http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/custom/uploads/2017/07/Bes_wave13Documentation_V1.0.pdf). 
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“Imagine a policy proposal stating that the United Kingdom will admit an additional 
10,000 immigrants from Syria next year. These immigrants will have [full access to 
benefits / limited access to benefits]. [No mention of policy / mention of policy.] To 
what extent would you support such a proposal? 
0 I fully oppose it. 
1 I somewhat oppose it. 
2 I neither oppose nor support it. 
3 I somewhat support it. 
4 I fully support it.” 
 
As with the previous experiment, I test whether randomization was successful, that is, 
whether treatment and control groups are balanced. I examine balance measures for five 
important respondent characteristics: political knowledge, age, gender, education, and political 
ideology. To measure respondents’ political knowledge, the BES includes five true-or-false 
questions about Britain’s political system. For every respondent, I generate a variable which 
counts the number of questions answered correctly; therefore, the resulting variable ranges from 
0 to 5, with higher values representing greater political knowledge. Age is measured via a 
continuous variable capturing the number of years since a respondent was born. Gender is 
measured via a dummy variable coded 1 for male respondents and 0 for females. Education is 
captured by a 6-point ordinal scale ranging from “no qualifications” to “postgraduate education 
completed”. Lastly, to measure political ideology, I use respondents’ self-placement on a scale 
ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values representing a more conservative ideology. For each of 
these five covariates, I again examine the weighted difference in means and the weighted 
variance ratio. Table 61 reports these balance measures for the policy treatment (integration 
requirements vs. no requirements) as well as the welfare treatment (limited access vs. full 
access). As with the previous experiment, all five covariates exhibit differences in means close to 
0 and variance ratios close to 1, which means that the sample is balanced. 
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Table 61. Covariate Balance Summary (BES) 
 Policy Treatment Welfare Treatment 
 
Difference in 
Means 
Variance Ratio 
Difference in 
Means 
Variance Ratio 
Pol. knowledge -.000 1.040 .001 1.000 
Age .000 1.009 .000 1.030 
Male gender -.000 1.000 .001 1.000 
Education -.000 .977 -.000 .937 
Pol. ideology .001 .956 .000 1.009 
 
 This survey experiment is intended to test the second mechanism posited by my 
theoretical framework. I have argued that negative perceptions of immigrants can arise when 
individuals’ ideas of distributive and procedural fairness are violated. Members of the host 
society may consider immigrants as “outsiders” and “newcomers”, and thus as underserving of 
the host society’s wealth they feel they worked long and hard to create. Therefore, when 
members of the host society are under the impression that their government is providing 
immigrants with generous rights and benefits without asking much in return, it will prompt a 
negative reaction toward said immigrants. Mandatory language and civic education requirements 
are a way for governments to signal the extent of immigrants’ obligations and responsibilities, 
thereby mitigating concerns about distributive and procedural fairness. If this argument is 
correct, I would expect mandatory language and civic integration requirements to have a 
relatively small effect on respondents’ attitudes toward admitting immigrants when these 
immigrants are explicitly denied full access to public assistance. The reason is that under such 
circumstances, distributive and procedural fairness should not be of great concern. Conversely, 
describing immigrants as having full access to the welfare state should invoke a negative 
response in respondents, and therefore open the door for a positive effect of mandatory 
integration requirements. 
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 Figure 9 shows the mean level of support for admitting 10,000 additional Syrian 
immigrants.59 In this figure, the two welfare conditions are pooled which allows me to examine 
the overall impact of the policy treatment regardless of immigrants’ level of access to the welfare 
state. The mean level of support for admitting 10,000 additional Syrian immigrants in the 
baseline group is 1.644 on a scale ranging from 0 to 4.60 Telling respondents that these 
immigrants will be required to participate in language and civic education classes raises the 
average level of support to 1.934. The difference between these two values is statistically 
significant, which means that mandatory language and civic education requirements have a 
positive effect on attitudes toward immigrants. This finding provides support for H10. 
 
Figure 9. Mean Values (BES) 
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59 Note that while the outcome variable ranges from 0 to 4 (1-point increments), for illustrative purposes the 
y-axis of the graph only ranges from 0 to 2 (.5-point increments). 
60 All analyses are conducted using the updated BES weighting schema (variable wt_new_W11). 
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Figure 10 disaggregates the sample, showing mean levels of support by experimental 
group. The mean level of support in the control group is 1.577. Substantively, this means that the 
average response in the control group lies between being somewhat opposed to and feeling 
neutral about admitting an additional 10,000 Syrian immigrants to the United Kingdom. The 
average level of support in treatment group 1C (no mention of policy, full access to benefits) is 
1.569 and statistically indistinguishable from the mean of the control group. The average levels 
of support in treatment groups 1D (no mention policy, limited access to benefits), 2C (mention of 
policy, full access to benefits), and 2D (mention of policy, limited access to benefits) are 1.792, 
1.787, and 2.080, respectively, with all three being significantly (p < .01) higher than the mean of 
the control group. Two important observations follow from this. First, limiting immigrants’ 
access to public assistance and mentioning that immigrants are required to enroll in language and 
civic education classes increases respondents’ willingness to admit them at similar rates. Second, 
as expected, support for the policy proposal is by far the highest in the experimental condition 
where immigrants are both limited in their access to the welfare state and subject to mandatory 
integration requirements. 
Table 62 illustrates the differences between the mean values for the various experimental 
groups, and whether these differences are statistically significant.61 The table shows that 
regardless of whether immigrants are described as having limited or full access to public 
assistance, mentioning mandatory language and civic integration requirements significantly 
increases respondents’ support for admitting additional immigrants from Syria. However, 
                                                 
61 These differences and their significance levels are calculated by regressing the experimental outcome on 
a set of dummy variables, one for each experimental group, and then using the lincom command in Stata v.15 to 
compute point estimates and p-values for linear combinations of regression coefficients. 
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contrary to expectations, the increase is greater in the “limited access” condition (.289) than it is 
in the “full access” condition (.218), although the difference between these two differences is 
insignificant. According to my theoretical framework, the positive effect of mandatory language 
and civic education classes for immigrants should have been greater in the “full access” 
condition, since distributive and procedural fairness should be of greater concern here. 
Therefore, while these findings support both H10 and H12a, they do not provide support for the 
second mechanism outlined in the theory section (H12b). 
 
Figure 10. Mean Values by Experimental Group (BES) 
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Table 62. Differences between Mean Values (BES) 
 Means 
Differences 
between Means 
Difference in 
Differences 
No policy, limited access (1D) 1.792 .289*** 
(2D – 1D) 
-.071 
((2C – 1C) –  
(2D – 1D)) 
Policy, limited access (2D) 2.080 
No policy, full access (1C) 1.569 .218*** 
(2C – 1C) Policy, full access (2C) 1.787 
 
 To further investigate these results, I conduct three multiple regression analyses. In the 
first model, I regress the experimental outcome on a policy dummy (coded 0 for treatment 
groups 1C and 1D as well as the control group; 1 for treatment groups 2C and 2D), a welfare 
dummy (coded 1 for treatment groups 1D and 2D, 0 for treatment groups 1C and 2C as well as 
the control group), and the interaction of both dummies. In the second model, I include the five 
covariates previously mentioned (political knowledge, age, gender, education, and political 
ideology). In the third model, I interact respondents’ level of political knowledge with the policy 
and welfare dummies. This is done to avoid a situation in which politically knowledgeable 
individuals, who presumably are aware of Britain’s actual integration requirements and welfare 
provisions for immigrants, ignore the respective primes, which if true would bias my results. 
Table 63 shows the results for the three multiple regression analyses. The coefficient for the 
three-way interaction term between political knowledge, the policy treatment, and the welfare 
treatment is statistically insignificant, meaning that H12b is not supported by the evidence even 
if respondents’ level of political knowledge is accounted for. 
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Table 63. Multiple Regression Analysis of BES Experiment (OLS) 
 Baseline Model Full Model Interaction Model 
Integration policy 0.214*** 0.192*** 0.106 
 (0.055) (0.064) (0.248) 
    
Limited welfare access 0.219*** 0.211*** 0.199 
 (0.052) (0.058) (0.229) 
    
Policy * welfare 0.075 0.080 0.179 
 (0.081) (0.094) (0.366) 
    
Political knowledge  0.148*** 0.142*** 
  (0.026) (0.037) 
    
Policy * knowledge   0.023 
   (0.058) 
    
Welfare * knowledge   0.003 
   (0.055) 
    
Policy * welfare * knowledge   -0.026 
   (0.087) 
    
Age  -0.015*** -0.015*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
    
Male gender  -0.250*** -0.249*** 
  (0.049) (0.049) 
    
Education  0.139*** 0.139*** 
  (0.019) (0.020) 
    
Political ideology  -0.181*** -0.181*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) 
    
Constant 1.572*** 2.494*** 2.514*** 
 (0.030) (0.117) (0.155) 
N 7,732 5,250 5,250 
R2 0.019 0.211 0.211 
Standard errors shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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5.4 DOES INTEGRATION AFFECT PUBLIC OPINION? 
Thus far, the results obtained throughout this dissertation have been relatively consistent (with 
the exception of the issue of index-dependency, of course). My analyses of country-level data 
(Chapter 3) and cross-national survey data (Chapter 4) both suggest that mandatory language and 
civic education requirements have a positive effect on immigrants’ level of economic integration 
but no impact on other dimensions of immigrant integration. The share of the foreign-born 
population at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) was not significantly associated with 
CIVIX or MIPEX-IRS in any of the models in Chapter 3. Similarly, Chapter 4 showed that 
mandatory integration requirements have no significant impact on measures of social integration 
(social trust; Western values) and political integration (institutional trust; political interest). In 
addition, with the exception of the survey experiment implemented by YouGov, the various 
pieces of evidence presented throughout this chapter indicate that these requirements positively 
affect public attitudes toward immigrants. 
 However, when it comes to the effect of immigrants’ level of integration/integration 
deficits on public attitudes toward immigrants, the results from Chapters 3 and 5 seem to 
somewhat contradict each other. In Chapter 3, I found that unemployment among immigrants is 
negatively and somewhat strongly correlated (-.382) with public opinion on immigration. In 
contrast, the analyses in the previous section suggest that unemployment among immigrants is 
not significantly associated with individual attitudes toward immigrants. To further explore the 
potential effect of integration deficits on public opinion and, by extension, the possibility of an 
indirect effect of mandatory integration requirements on attitudes toward immigrants, I first 
revisit the country-level data used in Chapter 3. Specifically, I estimate a series of bivariate 
regression models with public opinion as the dependent variable and the difference between the 
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immigrant and native-born unemployment rate as the predictor.62 As a reminder, public opinion 
is measured via the Eurobarometer item “What do you think are the most important issues facing 
your country at the moment?”. Higher percentages of respondents who answer the question with 
“migration” are taken to represent greater public concern about immigrant integration. Since the 
Eurobarometer surveys are conducted twice a year, I average the two to obtain a yearly value. 
 
Table 64. Determinants of Public Opinion 
 
             Model 1 
               (RE) 
         Model 2 
           (FE) 
       Model 3 
        (LDV) 
Difference unemployment -0.629 -0.808 -0.066 
 (0.543) (0.596) (0.094) 
    
Lagged DV   0.945*** 
   (0.051) 
    
Year dummies    
(not reported)    
    
Constant 15.373*** 16.621*** 3.036** 
 (4.199) (3.615) (1.173) 
N 211 211 211 
Within R2 .185 .187  
Between R2 .095 .094  
(Overall) R2 .001 .000 .788 
Rho .730 .763  
Robust SEs clustered by country shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
 
                                                 
62 I use the difference in unemployment rates rather than the immigrant unemployment rate itself, as the 
latter correlates strongly with the overall unemployment rate (.873) while the former does not (.197). Since 
macroeconomic conditions – which include the overall unemployment rate – are themselves a significant predictor 
of attitudes toward immigrants, this high correlation value is potentially problematic in that the immigrant 
unemployment rate may capture macroeconomic conditions rather than the concept it is supposed to capture, that is, 
integration deficits. 
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 Table 64 shows the results for three bivariate models: a random effects model, a fixed 
effects model, and an LDV model with an AR(1) specification. All three models include dummy 
variables for each year to absorb any atypical year-to-year variation. Across all models, the 
difference in unemployment rates has a negative but insignificant effect on public opinion. I 
conduct two sets of robustness checks to ensure that this null finding is consistent across 
different model specifications. First, using two different measures of integration deficits, namely 
the share of the foreign-born population AROPE as well as the difference between the share of 
the foreign-born population AROPE and the share of the native-born population AROPE, I find 
that immigrants’ prior level of integration does not significantly impact public attitudes toward 
immigrants. Second, I run the same three models with public opinion as the outcome but with 
two predictors, unemployment among immigrants and the overall unemployment rate. The 
coefficient for the former is consistently insignificant, while the latter is negatively and 
significantly associated with public opinion across models. Taken together, these findings 
strongly suggest the absence of a systematic relationship between integration deficits and public 
attitudes toward immigrants. 
 Similarly, my analyses in Section 5.2 have shown that in bivariate DID models, both the 
unemployment rate among immigrants as well as the share of the foreign-born population 
AROPE are not significantly related to individual attitudes toward immigrants. Using the 
difference in unemployment rates and AROPE shares between foreign-born and native-born 
individuals also yields consistently insignificant results. Therefore, upon closer inspection, the 
results from Chapters 3 and 5 are actually consistent: both sets of evidence suggest that public 
opinion is not a function of immigrants’ previous level of integration. Since the various models 
discussed here yield a consistently insignificant effect, it is unnecessary to estimate more 
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complex (and demanding) mediation models to test H14; instead, the absence of an effect of 
integration deficits on public opinion lead me consider H14 unsupported by the evidence. 
5.5 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, I have argued that mandatory language and civic integration requirements for 
immigrants directly and positively affect public attitudes toward immigrants, because (1) 
immigrants are perceived as less of a “threat” when they speak the local language and are 
familiar with local history, laws, and culture, and (2) these requirements are a way for 
governments to signal the extent of immigrants’ obligations and responsibilities and thereby 
mitigate concerns about fairness and deservingness. To test these arguments, I examined survey 
data provided by the ESS and found that public attitudes toward immigrants are more favorable 
in countries with more stringent language and civic education requirements, particularly among 
those individuals who are most likely to be aware of the existence of these policies. In addition, I 
analyzed evidence from two original survey experiments in the United Kingdom, the first 
conducted by YouGov in March of 2017 and the second administered as part of the BES in 
April-May of the same year. The former provides only limited support, the latter strong support 
for the notion that individuals are more supportive of immigration and immigrants when they are 
told that immigrants are subject to mandatory language and civic education requirements. 
These findings have three important implications. First, they call into question the results 
of previous studies which argued that laissez-faire integration policies reduce anti-immigrant 
prejudice (Hooghe and de Vroome 2015a; Schlueter et al. 2013). Second, these results 
demonstrate the importance of variables at the country-level on public attitudes toward 
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immigrants, factors that are often ignored in favor of individual characteristics of the host society 
members and the immigrant population (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Future research is 
well-advised to pay more attention to these kinds of variables. Further examination of the 
relationship between welfare policies for immigrants and public opinion promises to be a 
particularly fruitful endeavor in this context. 
Third, policymakers interested in combating anti-immigrant prejudice should consider the 
adoption or tightening of mandatory integration requirements for immigrants, particularly as an 
emerging body of research has been pointing to other benefits of these requirements as well (see 
Chapter 4). Countries which already have adopted such requirements are well-advised to expend 
more effort publicizing them. While there is no systematic data that would allow me to ascertain 
the exact level of knowledge about integration policies among native-born Europeans, an 
interviewee who works in the research division of the German Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees (see Section 4.4) argued that the German government – like most European 
governments – does a poor job at spreading information about its integration policies. The 
interviewee also suggested that most Germans do not know about their country’s integration 
requirements for immigrants, and that publicizing these requirements could be a way to combat 
anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany. 
 While the general notion that public attitudes toward immigrants are more positive in 
countries with mandatory integration requirements for immigrants was mostly borne out by the 
evidence, support for the two mechanisms behind this relationship was somewhat weaker. The 
survey experiment conducted by YouGov showed that Britons are much more supportive of 
immigrants from other European countries than of those from the Middle East, which is in line 
with the predictions of cultural threat theory. Interacting the treatment with political interest to 
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account for the possibility that prior knowledge about the UK’s actual integration policies might 
cause respondents to ignore the prime, I find that the presence of mandatory integration 
requirements increases support for Middle Eastern immigrants at significantly higher rates than it 
does for European immigrants. This finding provides support for my argument that mandatory 
language and civic education requirements improve public perceptions of immigrants by 
reducing the cultural distance between immigrants and the host population, and therefore are an 
effective way to make European publics more supportive of immigrant groups that are otherwise 
often perceived as culturally distant and threatening. 
Similarly, the survey experiment administered as part of the BES illustrated that 
respondents are much more supportive of immigrants when they are denied full access to the 
welfare state. However, contrary to expectations, the positive effect of mandatory integration 
requirements on attitudes toward immigrants is strong regardless of whether immigrants are 
described as having full or only limited access. Therefore, there is no support for H13b. This 
raises the question why this particular mechanism was not borne out by the evidence. One reason 
might be that compared to other Western European countries, third-country nationals in the 
United Kingdom only have limited access to social and employment protection (Wilkinson and 
Craig 2012). This could lead to overall low concerns among Britons about immigrant 
deservingness and distributive justice. Another reason might be that by describing the 
immigrants as Syrian, the experimental item evoked feelings of racial animosity and/or cultural 
threat, which in turn washes out the effect of the welfare prime. Further examination of this 
mechanism in a European country where immigrants have greater access to public assistance 
using a slightly modified survey experiment promises to be an interesting and important avenue 
for future research. 
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Lastly, I have posited that mandatory integration requirements indirectly lead to more 
positive public attitudes toward immigrants by increasing immigrants’ level of integration. 
However, analyzing two different sets of data, I find no evidence for the presence of such an 
indirect effect. For such an indirect effect to be present, two conditions must be met: first, 
mandatory integration requirements have to positively and significantly affect immigrants’ level 
of integration; second, immigrants’ level of integration has to positively and significantly affect 
public attitudes toward immigrants. While the first link in this causal chain is consistently 
supported by the evidence presented throughout this dissertation, the latter is not. In short, 
integration deficits are not a significant predictor of public attitudes toward immigrants. While 
these findings do not provide support for H14, they are interesting in their own right. European 
publics do not seem to be swayed by objective immigration conditions in their country, such as 
immigrants’ prior level of integration. Rather, the results from the various sets of evidence 
analyzed in this chapter suggest that public attitudes toward immigrants are a function of a 
diverse set of factors including a country’s integration policy and macroeconomic performance, 
immigrants’ origin (regardless of how well/poorly integrated they might be) and access to the 
welfare state, and certain characteristics of the individual respondent. 
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6.0  WAYS FORWARD IN THE STUDY OF INTEGRATION POLICY 
In this dissertation, I examined both the determinants and the consequences of mandatory 
language and civic education requirements for immigrants in Europe. As for the determinants, I 
formulated nine hypotheses and tested them against two sets of data: a sample of 15 EU member 
states between 2005 and 2014 (CIVIX) and a sample of 25 EU member states between 2007 and 
2014 (MIPEX-IRS). Using various alternative model specifications, I found that the results vary 
considerably across three dimensions: analytical approach (random effects model vs. LDV 
model), dependent variable (CIVIX vs. MIPEX-IRS), and measure of immigrant integration 
(unemployment vs. AROPE). This finding is consistent with recent research on methodological 
issues in integration research, which argues that what scholars know about the causes and effects 
of integration policy is subject to data and sample selection (Goodman 2015, 1; see also 
Goodman 2012b). 
 However, despite this lack of robustness across model specifications, four important 
inferences can be (cautiously) drawn from my analyses of the determinants of mandatory 
integration requirements. First, they suggest that government ideology and public opinion are 
only weakly associated with mandatory integration requirements, thereby calling into question 
conventional wisdom in integration research (Akkerman 2012; Bale 2008; Facchini and Mayda 
2010; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Hix and Noury 2007; Howard 2010). Second, the only variable 
significantly affecting language and civic education requirements for immigrants across all 
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model specifications is past policy, which suggests that immigrant integration policy is highly 
path-dependent. One promising avenue for future research would be to explore the mechanism(s) 
behind this path dependency, that is, why exactly this type of integration policy is so stable. This 
policy lock could be the result of national identity considerations, institutional routines and 
memory, or something else entirely. Third, though not entirely robust to alternative model 
specifications, learning appears to have a positive and significant effect on the adoption of 
stricter integration requirements for immigrants. This finding indicates that EU member states’ 
integration requirements are partly a function of the policies of their peers, particularly those that 
are relatively successful at integrating their immigrant communities. 
Fourth, one of the more consistent relationships uncovered Chapter 3 is that between 
unemployment among immigrants and mandatory language and civic education requirements for 
immigrants. Using a methodological approach that mitigates endogeneity issues, I found that the 
causal arrow runs from immigrant integration requirements to immigrants’ level of integration, 
not the other way around. This finding has three important implications. First, the results of 
studies which argued that integration requirements are determined by integration deficits but did 
not account for this reverse causality are likely spurious. Second, the fact that governments do 
not take objective immigration conditions such as integration deficits into consideration casts 
doubt on the suitability of technocratic approaches for explaining variation in immigrant 
integration requirements. Third, this finding is important in that it suggests that mandatory 
language and civic education requirements for immigrants work, that is, they lead to improved 
integration outcomes but only in the realm of economic integration. Unemployment among 
immigrants, both by itself and relative to unemployment among the native-born population, is 
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quite consistently associated with the intensity of a country’s integration requirements while 
measures that get more at the concept of social integration (AROPE) are not. 
Overall, then, immigrant integration requirements appear to be highly stable phenomena 
that are largely impervious to fluctuations in government ideology or public opinion. Once 
countries begin to follow a certain policy trajectory, they rarely stray from the course. Sweden, 
Ireland, and Portugal have all had conservative parties in government at some point during the 
past two decades, yet these countries have entirely resisted the trend toward stricter integration 
requirements. Conversely, France, Greece, and the United Kingdom all had left-leaning 
governments for part of the past 20 years, yet there has not been a single major reversal of these 
countries’ language and civic education requirements for immigrants. It appears that a break 
from previous policy requires a major event such as increasing efforts by the EU to harmonize 
the integration policies of its member states since 2004. 
 In the second empirical chapter, I examined the effect of mandatory language and civic 
education requirements for immigrants on several outcome measures of immigrant integration 
using cross-national survey data provided by the ESS. My findings suggest that these 
requirements are inconsequential, at least in the short term, for immigrants’ levels of political 
interest, institutional trust, and social trust as well as the degree to which they have adopted 
Western values (proxied by tolerance of homosexuals). However, mandatory integration 
requirements do appear to have a positive impact on immigrants’ employment prospects and 
their financial well-being. Evidence from 23 original, open-ended interviews suggests that this 
relationship is due to mandatory integration requirements being effective at helping immigrants 
acquire the host country’s language, which in turn enables them to find (better) jobs. Though not 
entirely robust to alternative model specifications, these findings suggest that policymakers 
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seeking to achieve better economic outcomes for their immigrant communities are well-advised 
to adopt stricter integration requirements, particularly those aiming at language acquisition. At 
the very least, my results cast doubt on previous studies which suggest that mandatory 
integration requirements are detrimental to immigrant integration (e.g. Boecker and Strik 2011; 
Van Oers 2013), since not a single negative effect was found. 
 The third and final empirical chapter explored the effects of mandatory language and 
civic education requirements for immigrants on public attitudes toward immigrants using three 
different sets of evidence: cross-national survey data provided by the ESS; two original survey 
experiments conducted in the United Kingdom in 2017; and country-level data on 25 Western 
European countries between 2007 and 2014. I find that mandatory language and civic education 
requirements have a direct and positive effect on public attitudes toward immigrants. This effect 
is direct in the sense that the mere presence of mandatory integration requirements has a positive 
impact on public opinion, regardless of their potential impact on immigrants’ level of integration. 
Trough the survey experiments, I was able to explore two potential mechanisms behind this 
effect. I found that mandatory integration requirements are particularly effective at improving 
attitudes toward immigrants who are culturally distant, which I take to mean that the direct effect 
described above is due to language and civic education requirements mitigating perceptions of 
cultural threat. The second mechanism I posited, that mandatory integration requirements 
ameliorate concerns about deservingness and fairness in host societies where immigrants have 
relatively generous access to social assistance, was not supported by the evidence. 
I argued that in addition to their direct impact, mandatory integration requirements 
indirectly affect public attitudes toward immigrants by improving immigrants’ level of 
integration, since well-integrated immigrants should be perceived more positively by members of 
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the host society. However, I did not find any evidence for the presence of such an indirect effect 
due to immigrants’ prior level of integration not having a significant impact on public opinion. 
Rather than being driven by such objective immigration conditions, public opinion is a complex 
function of a country’s macroeconomic performance, immigrants’ race/religion and access to the 
welfare state, and certain characteristics of the individual respondent. Based on these findings, 
governments could potentially improve public attitudes toward immigrants by restricting their 
access to the welfare state, though this course of action seems politically impractical63 and 
morally questionable (e.g. Guiraudon 2002). My survey experiments suggest that requiring 
immigrants to enroll in language and civics classes increases support for immigrants at virtually 
the same rate as cutting their social benefits, which makes them a viable option for combating 
anti-immigrant sentiment. 
In conclusion, the results presented throughout this dissertation make a compelling case 
for the adoption of stricter language and civic education requirements for immigrants. My 
findings suggest that mandatory integration requirements not only improve economic integration 
and well-being among immigrants but also positively affect public attitudes toward immigrants. 
Governments in countries where such requirements already exist are well-advised to do a better 
job at publicizing them, as this would be an effective way to mitigate anti-immigrant sentiments. 
While these are two important and, from a normative standpoint, welcome effects, current 
language and civic education requirements for immigrants in Europe are far from perfect. My 
results suggest that mandatory integration requirements have no impact on immigrants’ level of 
social and political integration, despite a substantial amount of resources being expended on 
                                                 
63 For example, in Germany, immigrants’ access to a certain level of public assistance is enshrined in the 
constitution, and changing this constitutional provision would require an unrealistically large political coalition. 
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civic education courses and tests. Therefore, policymakers may want to consider modifying these 
requirements. Future research could aid such modification processes by further examining the 
reasons behind the null effect of current integration requirements on immigrants’ level of social 
and political integration, for example by comparing the content and pedagogical approaches of 
civic education curricula across countries and time. 
Aside from the directions for future research previously mentioned throughout this 
dissertation, there are several additional research avenues that are worth pursuing. First, terrorist 
attacks by immigrants and ethnic minorities have been a significant source of concern for 
European policymakers and publics alike (see Rotella 2016), and as such may be an important 
determinant of mandatory integration requirements. A second research avenue that seems 
promising in this context is to look at the effects of mandatory integration requirements on 
immigrants who were not required to participate in them, particularly second-generation 
immigrants. It could very well be that language and civic education requirements have spillover 
effects on these immigrants, for example through social contacts with immigrants who did 
participate in them. Third, once mandatory integration requirements will have existed for a 
longer time, it will be possible to examine their long-term effects and distinguish them from 
short-term effects, which is something that was not possible in this dissertation. Fourth, an 
important area for future research is the relationship between mandatory language and civic 
education requirements and other types of immigrant integration policy such as anti-
discrimination, access to healthcare, and labor market mobility. It is possible that the adoption of 
stricter integration requirements is made more or less likely by the presence of certain other 
types of integration policy, and/or that the effectiveness of mandatory integration requirements is 
tied to other immigrant integration policies. 
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 How do my results connect with previous research on immigrant integration and 
integration policy? One important connection is that this dissertation casts doubts on the 
conclusions of several previous studies on the subject, particularly those who found that party 
ideology and public opinion drive policy adoption (e.g. Akkerman 2012; Bale 2008), that 
mandatory integration requirements are detrimental to successful integration (Boecker and Strik 
2011; Van Oers 2013), and that laissez-faire integration policies lead to more positive attitudes 
toward immigrants (Hooghe and de Vroome 2015a; Schlueter et al. 2013). In addition, this 
dissertation confirms some of the general methodological issues in integration research that 
scholars have recently started to point out. In accordance with the remarks by Goodman (2015), I 
found that some of my findings were “index-dependent”, i.e. they were sensitive to different 
measures of mandatory integration requirements. In addition, what we currently know about 
immigrant integration seems to partly depend on the methods we choose and how we measure 
integration. Particularly, my findings suggest that economic integration and other dimensions of 
integration might be fundamentally different, which is something future research should consider 
when examining the causes and/or effects of immigrant integration. 
 For integration researchers, it will be important to continue and intensify methodological 
discussions about how to measure integration, which factors should serve as outcome measures 
and which as determinants/antecedents of integration, and what a standard set of controls should 
look like. Finding common ground on these issues would greatly propel the field of integration 
research forward, as the current multiplicity of models, operationalizations, and outcome 
measures makes it very difficult to compare results across studies and establish a generally 
agreed upon body of knowledge. Another important task for immigrant integration researchers 
will be to expand the data coverage of existing integration policy indices both temporally and 
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spatially, particularly to countries outside of Western Europe and the EU. Doing so will allow us 
to conduct more precise tests of theories and hypotheses pertaining to the relationship between 
supranational actors and processes on the one hand and immigrant integration policy on the 
other. Some of these efforts are already underway; for example, a recent study by Dumbrava 
(2007) attempted to expand the Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) to 16 Eastern European states. 
 Immigrant integration will most likely remain an important topic for the foreseeable 
future. Recent events such as the 2015 European migrant crisis and the subsequent attempts by 
European governments to integrate hundreds of thousands of refugees into their societies will 
only increase the demand for quality scholarship on this subject. The overarching goal of my 
dissertation was to use novel perspectives, quality data, and advanced methods in order to 
provide more robust and nuanced answers about the origins and effects of mandatory integration 
requirements than previous studies. Hopefully, these answers will contribute to the ongoing 
scholarly endeavor of determining the “optimal” integration policy, that is, the kind of policy that 
produces the best possible outcome for Europe’s host societies as well as the immigrants 
themselves. 
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APPENDIX A 
SUBJECT RECRUITMENT AND INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The interviews were conducted in December of 2016. Before the interviews were conducted, I 
obtained approval from the University of Pittsburgh’s Institutional Review Board (study number 
PRO16100462). I then proceeded to identify suitable subjects for recruitment, that is, 
practitioners of and experts on immigrant integration policy in Germany. As for the former, the 
German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees provides a list on its website that identifies 
all private organizations licensed to carry out integration courses (Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees 2016). From this list, I randomly chose 150 organizations and sent them a request 
for an interview; of these organizations, 18 were willing to participate. As for the experts, I 
interviewed two tenured faculty at German universities who work on migration and migration 
policy, one policy advisor for a major political party, one employee in the research division of 
the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, and one legal expert who advises 
individuals on matters of asylum, residency, and citizenship. These five subjects were selected 
based on Google searches for experts on integration policy in Germany or commonly known 
third parties. Therefore, I conducted a total of 23 interviews, 18 with practitioners and five with 
experts. 
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When the subjects were contacted in early December of 2016, they were given the option 
to conduct the interview via Skype or via email. In addition, subjects located in Berlin were 
given the option for an in-person interview. Three of the interviews were conducted in person, 
five via Skype, and 15 via email. The interviews (as well as all prior correspondences) were 
conducted in German; since I am fluent in German, no translator was required. At the beginning 
of each interview, the subjects were presented with a standard script which informed them of the 
purpose of the research, assured them of the anonymity of their responses, etc. Each respondent 
was then presented with a series of open-ended questions, 15 for the practitioners and between 
seven and 14 for the experts (all practitioners received the same questionnaire; the experts 
received individual questionnaires tailor-made for each professional context). For the interviews 
that were conducted via Skype or in person, extensive notes were taken during the interview. At 
the end of each interview, these notes were read back to the respondent to make sure that I had 
captured the essence of his or her answers correctly. The questions that were given to the 
practitioners are available in this appendix (English translation), and the anonymized transcripts 
for all 23 interviews can be requested from the author. 
The following 15 questions were asked of all practitioners: 
Question 1: Please state the name of your employer and your job title. 
Question 2: How long have you been employed in this capacity? 
Question 3: What kinds of integration courses are being offered by your organization (language, 
civics, etc.)? 
Question 4: How long has your organization been offering these courses? 
Question 5: Approximately how many migrants participate in your integration courses each 
year? 
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Question 6: What can you tell me about the demographics of the migrants who participate in 
your integration courses? For example: How old are they on average? Are they mostly male or 
female? What are their countries of origin? Most importantly: How educated are they, and how 
willing to integrate are they generally? 
Question 7: Did the demographic make-up of your course participants change significantly over 
the past years, or did it remain mostly the same? In your experience, are today’s migrants more 
willing to integrate than, say, ten years ago, or did only little change in this respect? 
Question 8: Can you give me a detailed description of how your integration courses are executed 
in practice? For example: How long do they last (half a year, a year, etc.)? How many hours per 
week? What are the qualifications of your teachers, and how are they picked? 
Question 9: Did the execution of your integration courses change in certain respects over the 
past years? Or have they always been executed in more or less the same way? If the execution 
changed, what were the reasons for this change? 
Question 10: How is the effectivity of your integration courses evaluated? Internally, externally, 
both, or neither? Did previous evaluations lead to changes in your integration courses? 
Question 11: What happens to the course participants once the integration courses are over? Do 
they have to take certain tests, for example language tests? What happens to migrants who fail to 
pass these tests? Are they potentially ordered to leave? And can you tell me what percentage of 
your course participants fail to pass these tests? 
Question 12: In your experience, how well are your course participants doing on the job market? 
Do they generally find jobs, and do you know whether they are satisfied with these jobs? 
Question 13: Which organization do you have to answer to regarding your integration courses? 
How would you describe your relationship with this organization? 
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Question 14: In your opinion, is Germany’s current approach to integrating migrants successful? 
In other words, do the mandatory integration courses and tests achieve their desired outcomes? 
Based on your experiences, what would you do differently? 
Question 15: If possible, please write down the contact information of other organizations and 
individuals that would also be able and willing to answer these questions. 
 217 
APPENDIX B 
SURVEY EXPERIMENTS 
YouGov Survey Experiment 
 
GROUP 1A: NO POLICY, EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS 
There are several possible immigration laws being discussed. Imagine a policy proposal stating 
that immigrants coming to the United Kingdom will have similar access to social benefits and 
public services as other residents of the United Kingdom. With this policy in mind, to what 
extent do you think the United Kingdom should allow immigrants from other European countries 
to come and live here? 
(0) Allow no immigrants from European countries. 
(1) Allow some immigrants from European countries. 
(2) Allow many immigrants from European countries. 
 218 
GROUP 2A: NO POLICY, MIDDLE EASTERN IMMIGRANTS 
There are several possible immigration laws being discussed. Imagine a policy proposal stating 
that immigrants coming to the United Kingdom will have similar access to social benefits and 
public services as other residents of the United Kingdom. With this policy in mind, to what 
extent do you think the United Kingdom should allow immigrants from Middle Eastern countries 
to come and live here? 
(0) Allow no immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. 
(1) Allow some immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. 
(2) Allow many immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. 
 
GROUP 1B: LANGUAGE, EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS 
There are several possible immigration laws being discussed. Imagine a policy proposal stating 
that immigrants coming to the United Kingdom will have similar access to social benefits and 
public services as other residents of the United Kingdom. At the same time, these immigrants 
will be required to attend mandatory language classes to help them learn English. With this 
policy in mind, to what extent do you think the United Kingdom should allow immigrants from 
other European countries to come and live here? 
(0) Allow no immigrants from European countries. 
(1) Allow some immigrants from European countries. 
(2) Allow many immigrants from European countries. 
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GROUP 2B: LANGUAGE, MIDDLE EASTERN IMMIGRANTS 
There are several possible immigration laws being discussed. Imagine a policy proposal stating 
that immigrants coming to the United Kingdom will have similar access to social benefits and 
public services as other residents of the United Kingdom. At the same time, these immigrants 
will be required to attend mandatory language classes to help them learn English. With this 
policy in mind, to what extent do you think the United Kingdom should allow immigrants from 
Middle Eastern countries to come and live here? 
(0) Allow no immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. 
(1) Allow some immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. 
(2) Allow many immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. 
 
GROUP 3A: CIVIC, EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS 
There are several possible immigration laws being discussed. Imagine a policy proposal stating 
that immigrants coming to the United Kingdom will have similar access to social benefits and 
public services as other residents of the United Kingdom. At the same time, these immigrants 
will be required to attend mandatory civic education classes to familiarize them with British 
history, laws, and culture. With this policy in mind, to what extent do you think the United 
Kingdom should allow immigrants from other European countries to come and live here? 
(0) Allow no immigrants from European countries. 
(1) Allow some immigrants from European countries. 
(2) Allow many immigrants from European countries. 
 220 
GROUP 3B: CIVIC, MIDDLE EASTERN IMMIGRANTS 
There are several possible immigration laws being discussed. Imagine a policy proposal stating 
that immigrants coming to the United Kingdom will have similar access to social benefits and 
public services as other residents of the United Kingdom. At the same time, these immigrants 
will be required to attend mandatory civic education classes to familiarize them with British 
history, laws, and culture. With this policy in mind, to what extent do you think the United 
Kingdom should allow immigrants from Middle Eastern countries to come and live here? 
(0) Allow no immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. 
(1) Allow some immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. 
(2) Allow many immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. 
 
GROUP 4A: LANGUAGE + CIVIC, EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS 
There are several possible immigration laws being discussed. Imagine a policy proposal stating 
that immigrants coming to the United Kingdom will have similar access to social benefits and 
public services as other residents of the United Kingdom. At the same time, these immigrants 
will be required to attend mandatory language classes to help them learn English. They will also 
be required to attend mandatory civic education classes to familiarize them with British history, 
laws, and culture. With this policy in mind, to what extent do you think the United Kingdom 
should allow immigrants from other European countries to come and live here? 
(0) Allow no immigrants from European countries. 
(1) Allow some immigrants from European countries. 
(2) Allow many immigrants from European countries. 
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GROUP 4B: LANGUAGE + CIVIC, MIDDLE EASTERN IMMIGRANTS 
There are several possible immigration laws being discussed. Imagine a policy proposal stating 
that immigrants coming to the United Kingdom will have similar access to social benefits and 
public services as other residents of the United Kingdom. At the same time, these immigrants 
will be required to attend mandatory language classes to help them learn English. They will also 
be required to attend mandatory civic education classes to familiarize them with British history, 
laws, and culture. With this policy in mind, to what extent do you think the United Kingdom 
should allow immigrants from Middle Eastern countries to come and live here? 
(0) Allow no immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. 
(1) Allow some immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. 
(2) Allow many immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. 
 
BES Survey Experiment 
 
CONTROL GROUP 
Imagine a policy proposal stating that the United Kingdom will admit an additional 10,000 
immigrants from Syria next year. To what extent would you support such a proposal? 
(0) I fully oppose it. 
(1) I somewhat oppose it. 
(2) I neither oppose nor support it. 
(3) I somewhat support it. 
(4) I fully support it. 
 
 222 
GROUP 1C: NO MENTION OF POLICY, FULL ACCESS TO BENEFITS 
Imagine a policy proposal stating that the United Kingdom will admit an additional 10,000 
immigrants from Syria next year. These immigrants will have similar access to social benefits 
and public services as British citizens. To what extent would you support such a proposal? 
(0) I fully oppose it. 
(1) I somewhat oppose it. 
(2) I neither oppose nor support it. 
(3) I somewhat support it. 
(4) I fully support it. 
 
GROUP 1D: NO MENTION OF POLICY, LIMITED ACCESS TO BENEFITS 
Imagine a policy proposal stating that the United Kingdom will admit an additional 10,000 
immigrants from Syria next year. These immigrants will only have limited access to social 
benefits and public services. To what extent would you support such a proposal? 
(0) I fully oppose it. 
(1) I somewhat oppose it. 
(2) I neither oppose nor support it. 
(3) I somewhat support it. 
(4) I fully support it. 
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GROUP 2C: MENTION OF POLICY, FULL ACCESS TO BENEFITS 
Imagine a policy proposal stating that the United Kingdom will admit an additional 10,000 
immigrants from Syria next year. These immigrants will have similar access to social benefits 
and public services as British citizens. In addition, they will be required to enrol [sic] in language 
and civic education classes. To what extent would you support such a proposal? 
(0) I fully oppose it. 
(1) I somewhat oppose it. 
(2) I neither oppose nor support it. 
(3) I somewhat support it. 
(4) I fully support it. 
 
GROUP 2D: MENTION OF POLICY, LIMITED ACCESS TO BENEFITS 
Imagine a policy proposal stating that the United Kingdom will admit an additional 10,000 
immigrants from Syria next year. These immigrants will only have limited access to social 
benefits and public services. In addition, they will be required to enrol [sic] in language and civic 
education classes. To what extent would you support such a proposal? 
(0) I fully oppose it. 
(1) I somewhat oppose it. 
(2) I neither oppose nor support it. 
(3) I somewhat support it. 
(4) I fully support it. 
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